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Introduction 
It is a central tenet of American corporate law that the board of directors 
of a corporation is entitled to manage and direct the business and affairs of 
the company. Shareholders have distinctly more limited powers within the 
corporation: they can sell their shares, vote them where allowed, or sue the 
company and its management to enforce its officers and directors’ fiduciary 
duties.1 While suing and selling are important topics worthy of scholarly 
attention, this article focuses on shareholder voting rights.  
As a routine matter, shareholders vote on a significant number of issues. 
For example, statutory, state corporate law requires that they vote annually 
to elect all, or at least a significant portion, of the members of the board of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: 
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18 
(1999). 
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directors. A second major area for shareholder voting pertains to 
management and directors proposals, such as votes to approve a merger or 
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation, or a proposed 
amendment to the corporate charter. In more limited circumstances, 
shareholders have the right to place proposals on the corporate ballot using 
Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Exchange Act, as well as the right to initiate bylaw 
amendments that are consistent with state law limitations.  
In this article, we conduct an extensive review of empirical studies 
concerned with the most important areas for shareholder voting: elections 
of directors and management proposals.2 We seek to inform the reader 
about which topics have been well-studied and which areas still require 
further investigation. Part I examines the various theories that have been 
proposed to explain the existence of shareholder voting at corporations. Part 
II looks at the evidence surrounding proxy contests for corporate control 
and whether it serves to discipline management or just provide a target for 
opportunistic investors. Part III looks at uncontested director elections and 
whether they have a meaningful role in keeping management accountable to 
shareholders. Part IV examines management proposals to understand which 
proposals play a meaningful role in corporate governance. We conclude 
with a brief summary and recommendations for future lines of potential 
research. 
I. Theory of Corporate Voting 
What are the theoretical justifications for giving the shareholders voting 
rights?3 Easterbrook and Fischel advance one of the first formal analyses of 
this question.4 In their highly influential book, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law, they characterize shareholders as “gap fillers” in the 
incomplete contract that is the corporation.5 The shareholders hold the 
residual interest in the corporation, and therefore have “the appropriate 
incentive[] . . . to make discretionary decisions. . . . The shareholders 
                                                                                                                 
 2. There is a related, recent survey that covers research on shareholder proposals and 
some other selected areas of shareholder voting. See Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty Years 
of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017). 
 3. For a discussion on the theory of corporate voting, see Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. 
Edelman, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting at U.S. Public Companies, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 459 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas 
eds., 2015).  
 4. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 63-65 (1991).  
 5. See id. at 21-22.  
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receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. 
They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion.”6 In other 
words, shareholders have the right to exercise discretion through their 
voting rights because they have the claim on the residual value of the firm. 
For practical reasons, they can choose to delegate those voting rights to the 
board of the corporation, but “managers exercise authority at the sufferance 
of investors.”7 Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory is subject to a number of 
critiques, which one of the authors has explored elsewhere but will not be 
repeated here.8  
A second theoretical argument justifying shareholder voting can be 
derived from Berle and Means’ observation that in the modern corporation, 
there is generally a separation of ownership and control.9 Jensen and 
Meckling build on this point to argue that there is a principal-agent 
relationship between the shareholders of the corporation and the board of 
directors.10 In any principal-agent relationship, the agent will be tempted to 
try to extract private benefits, while the principal will take actions to 
minimize these costs.11 In the corporate setting, shareholders can engage in 
monitoring as well as adjusting the price they charge for capital.12 
Monitoring activities include shareholder voting, which shareholders will 
use if it is cost effective to do so.13 This model has also been subjected to 
various criticisms.14 
More recently, Edelman and Thomas have proposed an alternative 
justification for shareholder voting.15 They note that shareholders are the 
only corporate stakeholders whose only certainty of obtaining returns on 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at 68.  
 7. Id. at 67.  
 8. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 460; see also Paul H. Edelman et al., 
Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1371-72 
(2014) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting].  
 9. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1932).  
 10. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976). 
 11. Id. at 309-10.  
 12. Id. at 312-13.  
 13. See id.  
 14. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 460-64. For one thing, there is little evidence 
that the law requires boards to act on the shareholder’s behalf. See Margaret M. Blair, 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 214-23 (1995); see also Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting, supra note 8, at 1372-
74. 
 15. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 462. 
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their investment is tied directly to stock price changes.16 In other words, 
shareholders can only be sure of getting any return on their stock by selling 
it “at market price to realize a capital gain (or loss).”17 The other forms of 
returns they may receive—dividends or other payments from the 
company—are not guaranteed but are subject to the board of directors’ 
discretion.18 By contrast, the other corporate stakeholders generally know 
what their returns will be, such as interest payments to creditors, subject to 
the enterprise’s financial viability.19 
If the corporation’s stock price is positively correlated with the residual 
value of the firm and stock markets are given sufficient information about a 
public firm’s value so that its residual value accurately reflects their share 
price, then shareholders are the single corporate stakeholders whose return 
depends on both the firm’s residual value and the stock market’s accurate 
functioning.20 Hence, shareholders can use the vote “to ensure that the 
residual value of the firm is maximized” (which therefore maximizes stock 
price).21  
For example, shareholders “use the monitoring function of the vote” to 
remove boards that fail in maximizing share price by removing them in 
proxy contests.22 When management proposes a value-decreasing merger, 
shareholders may use the vote to reject it or to force the acquirer to make a 
better offer.23 Less dramatically, hedge funds may use the vote as part of a 
campaign to gain representation on the corporation’s board of directors and 
place pressure on the board to realize the full value of the stock.24 More 
generally, the vote provides shareholders with a method of monitoring the 
board to ensure it protects their interests.25  
Assuming that one can establish the legitimacy of shareholder voting 
rights using one of these theories, historically shareholders have been 
reluctant to exercise the vote vigorously.26 The explanation for this 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. at 462-63.  
 19. Id. at 463.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. For an extensive discussion of the legal rules and regulations affecting proxy 
contests for corporate control, see RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & 
EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed. 1998). 
 23. See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 463.  
 24. See id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. See id. at 474-75.  
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behavior generally focuses on the costs of voting.27 Shareholders 
individually bear all the costs of voting, such as gathering information, 
preparing solicitation materials, distributing those materials, and soliciting 
support; yet, their successes benefit all of the shareholders.28 In other 
words, there is a collective action problem: how can individual shareholders 
be incentivized to actually engage in monitoring activities?29 Of course, 
there are a variety of ways to reduce these costs, such as using third-party 
voting advisors or permitted electronic proxies.30 But even reduced costs 
will only be incurred if the benefits of voting to the share price are likely to 
exceed them.31 
In recent years, activist shareholders have been more willing to incur the 
costs of voting and seek to gain representation on, and even control of, 
corporate boards.32 Their aggressive use of the vote has brought proxy 
contests and voting on management proposals, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, to the forefront.33 New regulatory developments have spurred 
the growth of third-party voting advisors and mandatory voting by pension 
funds and other institutional investors.34 These developments underscore 
the importance of understanding corporate voting today and highlight the 
need for a review of the academic literature concerning shareholder voting. 
II. Proxy Contests for Corporate Control 
In 1950, the first activist shareholders succeeded in gaining board 
representation at a public company through a proxy contest.35 It happened 
at the Sparks-Withington Company, a New York Stock Exchange listed 
company that manufactured radio and television parts.36 A shareholder and 
accountant, John Smith, submitted a full slate of directors seeking to correct 
the company’s poor profits, nonexistent dividend, and inefficient 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 468, 472.  
 28. Id. at 468.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: 
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 475-76 (2008). 
 31. See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 469.  
 32. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008). 
 33. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting, supra note 8, at 1408-13. 
 34. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 474-75.  
 35. Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Further Insight into More Effective 
Stockholder Participation: The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429, 430, 
432-33 (1953) [hereinafter Emerson & Latcham, Further Insight]. 
 36. Id. at 431-32. 
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management.37 The contest quickly turned into an all-out mudslinging 
battle.38 In a proxy statement, Smith asked shareholders if they could live 
on a dime of dividends.39 The company’s directors responded by holding 
cocktail parties for shareholders and offered shareholders radio and 
television sets at reduced prices.40 Each side shot accusations at the other.41 
Smith accused the directors of engaging in self-dealing with other 
companies owned by family members.42 The directors accused Smith of 
acting only out of self-interest, and they claimed his aim was to replace the 
company’s auditing firm with his own, Smith & Skutt.43 Management used 
company funds to employ a proxy solicitation firm, Georgeson & Co.44 
Smith used his second-hand Beechcraft Bonanza airplane to travel across 
the Midwest and rally other shareholders.45 When the dust settled, Smith’s 
Protest Committee won control of the board of directors by a margin of 2% 
of shares.46 It was the first successful challenge to a NYSE-listed 
company’s incumbent management by a grass-roots shareholder 
committee.47  
Proxy contests’ importance declined when the tender offer, a faster 
mechanism for bringing about a change-of-control transaction, became 
more popular in the 1970s.48 During this time, hostile bidders were able to 
overcome a variety of management defensive tactics to gain control of 
publicly traded U.S. firms.49 The tender offer’s popularity peaked in the late 
1980s50 and began a rapid decline in the wake of the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Time/Warner litigation.51 Time/Warner and 
subsequent Delaware case law upheld target companies’ “Just Say No” 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 432. 
 38. Id. at 433. 
 39. Id. at 441. Specifically, Smith asked, “Can you live on a dime a year? In dividends, 
we mean.” Id. 
 40. Id. at 438-39.  
 41. Id. at 441. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 432, 443. 
 44. Id. at 445. 
 45. Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder 
Sovereignty, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 397 (1953) [hereinafter Emerson & Latcham, 
Shareholder Sovereignty]. 
 46. See Emerson & Latcham, Further Insight, supra note 35, at 451 n.93. 
 47. Id. at 429-30. 
 48. THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 22, § 1.01[B]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Del. 1989).  
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defenses.52 This pushed bidders to bring joint tender offers and proxy 
contests where they would offer to buy the company if the target firm’s 
shareholders would vote to turn out the incumbent board and allow the 
bidder to redeem the target firm’s poison pill.53 
Since the early 2000s, an important new player has emerged in corporate 
voting: the activist hedge fund.54 These investors typically purchase stakes 
of 5% to 10% of the target company’s stock and then push to bring about 
changes in the firm. Their strategies often lead them to seek seats on the 
target firm’s board of directors, either through a short slate proxy contest or 
by a negotiated agreement with the incumbent board.55 They are the most 
frequent sponsors of proxy contests: during the period 2003–2012, they 
sponsored 70% of all such contests, most of which were non-control 
contests where activists seek to influence or replace existing management, 
rather than to run the company.56 While hedge fund activists have been 
carefully studied in the empirical literature, few papers have focused on 
their involvement in corporate voting contests.  
Part A below summarizes the existing body of empirical research on 
proxy contests for corporate control. This work largely analyzes contests 
that occurred before hedge fund activism became significant. The first 
thirteen subsections draw on these earlier studies, while the next subsection 
focuses on the newer research that examines hedge fund activism. The final 
subsection summarizes the overall results and gives an overview of their 
important points. Part B examines the determinants of the outcome in proxy 
contests for corporate control. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 52. Eduardo Gallardo, Poison Pills Revisited, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Feb. 18, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/02/18/poison-pills-
revisited/#4 (“[C]ommentators have suggested that the current state of Delaware law allows 
a target board to “just say no” to an inadequately priced tender offer by enacting a 
shareholder rights plan, effectively stopping shareholders from tendering their shares at the 
board’s discretion.”). 
 53. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 22, § 1.01[B].  
 54. Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial 
Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES 101, 101 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007). 
 55. Vyacheslav Fos, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests, 63 MGMT. SCI. 655, 
656 (2017). 
 56. Id. 
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A. The Impact of Contested Elections of Directors on Shareholder Value 
Researchers have tried to distinguish between two competing theories on 
how the proxy contest fits within corporate governance.57 The first theory 
views proxy contests as a mechanism of corporate governance that 
increases shareholder value by replacing or disciplining management.58 The 
second theory views proxy contests as a destructive competition between 
business tycoons that wastes shareholder wealth.59 Distinguishing between 
these theories requires investigating the identity and power of the dissidents 
challenging the management incumbents, the conditions that lead to proxy 
contests, and their impact on shareholders’ wealth.60  
1. Dissident Stock Ownership 
Looking at proxy contests in the early 1950s, Emerson and Latcham 
discover that dissidents own on average between 7% and 8% of the target 
company.61 These results suggest that dissidents are motivated by the 
success of the company, rather than the private benefits of control.62 Instead 
of being surprise raiders, dissidents tend to be shareholders with a 
significant ownership stake in the company who only resort to proxy 
contests after other measures have failed.63  
Additionally, DeAngelo and DeAngelo uncover that dissidents publicly 
announced their disagreement with the company policies prior to 
announcing the proxy contest in 71% of cases, while many of the other 
cases had private signs of dissident activity before the contest.64 This 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See, e.g., Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of 
Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 405-06 (1983). 
 58. Id. at 405. 
 59. Id. at 406 (citing Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1962)). 
 60. See id. at 406-07.  
 61. See Emerson & Latcham, Shareholder Sovereignty, supra note 45, at 412; Frank D. 
Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Proxy Contests: Competition for Management Through 
Proxy Solicitation, 8 SW. L.J. 403, 411 (1954). 
 62. See David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the 
Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 413 (1993). 
 63. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of 
Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 32 (1989).  
 64. See id. at 32, 33 tbl.1. The announcement of the proxy contest was the first public 
“sign of dissident activity” in only seventeen of the sixty cases that they studied. Id. at 32. Of 
the remaining seventeen, seven involved a formal insider of the firm, and seven had 
evidence of prior contact between the management and the dissidents before the proxy 
contest announcement. Id. 
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suggests that dissidents are not surprise raiders but rather shareholders with 
a vested interest in the firm who use the proxy contest as a last resort.65 In 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s analysis, the dissident leader had prior 
experience in the industry in half of the contests, with one-third having 
prior experience at the target firm.66  
Along the same lines, Ikenberry and Lakonishok demonstrate that 
dissidents tend to have a substantial ownership stake in the firm, suggesting 
that they are looking after their own investment.67 They determine that the 
median dissidents own 10.62% of the company, twice the ownership stake 
in the company as the median incumbent directors.68 Similarly, Harris finds 
that the dissidents own on average 8.7% of the company, a slightly lower 
percentage of ownership than the mean incumbent group.69  
2. Corporate Performance Effect on Targeting 
Firms targeted for proxy contests consistently performed worse than 
similarly situated firms based on accounting measures.70 DeAngelo shows 
there are negative median returns on equity in the three years leading up to 
when dissidents announce their dissatisfaction with firm governance.71 In a 
similar vein, Mukherjee and Varela find proxy contest firms have 
significantly lower returns on equity than other firms in their industry in the 
two years leading up to the election.72  
                                                                                                                 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 36, 37 tbl.3. Of the sixty contests, dissidents in twenty-nine had prior 
experience in the industry, including ten at the target firm. Id. 
 67. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 413.  
 68. See id. at 413, 414 tbl.2A. They find that the median dissident group owns 10.62% 
of the company, while the median incumbent group owns 4.61%. Id. Similarly, they find 
mean dissident ownership of 13.58% and mean management ownership of 8.94%. Id. 
 69. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1796, 1797 
tbl.2 (2011). Harris’s sample includes 190 contested elections at publicly traded firms from 
2006 to 2009. Id. at 1791-92. He finds that the mean dissident owns 8.7% of the target 
company, while the mean incumbent directors own 9.5% of the company. Id. at 1797 tbl.2. 
 70. See Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and 
Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests, 
10 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 12-14 (1988). 
 71. Id. She finds market-adjusted returns on equity for the three years leading up to the 
dissident activity of -4.3%, -4.4%, and -5.8%, respectively, each significant at the 1% level 
using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Id. at 13-14, 13 tbl.3.  
 72. Turun K. Mukherjee & Oscar Varela, Corporate Operating Performance Around 
the Proxy Contest, 20 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 417, 419-20 (1993). They examine return on 
equity using the Du Pont system and the statistical tests used “include the t-test, the 
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Duvall and Austin’s analysis shows that targeted firms have significantly 
lower returns on equity relative to the industry in the seven years leading up 
to a proxy contest.73 In Austin’s study he discovers that 35% of proxy 
contests are associated with deficiencies in operating performance, another 
25% resulted from disagreements over corporate policy, while the 
remaining contests resulted from social factors such as personality 
conflicts.74 In a like fashion, Ikenberry and Lakonishok find that proxy 
contest firms did significantly worse than comparable firms in their industry 
in net sales, operating income before depreciation, cash flow, and dividends 
in the five prior years.75 In sum, dissidents tend to target underperforming 
firms, supporting the view that proxy contests are useful corporate 
governance tools.76 
3. Prior Target Stock Returns 
The studies that focus on the target’s prior stock returns paint a more 
confusing picture.77 Generally speaking, studies tend to observe weak 
evidence of target firm negative cumulative abnormal returns (“CAR”) in 
the years leading up to the election.78 For instance, Ikenberry and 
Lakonishok are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the target firm’s 
CAR equals zero for the five years leading up to the proxy contest.79 Dodd 
and Warner similarly find weak evidence of negative returns.80  
                                                                                                                 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pair Signed-Rank test and the Mann-Whitney test.” Id. They found the 
difference significant at the 5% level. Id. at 420. 
 73. See Richard M. Duvall & Douglas V. Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy 
Contests, 20 J. FIN. 464, 464-65 (1965). They find rates of returns on equity capital average 
a -5.7% difference during the seven years leading up to the proxy contest. Id. This was 
statistically different from their respective industries. Id. at 465. 
 74. See DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN, PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE REFORM 20 tbl.3, 33 
tbl.4, 39 tbl.5 (1965). 
 75. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 417. They found that net sales (-26.2%) 
and operating income before depreciation (-39.3%) were significantly different at the 1% 
level, while cash flow (-37.2%) and dividends (-32.6%) were significantly different at the 
5% level. Id. at 419 tbl.4B. During the three years leading up to the proxy contest, they also 
found that net income before extraordinary items (-80.8%) was significantly different at the 
5% level. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 417. 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 414. 
 78. See id. at 414-15. 
 79. See id. at 414. In their sample, they find a CAR of 4.7% for months -60 to -24 
and -8.6% for months -23 to -6. Id. 
 80. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 414.  
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Yet, an interesting pattern emerges when stock return variations are 
examined over time.81 Ikenberry and Lakonishok see significant negative 
returns from two years to six months before the contest announcement, but 
then significant positive returns during the two months leading up to the 
announcement.82 Similarly, Dodd and Warner show weak negative returns 
from two years to six months before the contest but significant positive 
stock returns during the last six months.83 The reported positive returns just 
prior to the proxy contest may have resulted from the stock market getting 
wind of the approaching contest, since the extensive preparations required 
for a proxy contest can be difficult to keep secret.84 Consistent with this 
interpretation, DeAngelo also uncovers significant positive stock returns in 
the six months leading up to the contest.85  
Using a portfolio method to measure stock returns, Mukherjee similarly 
shows that the contest firms outperform the S&P 500 in the six to nine 
months leading up to the contest, depending on which test he uses.86 These 
returns, however, level off in the last two to four weeks before the contest.87 
In other words, the stock market may have fully priced the coming proxy 
contest weeks before it is even announced.88  
Discordantly, Austin finds three trends in the period leading up to a 
contest, showing that about a third of firms’ stock increases in value, a third 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See id. at 418-19. 
 82. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 414-15 tbls.2 & 3. The negative returns 
in the two-years-to-six-months period are not statistically significant until they adjust for 
size and beta. Id. The positive returns in the two months before the announcement are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. However, for Ikenberry and Lakonishok, the 
abnormal returns become negative after they adjust for size and beta. Id. at 415. 
 83. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 414-15 tbl.2. Looking at univariate statistics in 
the months 60 to 24 before the contest, they find a cumulative residual of 0.054 with a 
z-statistic of 1.42. Id. at 414. In months 23 to 6 before the contest, Dodd and Warner find a 
mean cumulative residual of -0.087 with a z-statistic of -1.01. Id. Finally, “the mean 
cumulative residual for months -5 through 0 is 0.054, with a z-statistic of 2.72.” Id. at 415. 
 84. Id. at 423-25. 
 85. DeAngelo, supra note 70, at 16. DeAngelo finds a mean cumulative prediction error 
of 6.6% for the five months before the contests (z = 2.60) and 9.7% for the two months 
before the contest (z = 4.52). Id. 
 86. See Tarun K. Mukherjee, Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Proxy Fights for 
Control: A Non-Parametric Approach, 21 REV. BUS. & ECON. RES. 85, 93 (1985). The sign 
test finds higher returns from six months to four weeks prior to the contest announcement, 
significant at the 5% level. Id. at 93, 94 tbl.2. The Wilcoxon test finds higher returns from 
nine months to one week before the contest announcement, significant at the 5% level. Id. at 
93, 96 tbl.4. 
 87. See id. at 93.  
 88. See id. 
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decreases in value, and a third does not significantly change.89 He suggests 
that the increases may be due to dissidents buying additional stock to gain 
more voting power before the contest.90  
Finally, Mulherin and Poulsen find significantly positive stock returns 
from twenty days before the announcement until five days afterwards.91 
Summarizing, the bulk of these results suggest that proxy contests generally 
target firms with underperforming stock, but that this effect becomes 
obscured by the perceived benefits of the coming proxy contest.92 
4. Value of the Vote Hypothesis 
Dodd and Warner propose an alternative theory, called the “value of the 
vote hypothesis,” attributing the increasing stock price to the value of each 
share’s vote leading up to the record date.93 This hypothesis suggests that 
the price of the stock should decrease after the record date because only the 
record holder has the right to vote in the proxy contest.94 As expected, 
Dodd and Warner find significant negative returns between the contest 
announcement and outcome, which usually encompasses the post-record 
date period.95 To test this theory, they separate the sample between contests 
where the announcement occurs before and after the record date.96 They 
find some evidence that stock prices drop more in contests with the record 
date after the announcement than in contests with the record date before the 
announcement.97 This difference, however, does not fully explain the drop 
in price between the announcement and outcome.98  
                                                                                                                 
 89. See AUSTIN, supra note 74, at 49-50, 50 tbl.6. 
 90. Id. at 49-50. 
 91. J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change: 
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 292-93, 292 tbl.4 (1998). 
Between twenty days before the contest announcement until five days afterwards, they find 
cumulative abnormal return of 8.04%, with a z-statistic of 10.7. Id. at 292 tbl.4. 
 92. See, e.g., Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 414-15. 
 93. See Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 425-31. 
 94. See id. at 428-29. 
 95. Id. at 424-25. For the entire sample between these announcement and outcome, they 
find a mean cumulative residual of -0.043 (z = -2.63), with only 32% of the sample having 
positive cumulative residuals. Id. at 425. “[W]here dissidents win a majority,” the “mean 
cumulative residual” is -0.053 (z = -1.71). Id. “[W]here dissidents fail to win a majority,” the 
“mean cumulative residual” is -0.056 (z = -2.14). Id. It appears that they did not design the 
study with the value of the vote hypothesis in mind and decided to improvise after they saw 
the unexpected results. See id. 
 96. See id. at 429. 
 97. Id. at 429-31. For the forty-two contests with data available and record dates after 
announcement dates, they find a mean residual for the day after the record date of -0.014 
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Mukherjee also shows that the company’s stock loses value during the 
contest period relative to the S&P 500.99 However, when he separates the 
sample between dissidents winning and losing, only dissident losses exhibit 
significantly worse returns between the announcement and outcome of the 
contest.100  
Ghosh et al. further assess the value of the vote hypothesis.101 They 
discover more pronounced positive abnormal returns leading up to a proxy 
contest for board control than with an issue proxy contest.102 They fail to 
find statistically significant differences in the lead up to board control 
contests with the record date before and after the contest announcement and 
with and without cumulative voting.103 They do, however, uncover 
significant negative returns following the record date of a proxy contest and 
larger negative abnormal returns for contests with cumulative voting than 
those without it.104 They argue that this provides some support for the value 
of the vote hypothesis.105 Overall, the value of the vote hypothesis appears 
to have significant support but cannot fully explain the pattern of stock 
prices during the proxy contest.106 
5. Effect of Poor Corporate Performance 
Unsurprisingly, dissidents have a better chance of winning a proxy 
contest at poorly performing companies.107 Duvall and Austin show that 
firms where dissidents succeeded in gaining control had significantly lower 
average rates of return on equity than firms where dissidents failed.108 
                                                                                                                 
(z = -3.02). Id. at 429-30. However, for contests with record dates before the announcement 
dates, they find an insignificant mean residual of -0.0003 (z = -0.49). Id. at 430-31. 
 98. Id. at 431. 
 99. See Mukherjee, supra note 86, at 97. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Chinmoy Ghosh et al., Proxy Contests: A Re-examination of the Value of the Vote 
Hypothesis, 18 MANAGERIAL FIN. 3, 4 (1992). 
 102. Id. at 8.  
 103. Id. at 8-9. They expect that cumulative voting would have a more pronounced value 
of the vote effect because the dissidents need less votes to gain board representation. Id. at 5-
6. 
 104. Id. at 10. The difference for cumulative and non-cumulative voting was significant 
at the 1% level. Id. at 15 tbl.5 (Panel A). 
 105. Id. at 11. 
 106. See, e.g. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 429-31. 
 107. See, e.g., Duvall & Austin, supra note 73, at 465-67. 
 108. Id. at 466. In their sample, forty-five contests were for control. Id. Of these, fifteen 
contests resulted in dissident victory, where the firms average rates of return relative to 
industry of -12%. Id. at 466, 466 tbl.2. At the thirty firms where dissidents lost, the firm had 
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Interestingly, representation contests where dissidents gained board seats 
had slightly higher rates of return on equity compared to firms where they 
failed to get any seats.109 Using a multiple regression model, Duvall and 
Austin learn that dissidents are more likely to gain control at firms with 
lower returns on equity relative to industry and lower profit margins 
relative to industry.110  
Similarly, Hancock and Mougoué show that return on equity, dividend 
payout, earnings per share, and price earnings ratio negatively correlate 
with dissidents’ odds of victory.111 Mukherjee and Varela find that 
successful contests had significantly lower returns on equity than an 
industry control group in the three years leading up to the contest, while 
unsuccessful contests had significantly lower returns on equity only in the 
year before the contest.112  
Harris shows that there is a significant difference in the average stock 
returns during the five years preceding this contest where dissidents win 
and lose.113 Yet, he fails to find a significant correlation with one-year or 
five-year stock returns and dissidents’ chances of victory.114 It seems based 
on these studies that shareholders are more willing to vote for new 
management when the company is performing poorly.115 
  
                                                                                                                 
average rates of return relative to industry of -4.8%. Id. Using a sum of squares test, they 
find these differences to be statistically significant at the .06 level. Id. at 467. 
 109. Id. at 467. For representation contests, they find rates of return to be slightly higher 
where the dissident was elected (-0.5%) compared to where he wasn’t (-3.6%), but the 
difference wasn’t statistically significant. Id. 
 110. Id. at 470-71. 
 111. G.D. Hancock & M. Mougoué, The Impact of Financial Factors on Proxy Contest 
Outcomes, 18 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 541, 546-47 (1991) (computing statistical significance at 
the 5% level). They were unable to find a statistically significant correlation between 
dissidents’ odds of victory and return on assets, average excess return, beta, degree of 
financial leverage, and the degree of operating leverage. Id.  
 112. Mukherjee & Varela, supra note 72, at 421, 422 tbl.1, 423 tbl.2 (computing 
statistical significance at the 10% level). 
 113. Harris, supra note 69, at 1797-99, 1799 tbl.3. He found average five years stock 
returns leading up to the contest of -10.4% where dissidents won and 4.77% where 
dissidents lost, significantly different at the 5% level with a t-test and at the 1% level with a 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. Id. at 1799 tbl.3. 
 114. See id. at 1799-800. 
 115. See, e.g., Duvall & Austin, supra note 73, at 465-66. 
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6. Liquidity Effects 
Liquidity facilitates the occurrence of a proxy contest.116 Fos finds that 
proxy contests occur more often at companies with liquid stock.117 
Liquidity makes the proxy contest easier because dissidents can buy large 
blocks of stock without increasing the stock price.118 Norli et al. find that 
stock liquidity facilitates shareholder activism.119 They determine that 
liquidity positively correlates with instances of shareholder activism, 
including both proxy contests and shareholder proposals.120 Using an 
interaction term between liquidity and past performance, Norli et al. 
discover that the probability of shareholder activism is more sensitive to 
past performance when the company has higher liquidity.121 They further 
find that the liquidity negatively relates to the abnormal returns in the three 
days around the announcement of shareholder activism.122 Since the market 
will price in the probability of shareholder activism, this shows that the 
market believes that shareholder activism is more likely at companies with 
more liquid stock.123 They believe that liquidity facilitates shareholder 
activism by making it easier for dissidents to buy shares.124 
7. Stock Price Effects During a Proxy Contest 
Dodd and Warner show that the target company’s stock price generally 
increases during the proxy contest, suggesting a potential increase in future 
value.125 They uncover positive stock returns from approximately sixty days 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Fos, supra note 55, at 655.  
 117. Id. at 656, 664-65 (using the Amihud illiquidity measure). For an in-depth analysis 
regarding the Amihud model of market illiquidity, see Yakov Amihud, Illiquidity and Stock 
Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects, 5 J. FIN. MARKETS 31 (2002). 
 118. Fos, supra note 55, at 656.  
 119. Øyvind Norli et al., Liquidity and Shareholder Activism, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 486, 
503 (2015) (using the Amihud trade impact measure). The authors define shareholder 
activism to include both proxy contests and shareholder proposals. Id. at 491-92. Their final 
sample identified 385 instances of shareholder activism between 1994 and 2007. Id. at 487. 
 120. See id. at 502-03. They use a probit regression with the probability of shareholder 
activism as the dependent variable and liquidity as an independent variable, yielding a 
positive relationship significant at the 1% level. See id. 
 121. Id. at 503. The interaction variable yields a negative coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. See id. 
 122. See id. at 498-99, 498 fig.2. They find a coefficient of -0.105, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Id. 
 123. See id. at 502-03. 
 124. Id. at 511, 515. 
 125. See, e.g., Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 416. These results are different from the 
results relating to the value of the vote hypothesis because they include both the pre-contest 
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before the contest announcement up until the outcome.126 Surprisingly, their 
results do not vary greatly depending on who ends up winning the proxy 
contest.127 However, when examining the stock returns immediately 
surrounding the outcome of the contest, they find positive returns for 
dissident victories and negative returns for dissident defeats.128  
Somewhat along the same lines, Borstadt and Zwirlein find positive 
abnormal returns in the period surrounding the proxy contest.129 DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo also discover overall increases in stock value through the 
course of the proxy contest.130 These returns, however, disappear when the 
forty days leading up to the contest are removed, which supports the notion 
that the stock market prices the value of the contest before it even begins.131  
Alexander et al. find gains in stock value through the course of the 
contest.132 Looking at the resolution of the contest, they report significant 
                                                                                                                 
period and the stock market reaction to the results of the contest. See supra notes 93-105 and 
accompanying text. 
 126. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 416. Defined as the fifty-nine days before the 
announcement and going to when the election outcome results are announced, they find that 
the mean cumulative residual is 0.082, with a z-statistic of 2.78, and a median cumulative 
residual of 0.079. Id. 
 127. Id. For the period of fifty-nine days before the announcement up until the election 
outcomes are announced, they find a mean cumulative residual of 0.082 (z = 1.89) for 
contests where dissidents win no seats, 0.081 (z = 2.05) for contests where dissidents win at 
least one seat, and 0.128 (z = 1.43) for contests where dissidents win a majority. Id. 
 128. Id. at 418. For the two-day period prior to and including the announcement, they 
find a mean cumulative residual of 0.011 (z = 2.38) for contests where dissidents win at least 
one seat and -0.014 (z = -1.67) for contests when dissidents win no seats. See id. They note 
that “[t]he relatively small size” of these returns indicates that the good and bad news from 
the contests has already been anticipated by the market. Id.  
 129. Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy 
Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, 
21 FIN. MGMT. 22, 28 (1992). They find an average abnormal return of 11.4% (z = 5.83) 
during the proxy contest, defined as sixty days before the announcement until the contest 
resolution. Id. 
 130. DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 40. From forty days before the initiation 
through the election, they find average abnormal stockholder wealth increases of 6.02% 
(z = 4.32). Id. 
 131. See id. When the forty days before the initiation are taken out of the sample, they 
find negative but insignificant returns, with -12.47% (z = – 0.77) from initiation of dissident 
activity to the outcome and -6.32% (z = -1.14) from contest announcement to outcome. Id. 
“These returns become significantly negative under the market-adjusted returns 
approach . . . .” Id. 
 132. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., Interim News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice, 
23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4419, 4431, 4436 (2010) (using a sample of 255 proxy contests 
occurring between 1992 and 2005). For the period of twenty-five days before the proxy 
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positive returns for a dissident victory and insignificant negative returns for 
a management victory.133 On balance, these studies support the claim that 
investors appear to view proxy contests positively regardless of who wins, 
although the announcement of dissident victories gains a more enthusiastic 
reaction.134 
The stock gains associated with proxy contests may result from their link 
to takeovers of the company, which typically occur at a price per share that 
is significantly above the current market price.135 When DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo break down the full period between contest outcomes, they find 
significant positive stock returns only for contests where dissidents gain 
some seats but not a majority.136 Their data appear to indicate that the 
increased target firm value results from the sale or liquidation of the 
company, which mostly occurs where dissidents gain some but not a 
majority of seats.137 Looking at the two days surrounding the contest 
outcome, they find that dissidents withdrawing from the contest results in 
significantly negative stock returns, further supporting their earlier 
mentioned conclusion.138  
Mulherin and Poulsen also show that most of the stock price returns 
created by proxy contests actually result from takeovers.139 Looking at 
proxy contests accompanied by a takeover bid, they find that firms that 
                                                                                                                 
contest filing date until the resolution of the contest, they find a CAR of 17.26%, significant 
at the 1% level. Id. at 4435 tbl.2, 4436. Even for contest won by management there is a 
positive CAR of 19.24%, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 4435 tbl.2. 
 133. Id. at 4436. In the days surrounding the completion of the contest, they find a CAR 
of 2.02% (t-statistic = 2.89) for dissident victory and a CAR of -1.07% (t-statistic = -1.56) 
for the management victory. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 416. 
 135. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 44-45. 
 136. See id. at 41-43. Between forty days before the start of dissident activity up until the 
contest outcome, they find that contests resulting in some but not a majority seats had 
shareholder returns averaging 30.12% (z = 4.77). Id. at 41 tbl.4. 
 137. See id. at 43-44. They count only those firms that have a sale or liquidation as 
resulting from the contest where the financial press reports a link. See id. They find fifteen 
contests result in sale or liquidation of the firm, of which seven had dissidents winning some 
but not a majority of seats. Id. at 44. Those fifteen contests saw wealth gains of 15.16% 
(z = 4.21) for the full period of dissident activity. Id. The remaining sample had shareholder 
gains of 2.90% (z = 2.54). Id. at 44-45. 
 138. See id. at 42. Overall where the dissidents gain no seats, they find shareholder losses 
of -5.45% (z = –7.56) in the two days surrounding the contest outcome. Id. For the seven 
contests that ended with shareholder elections, they find insignificant outcomes of -1.73% (z 
= -1.51). Id. For the sixteen contests that ended with dissidents withdrawing, they find 
stockholder returns of -7.19% (z = -8.13). Id. 
 139. See Mulherin & Poulsen, supra note 91, at 308-09. 
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experience successful takeovers have significantly higher stock returns than 
firms with unsuccessful takeover bids.140 Similarly, looking at contests 
without a takeover bid where dissidents obtain seats, they find that contests 
that result in the turnover of top management have significantly higher 
stock returns during the proxy contest and in the year following the proxy 
contest than contests without management turnover.141 They further show 
that a turnover in top management and a restructuring of the company are 
not independent events, supporting the generalization that successful 
turnarounds require new management.142 Mulherin and Poulsen conclude 
that much of the value created by proxy contests comes from either the 
acquisition of the company or the turnover of top management.143 In sum, 
these papers suggest that the market benefits of proxy contests may have 
more to do with their role in company takeovers than their impact on 
corporate governance.144 
8. Proxy Contest or Tender Offer? 
To view the issue from another angle, one could ask why someone 
would try to use a proxy contest rather than a tender offer to gain control of 
a company.145 Sridharan and Reinganum find that proxy contest targets tend 
to be significantly more leveraged than tender-offer targets.146 They have 
greater degrees of management control than tender-offer targets147 and tend 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See id. at 299. For firms with an unsuccessful takeover bid, they find insignificant 
abnormal returns from twenty days before the announcement up until the resolution and 
significantly abnormal returns of -23.7% (z = -4.18) for the year after the resolution. Id. at 
299, 299 tbl.7 (Panel A). For firms with successful takeover bids, they find positive 
abnormal returns of 20.1% (z = 9.49) from twenty days before the announcement until the 
resolution and positive abnormal returns of 12.4% (z = 1.83) in the year after the resolution. 
Id. 
 141. Id. at 301 tbl.7, 302 (noting t-statistics of 2.46 and 1.09 respectively). 
 142. Id. at 305, 307, 307 tbl.10 (Panel A) (resulting in a p-value of 0.000). 
 143. Id. at 303-05. 
 144. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 51-52. 
 145. See Uma V. Sridharan & Marc R. Reinganum, Determinants of the Choice of the 
Hostile Takeover Mechanism: An Empirical Analysis of Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, 
24 FIN. MGMT. 57, 57-59 (1995).  
 146. Id. at 62, 66. They find that the mean leverage ratio is 0.31 for proxy contest targets 
and 0.24 for tender offer targets, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. See id. at 
62.  
 147. Id. Non-insiders hold larger blocks of shares greater than 5% in “tender offer targets 
(17.1%) than for proxy contest targets (12.9%).” Id. “[T]he average fraction of shares held 
by” outside directors is higher for “tender offers (5.32%) than for proxy contest targets 
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to be less profitable than tender-offer targets.148 Interestingly, proxy 
contests and tender offers target firms with a similar proportion of 
staggered boards.149 Using a logistic regression, they find that the 
dissident’s decision to use a proxy contest is significantly positively related 
to the ratio of inside directors and the level of leverage and negatively 
related to the percentage of shares held in greater than 5% blocks.150 More 
profitable firms are more likely to attract a tender offer.151 These results, 
however, must be viewed with caution because the authors limit their 
sample of proxy contests to those linked to a takeover attempt.152 
9. Longer Term Performance Effects 
Mulherin and Poulsen offer evidence that shows proxy contest targets 
continue to underperform the stock market in the years after the contest, 
especially where dissidents win control.153 They report nearly significant 
negative CARs in the year following the proxy contest.154 By contrast, 
Mukherjee finds that these firms outperform the market for six to eight 
weeks after the contest.155 However, when he separates his sample between 
contests where the dissidents succeed and those where they fail, he finds 
that dissident failures significantly outperform the market for four weeks, 
while dissident successes did not have a statistically distinguishable 
                                                                                                                 
(2.32%).” Id. Tender offer targets have fewer insiders sitting on the board (29.6%) than 
proxy contest targets (37.27%). Id. 
 148. Id. They find an ROA of 2.58% for proxy contest targets and 5.76% for tender offer 
targets, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. They find similar results with an 
“economy-wide adjusted ROA.” Id.  
 149. Id. They find that 28% of proxy contests have staggered boards compared to 26% of 
tender offers. Id. 
 150. Id. at 63-65 (noting statistical significance at the 5%, 10%, and 5% levels 
respectively). They are unable to find a relationship between staggered boards, changes in 
leverage, or the fraction of shares held by outside directors. See id. at 62-63. 
 151. Id. at 65. They find that adjusted ROA positively correlates with using a tender 
offer, significant at the 1% level. Id. Cumulative excess return is also positive but only 
marginally significant. Id. 
 152. See id. at 59-60. They include proxy contests that don’t seek a majority of board 
seats because they still seek some degree of control and because eliminating them would 
shrink their small sample. Id. at 59. 
 153. See, e.g., Mulherin & Poulsen, supra note 91, at 302-03. 
 154. Id. at 293. In the year after the proxy contest, they find CARs of -3.43% (z = -1.93), 
falling just short of statistical significance at the 5% level. Id. at 292 tbl.4 (Panel A), 293. 
However, there is a downward bias because they do not include firms that are acquired just 
after the proxy contest. Id. at 294. 
 155. See Mukherjee, supra note 86, at 98 tbl.5, 99 tbl.6, 100 (noting statistical 
significance at the 5% level with both the Sign Test and Wilcoxon Test). 
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performance.156 In sum, at least in the short term, the market appears to 
favor dissident failures when the proxy contest results are released.157  
Ikenberry and Lakonishok determine that firms have negative stock 
returns in the twenty months after the resolution of the proxy contest.158 
When separated by outcome, they find that dissidents gaining some, or a 
majority of, seats is associated with significantly negative abnormal 
returns.159 Where management keeps all of their seats, they observe only 
insignificant negative returns.160 However, when they expand their analysis 
to examine the period four and a half years after the contest, all statistically 
significant results disappear.161 This may indicate that dissidents run the 
company poorly, at least in their first twenty months on the board.162 The 
market may also be correcting for over-optimism during the dissidents’ 
initial victory.163  
Ikenberry and Lakonishok further find that about a quarter of the 
negative returns occur in the day before and after an earnings report,164 
which indicates that information in the earnings report (and therefore, the 
performance of the company) caused the disappointing stock returns.165 
Finally, Ikenberry and Lakonishok show that in contests where dissidents 
gain at least one seat, companies without management turnover perform 
substantially worse than companies with management turnover.166 In 
contrast, Borstadt and Zwirlein fail to find any abnormal returns in the three 
years after the proxy contest, which might suggest that the proxy contest 
has moved the company back on track.167 Overall, in the short term, 
dissident victories are associated with poorer stock performance, while in 
the long run the two groups appear to be indistinguishable.168 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See id. at 100.  
 157. Id. at 101. 
 158. See Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 420-21, 420 tbl.5 (noting 
significance at the 5% level). They find a CAR of -17.24% for the period for five months to 
two years after the contest. Id. 
 159. See id. (noting significance at the 1% level). 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 421, 423. 
 163. Id. at 433.  
 164. See id. at 422. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 424 (finding an insignificant result of -20.3% between months five and 
twenty-four for proxy contest with dissident victories and management turnover, compared 
to the CAR of -40.1% for dissident victories without management turnover). 
 167. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 129, at 28-29.  
 168. See, e.g., Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 421-23. 
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The target company’s future operating performance reflects a similarly 
bleak picture.169 Ikenberry and Lakonishok demonstrate that firms with 
dissident victories have significantly worse net sales, operating income 
before depreciation, cash flow, and dividends compared to industry peers, 
while firms with management victories are statistically indistinguishable 
from their industry peers.170  
Mukherjee and Varela find that contest firms had worse performance in 
the three years following the proxy contest, as measured by return on 
equity, compared to an industry control group, particularly in the third year 
where the difference was statistically different at the 5% level.171 When 
they divide the groups between dissident successes and failures, they find 
that the target firms with dissident successes had significantly lower rates of 
return on equity compared to a control group in the year after the contest, 
while dissident failures had lower rates of return on equity in years two and 
three after the contest.172  
Austin observes that in his sample of proxy contests about a third of 
targeted firms failed or were taken over within three years.173 This occurred 
twice as often after representation contests as contests for control.174 He 
suggests that the tensions of a divided board may be too great for a 
company to withstand.175 Of those that survived, about an equal number are 
doing better as are doing worse.176  
The poor operating results of target firms where dissidents win a proxy 
contest may indicate that shareholders fail to vote rationally in the proxy 
contests.177 The results may also be due to self-selection problems where 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See id. at 427, 430. 
 170. See id. at 427, 428-29 tbl.9. For contests resulting in some dissident victory, they 
find over the subsequent five years negative net sales (-31.6%, at a 5% significance), 
operating income before depreciation (-79.2%, at a 5% significance), cash flow (-99.1%, at a 
10% significance), and dividends (-72.5%, at a 1% significance). Id. at 428-29 tbl.9. 
Interestingly, these results become less statistically significant when dissidents win a 
majority of the board seats. Id. at 427. 
 171. Mukherjee & Varela, supra note 72, at 420-21. The authors defined return on equity 
as income before extraordinary items divided by total equity. Id. at 419. 
 172. Id. at 421 (each significant at the 5% level). 
 173. See AUSTIN, supra note 74, at 54-55. 
 174. See id.  
 175. See id. at 55. 
 176. See id. at 59-61. 
 177. See Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 433-34. 
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dissidents win at the worst performing firms that are simply beyond 
saving.178  
10. Management and Director Effects 
Proxy contests facilitate the turnover in management, even where 
dissidents fail to gain any seats.179 DeAngelo and DeAngelo find that less 
than a fifth of the sample firms retain “the same incumbent management 
team” three years after the proxy contest.180 Even where the dissidents did 
not win a majority of seats, about half of these firms experienced turnovers 
in top management, with three-quarters of these turnovers linked directly to 
the proxy contest.181 They interpret this as support for the view that proxy 
contests are mechanisms to discipline management of a company even 
where they do not succeed.182 Along those lines, Faleye finds that the 
likelihood of a forced executive turnover increases from 9.18% before the 
contest to 22.45% after the contest.183  
Borstadt and Zwirlein learn that two-thirds of firms have a change in at 
least one top-level executive or board member in the three years after the 
proxy contest.184 Using very recent data, Fos and Tsoutsoura find that only 
43% of directors retain their board seats three years after the contest.185 
Their regression results show that 27% to 39% of directors will lose their 
seats as a result of the proxy contest.186  
Ikenberry and Lakonishok show that top management turnover helps 
curb the negative stock returns after the contest.187 In the year and a half 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See id.  
 179. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 50-51. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 46. Of the thirty-nine firms that did not experience a change of control, twenty 
experienced the resignation of a top manager within three years, of which fifteen 
resignations can be linked to the proxy contest. Id. at 46, 49. DeAngelo and DeAngelo used 
detailed case studies to establish a link. See id. at 46. 
 182. Id. at 50-52. 
 183. Olubunmi Faleye, Cash and Corporate Control, 59 J. FIN. 2041, 2056 (2004) 
(noting significance at the 1% level). 
 184. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 129, at 27. “A complete change in control 
occurred in 70 firms,” while thirty-one firms saw an external replacement of at least one 
“top-level executive or board position[].” Id. 
 185. Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career 
Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 316, 321 (2014). 
 186. Id. at 322 tbl.4 (Panel B), 323 (noting significance at the 1% level). 
 187. See Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 424-25, 427. They find management 
turnover in 24% of the cases where dissidents gain no seats, and turnover in 58% of cases 
where “dissidents gain at least one seat.” Id. at 424. 
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after a contest where dissidents gain at least one seat, they find significantly 
negative stock returns where there is no management turnover, but 
insignificant returns where there is a management turnover.188 This is 
consistent with the claim that proxy contests help corporate governance by 
facilitating the turnover in top management.189 
Proxy contests also hurt a director’s tenure at other companies.190 Using 
data from recent proxy contests, Fos and Tsoutsoura find that directors of 
target firms have on average 2.2 seats leading up to the contest, which 
drops to 1.8 seats five years later.191 Using regression analysis, they claim 
that directors are likely to lose seats after a proxy contest.192 Their 
regression predicts that a targeted director will lose in total 1.7 
directorships, including those at the targeted company and other companies, 
leading to lost income of $2.9 million over twelve years.193 The authors 
take advantage of the presence of staggered boards to show that these 
results are caused by the proxy contest rather than the director’s position at 
a poorly performing firm.194 Looking at companies with staggered boards, 
they compare the future career paths of those directors that were standing 
for election at the time of the proxy contest (“nominated”) directors with 
other directors on the board that were in board classes not being voted on 
(“non-nominated”) directors.195 Their analysis shows that nominated 
directors lose significantly more seats at other firms than non-nominated 
directors.196  
                                                                                                                 
 188. See id. at 424. Where dissidents win one seat but don’t cause a management 
turnover, they find a CAR of -40.1% (t = -2.74) for the five to twenty-four months after the 
initiation of the contest. Id. Where dissidents gain at least one seat and cause a turnover in 
management, they find a CAR of -20.3% (t = -1.54) for the same time period. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., id. at 424-25, 427. 
 190. See Fos & Tsoutsoura, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 333-35. 
 191. See id. at 324, 324 fig.2. 
 192. Id. at 325, 325 tbl.6 (noting significance at the 1% level). 
 193. Id. at 326. For being targeted with a proxy contest, a director can expect to lose 0.55 
directorships at the targeted firm and 1.15 directorships at other firms. Id. They arrive at the 
compensation figures by starting with the fact that an average “director has 12 years until 
retirement . . . and is paid $0.144 million per year.” Id.  
 194. See id. at 327. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 328, 329 tbl.10 (noting significance at the 5% level). A regression shows that 
“nominated directors are expected to lose 0.67 directorships” in other companies, while non-
nominated directors should lose 0.44 directorships, leaving nominated directors with a 60% 
higher career cost. Id. at 328. 
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They next investigate whether media coverage or the fact of being voted 
off the board attributes to the difference.197 Both nominated and non-
nominated directors have a higher chance of being covered by the media 
after a proxy contest,198 but “nominated directors receive more media 
coverage than non-nominated directors.”199 They next check if nominated 
directors who lose the proxy contest are more likely to lose seats on other 
boards than nominated directors who keep their seats.200 As expected, they 
find that directors who lose their seats are more likely to lose seats on other 
boards as well.201 Interestingly, independent directors appear to receive a 
bigger hit to their reputation and can expect to lose more board seats than 
inside directors.202 Overall, this evidence supports the view that proxy 
contests impose significant career costs on incumbent directors.203 These 
career costs likely act as a major incentive for directors to run the company 
properly and avoid proxy fights. 
11. Post-Success Earnings “Baths” 
If dissidents win a proxy contest, they tend to take an earnings “bath” 
after they take control in order to make the firm appear less profitable, 
presumably because they know they can blame outgoing management and 
position themselves to make the company appear more profitable later 
on.204 DeAngelo finds that more than half of the target firms with dissident 
victories reduced earnings through “discretionary non-cash writeoffs” in the 
year after the contest.205 She detects insignificant unexpected earnings, 
significantly negative unexpected accruals, and significantly positive 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See id. at 329. 
 198. Id. at 330 (noting significance at the 1% level). They find that “[t]he probability of 
being covered by the media increases from 28% before the proxy-contest announcement date 
to 37% after the proxy-contest announcement date.” Id. 
 199. Id. (noting significance at the 1% level). They find that a nominated director has a 
40% probability of being covered in the news, while a non-nominated director has only a 
31% probability of being covered in the news. Id. 
 200. See id. at 332. 
 201. Id. at 332, 332 tbl.13 (noting significance at the 10% level). 
 202. Id. at 333-34 (noting significance at the 1% level). Their regression suggests that an 
independent director will lose 0.21 more seats than an inside director. Id. 
 203. See id. at 334. 
 204. See Daniel W. Collins & Linda DeAngelo, Accounting Information and Corporate 
Governance: Market and Analyst Reactions to Earnings of Firms Engaged in Proxy 
Contests, 13 J. ACCT. & ECON. 213, 226 (1990). 
 205. DeAngelo, supra note 70, at 30. She finds that twelve of the twenty-two firms with 
dissident victories had writeoffs in the year after the proxy contest, while two more had 
writeoffs the following year. Id.  
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unexpected cash flows.206 These results indicate that firms experiencing a 
control change typically experience an immediate increase in firm 
profitability but that this is not reflected in reported profitability, most 
likely because new management manage their earnings by taking a 
“bath.”207  
Collins and DeAngelo find significantly negative unexpected accruals 
for firms where dissidents gain control, which are significantly lower than 
firms with unsuccessful contests and pre-contest unexpected accruals.208 
They also report significantly lower analysts’ earnings-forecast errors for 
successful contests compared to unsuccessful contests.209 They examine the 
post-contest annual reports for the successful proxy contests and are able to 
find unusual income items for 95% of the companies.210 Of these firms, 
80% “report unusual items that are negative in the aggregate.”211 This 
evidence suggests that new management takes an earnings “bath” to make 
the firm appear more profitable in the future.212 
12. Impact on Cash Holdings 
Proxy contests may help to reduce excess cash within corporations.213 
Management has a self-interested tendency to maintain high levels of cash 
within the corporation, even to the detriment of shareholders.214 Paying out 
the excess liquidity as a dividend would reduce the resources under their 
control, restrict their ability to pursue corporate growth, and force them to 
raise funds to finance future projects.215 As expected, Faleye finds that 
targets of proxy contests have significantly higher cash-to-asset ratios 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Id. at 32-33. She finds a mean unexpected accrual of -0.0477 and a mean 
unexpected cash flow of 0.0241. Id. at 32 tbl.11. 
 207. See id. at 32-34. 
 208. See Collins & DeAngelo, supra note 204, at 226. For the successful contests, they 
find mean unexpected accruals of -2.78% and median unexpected accruals of -3.29%, which 
are different from zero at the 0.0265 and 0.0167 levels respectively and different from 
unsuccessful contests at the 0.0169 and 0.0300 levels respectively. Id. at 226-27.  
 209. Id. at 227-28. They find significantly lower analysts’ earnings forecast errors for 
successful contests compared to unsuccessful contests, with the mean significantly different 
at the 0.064 level and the median significantly different at the 0.0216 level. Id. at 228. 
 210. Id. at 228-29, 229 tbl.4. 
 211. Id. at 229. They find that “total unusual items comprise a negative 65.3% of 
reported income,” with a median of -96.2% “after a successful proxy contest.” Id. at 230.  
 212. See id. at 230, 232. 
 213. See Faleye, supra note 183, at 2041. 
 214. Id. at 2042-43 (citing Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323-29 (1986)). 
 215. Id. at 2042. 
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compared to a control sample.216 Also, contest targets have a mean and 
median excess cash that is significantly different from zero, while the 
control sample did not.217 Faleye confirms that excess cash positively 
relates to being targeted in a proxy contest.218 Excess cash also positively 
relates to abnormal stock price returns in the three-day period surrounding 
the announcement of the proxy contest.219 This correlation suggests that 
investors view proxy contests as effective mechanisms to curb excess cash 
problems.220  
Faleye discovers that, in the year after the proxy contest, companies 
experience a significant drop in their average cash ratio and average excess 
cash.221 Money distributed to shareholders increases from $5.9 million on 
average in the year before the contest to $55.4 million in the year after.222 
Where dissidents campaigned on excess cash retention issues, targeted 
firms were significantly more likely to make a special cash distribution.223  
Similarly, Hancock and Mougoué find that a dissident victory is 
negatively associated with the price-to-earnings ratio and dividend-payout 
ratio.224 They also find that management success is significantly positively 
correlated with the dividend-payout ratio.225 It appears that corporate 
directors use dividends to appease shareholders after a proxy contest.226 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id. at 2048. The cash-to-asset ratio of contest firms are a mean of 12.82% and a 
median of 8.56%, compared to 10.39% and 5.79% respectively for control firms, significant 
at the 10% and 1% levels. Id. 
 217. Id. at 2049 (showing a significant difference from zero at the 1% level). He finds a 
0.0722 mean and 0.0367 median excess cash for target firms. Id.  
 218. See id. at 2049. The relationship is significant at the 5% level. Id. at 2050 tbl.2. The 
regression also controls for management ownership, outside block ownership, and market-
adjusted returns. Id. 
 219. Id. at 2052 (noting a significance less than the 1% level). 
 220. See id.  
 221. Id. The average cash ratio falls from 12.82% to 9.15% between the start and finish 
of the contest, having a statistically significant difference at the 5% level. Id. The average 
excess cash goes down from 0.0722 to 0.0351, significant at the 1% level. Id. 
 222. Id. at 2054 (showing a significant difference at the 5% level). 
 223. Id. at 2058. Dissidents mentioned cash issues at fourteen firms, while the remaining 
eighty-four did not. Id. Where cash issues were raised in the campaign, 57.14% of firms 
made special cash distributions, compared to 13.01% in the campaigns without cash issues, 
significantly different at the 1% level. Id.  
 224. Hancock & Mougoué, supra note 111, at 548 tbl.4, 549 (showing significance at the 
5% level).  
 225. Id. (showing significance at the 5% level). 
 226. Id. at 549. 
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Overall, it appears that proxy contests help to control excess cash within a 
company and prompt management to pay dividends to shareholders.227 
13. Corporate Governance Effects 
In principle, the mere threat of a proxy contest may positively impact 
corporate governance.228 To assess this theory, Fos examines the effect that 
an increased probability of being targeted in a proxy contest has on 
corporate governance.229 He does this by establishing a number of factors 
that make a proxy contest likely and then, using those factors, predicting the 
probability that a company will have a proxy contest in a given year.230 He 
finds that companies that have an increased probability of a proxy contest 
are likely to have higher leverage, lower R&D, and lower capital 
expenditures.231 He concludes that the threat of a proxy contest is sufficient 
to impact and assist corporate governance.232 He also repeats his analysis to 
understand when these disciplinary effects take place.233 His results show 
that targeted companies increase leverage, spend less on R&D, decrease 
capital expenditures, and increase dividend payouts in anticipation of, or in 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Faleye, supra note 183, at 2059. 
 228. See Fos, supra note 55, at 656. Fos’s sample includes 1061 proxy contests that occur 
between 1994 and 2012. Id. at 657. 
 229. See id. at 656. 
 230. See id. at 664. He constructs a probit regression with the occurrence of a proxy 
contest as the dependent variable. Id. He finds that proxy contests are more likely to occur at 
firms that have a low market valuation, poor stock performance, higher institutional 
ownership, lower market capitalization, and higher liquidity. Id. Each of these factors had a 
statistically significant relationship at the 1% level, except for institutional ownership, which 
was statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. He constructs seven multiple regressions, 
with the occurrence of a proxy contest as the dependent variable. See id. at 664-65. All seven 
have variables for liquidity, market value, sales, institutional ownership, and book to market 
ratio. See id. Additionally, each has a corporate policy: leverage, cash, and dividends. See id. 
at 664-68. He then uses the equation produced by each respective regression to create a 
probability of a proxy contest for a given company in a given year. Id. He uses the respective 
probability as an independent variable in each of seven multiple regressions with each of the 
corporate policies as dependent variables. See id. 
 231. Id. at 669 (showing significance at the 1% level). He did not find a statistically 
significant relationship between the probability of receiving a proxy contest and cash 
holdings. Id.  
 232. Id. He demonstrates that correlation is due to causation by proving the identification 
assumption, which is that stock liquidity satisfies the exclusion restriction, and thus showing 
that his results are not endogenous. Id. at 668-69.  
 233. Id. 
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trying to avoid, a proxy contest.234 He fails to find any correlation between 
changes in policy and the post-contest years.235 He concludes that the threat 
of a proxy contest accounts for a significant part of its effect on corporate 
governance.236 
14. Hedge Fund Activism and Proxy Contests for Control or 
Representation 
Hedge funds have shaken up the U.S. corporate governance scene since 
the early 2000s by pushing for changes at targeted companies such as sales, 
restructurings, higher dividend payments, and changes to corporate 
management. Hedge funds frequently take substantial positions in targeted 
companies’ stock, between 5% and 10%, and then begin lobbying for 
change.237 Their activism “is backed up—implicitly or explicitly—by the 
threat of a proxy contest for corporate control.”238 Fos and Tsoutsoura find 
that hedge fund activism has caused an increase in the number of proxy 
contests.239  
In another paper, Fos reports data on the number of control contests 
versus short slate contests: during the period 1994–2012, there were 199 
control contests, but 708 contests involved short-slate contests to some 
extent.240 He notes that in the same years, hedge funds sponsored 602 
contested proxy contests of all sorts (control contests, short-slate contests, 
and issue contests), or approximately 57% of all such fights.241 The hedge 
funds’ sponsorship of proxy contests greatly increased in the latter part of 
this time period (2003–2012) so that they sponsored 70% of total proxy 
fights during that interval.242 Fos suggests that hedge funds prefer non-
control contests, such as running a short slate of candidates, because they 
seek to change the management of a firm, not to manage the firm 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Id. He finds that the dummy variable for having a proxy contest within a year 
positively correlates with leverage (10% significance) and dividend payouts (5% 
significance) and negatively correlates with R&D spending (5% significance), capital 
expenditures (10% significance), and CEO compensation (5% significance). Id. at 668 tbl.8. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See Brav et al., supra note 32, at 1730-31. 
 238. Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 54, at 131. 
 239. Fos & Tsoutsoura, supra note 185, at 317. 
 240. Fos, supra note 55, at 660 tbl.2. 
 241. Id. at 660 tbl.3. 
 242. Id. The number of proxy contests sponsored by hedge funds increased by 170% in 
the 2003 to 2012 period compared to the 1994 to 2002 period, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. See id.  
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themselves.243 Fos also finds that the market has a more positive reaction to 
the announcement of a contest sponsored by hedge funds compared to other 
types of sponsors.244 However, this difference in the firm’s cumulative 
abnormal returns disappears eight months after the announcement, 
suggesting that hedge funds are no better at increasing a firm’s value 
through proxy contests than other sponsors.245 
There has been relatively little other academic research on hedge funds’ 
use of proxy contests in elections of directors. We found one other study 
where the researchers separately identified hedge fund director contests and 
compared them with proxy contests brought by other types of activist 
investors.246 However, the leading scholar in the area concludes that hedge 
fund-sponsored director election proxy contests are largely for 
representation or influence on the board of directors.247 He argues that 81% 
of proxy contests are “non-control contests,” so that “the current corporate 
governance environment therefore resembles the ‘market for corporate 
influence’ and not the ‘market for corporate control.’”248 
15. Summary 
Proxy contests appear to function as a productive corporate governance 
mechanism, but a lot of questions and uncertainty still surround their utility. 
They provide many benefits to the corporation, including facilitating a 
change in management, reducing unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the 
payout of dividends.249 The threat of a proxy contest alone may be 
sufficient to bring about these results.250 The stock market appears to 
confirm the advantages of proxy contests and can even price the benefits of 
the contest before it begins.251 The dissidents also have significant stakes in 
the targeted company and commence the contest usually after failed 
                                                                                                                 
 243. See id. at 660. 
 244. See id. at 662. 
 245. See id. 
 246. The closest thing we found related to hedge fund sponsorship of contested 
shareholder proposals. Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and 
Practice: Evidence from a Comparison of the United States and United Kingdom, 49 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 739, 779-80 tbl.10 (2012). They found that hedge funds and private equity firms 
sponsored about 45% of U.S. contested proposals, held on average 8.9% of the targeted 
firm’s stock, and spent on average more than $400,000 on their solicitation costs. Id.  
 247. See Fos, supra note 55, at 660-64. 
 248. Id. at 660 & tbl.2.  
 249. See supra Sections II.A.10, II.A.12. 
 250. See supra Section II.A.13. 
 251. See supra Sections II.A.6, II.A.8. 
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negotiations, characteristics not normally associated with raiders.252 The 
companies targeted in the contest also tend to be underperforming the 
market and generally in need of better management.253  
Still other evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of proxy 
contests and newly elected dissidents to help poorly performing 
corporations.254 The stock gains associated with proxy contests may result 
from their impact on the likelihood of a corporate takeover.255 Companies 
with dissident victories tend to have poor stock returns and weak operating 
performance after the proxy contest.256 In these cases, it is possible that 
these companies were beyond saving to begin with, or perhaps the newly 
elected dissidents face a steep learning curve before they can move the 
company back on track.257 
Hedge fund activism has been understudied with little academic research 
examining the differences between proxy contests brought by hedge funds 
and those initiated by other activist investors. Hedge funds, however, do 
appear to be the primary proponents of contested proxy solicitations and to 
have brought more short slate contests than control contests.258 
B. Determinants of Control Contests’ Outcome 
1. Do Incumbents Have Systemic Advantages? 
Another line of inquiry asks whether proxy contests go far enough in 
providing a fair opportunity for the challenging dissidents to gain control of 
the corporation.259 Studies tend to show that incumbent directors have a 
significant advantage in winning proxy contests, due to a number of factors 
such as inefficiencies in the proxy system, the presence of blockholders, 
trust issues for stockholders, the stock’s liquidity, and the ability of 
directors to manage earnings.260 On the surface, studies find that 
challengers succeed in obtaining control of the firm in a quarter to a third of 
                                                                                                                 
 252. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 253. See supra Sections II.A.2-4. 
 254. See supra Section II.A.9. 
 255. See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra Section II.A.9.  
 257. See supra Section II.A.9. 
 258. Fos, supra note 55, at 660 tbls. 2 & 3. 
 259. See, e.g., John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 
20 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 258-59 (1988). 
 260. See, e.g., id. at 258-60.  
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proxy contests.261 Such evidence suggests that incumbents have an 
advantage in proxy contests, but it fails to take into account the quality of 
the challenging candidates.262 Researchers ask whether the proxy contest 
presents a fair fight in control over a firm and what factors advantage one 
side or the other.263 
Director elections appear to favor the incumbent directors even where 
the dissidents would be as good or better candidates to run the company.264 
Listokin developed a novel and rather clever way to show that incumbent 
directors have a structural advantage in proxy contests.265 He views a 
shareholder vote as a mechanism of information aggregation analogous to 
how the stock market aggregates information to determine value, but 
through different processes and with different results.266 He runs a 
regression to see how the stock market reacts to dissident and management 
victories as the voting outcome gets closer and closer to a tied election.267 
Theoretically, a close vote implies that shareholders view the incumbents 
and dissidents as equally capable of running the company.268 If the stock 
market assesses information in a similar manner, then it should have a 
minimal reaction to a close vote since it would also value either outcome as 
about equal.269 If it assesses information differently, however, then its 
reaction to a close vote demonstrates a systematic bias in the shareholder 
vote’s ability to assess the two outcomes of a proxy contest.270 His 
regression predicts that a management victory after a close vote reduces the 
value of stock by 5.9% compared to a dissident victory.271 This shows that 
                                                                                                                 
 261. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 41 (showing success in 35% of 
the contests); Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 409 (showing success in 25.4% of control 
contests); Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 413 (showing success in 28.4% of the 
contests). 
 262. See Yair Listokin, Corporate Voting Versus Market Price Setting, 11 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 608, 609-10 (2009). Listokin’s sample includes ninety-seven proxy contests that 
occurred between 2000 and 2006. See id. at 615-16.  
 263. See id. at 609-10. 
 264. See id. at 610. 
 265. See id. at 608-09. 
 266. See id. at 609. 
 267. See id. at 610, 623.  
 268. See id. at 609. 
 269. See id. It helps that as the outcome of a proxy contest becomes even it becomes 
harder to predict who will win. See id. This means that the stock market will not be able to 
price in the value of either outcome vis-à-vis their relative probabilities of occurring prior to 
the outcome announcement. See id.  
 270. See id. at 609-10.  
 271. Id. at 623 (showing significance at the 10% level). 
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when a shareholder vote views both outcomes as fairly equal, it is actually 
overvaluing a management victory, demonstrating a systematic bias 
towards management in the proxy contest process that hurts shareholder 
value.272 Other studies demonstrate a number of factors that might cause 
this disparity.273 
Mechanical aspects of the proxy process give incumbent directors an 
inherent advantage.274 Proxies are costly and difficult to solicit for 
dissidents.275 Shares are usually held in nominee or street name, which 
means that votes have to be solicited through the nominee.276 The record 
date occurs weeks before the vote, and so for companies with high share 
turnover, a large portion of voting rights will be separated from shareholder 
ownership.277 These dynamics give incumbents a significant advantage due 
to their prior experience in dealing with these problems and their 
preexisting relationship with shareholders.278 This background leads Pound 
to several testable hypotheses.279 If it is more difficult for dissidents to 
solicit votes, then more shareholders should relate to a greater chance of 
management victory.280 It should also mean that a shorter contest time or 
holding the vote at a special meeting also increases the chance of 
management victory.281 As expected, Pound finds that more shareholders, 
shorter times between the announcement and outcome, and holding the vote 
at a special meeting rather than the usual meeting all indicate lower chances 
of dissident success.282 He views this as evidence that structural aspects of 
the proxy process bias the contest toward management victory.283  
                                                                                                                 
 272. See id. at 631. To phrase the conclusion differently, if the process of voting is biased 
towards management relative to the stock market’s valuation then it will place a premium on 
dissident victory when the biased voter is indifferent to the results, as it does in this study. 
See id. However, this conclusion depends entirely on the assumption that the stock market 
reflects the “true” value of each outcome. Id. at 623. If the shareholder vote is viewed as the 
better valuation mechanism, then these results show a systematic bias in the stock market’s 
valuation of each outcome. Id. 
 273. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 259. 
 274. Id. at 258-59. 
 275. Id. at 239.  
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 239-40. 
 278. Id. at 240. 
 279. See id. at 241. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 258-59 (showing significance at the 1%, 10%, and 10% level respectively).  
 283. See id. 
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In some studies, the presence of institutional investors and large 
blockholders tend to favor the incumbent directors.284 Pound finds that 
higher levels of institutional ownership relate to lower chances for dissident 
victory.285 This correlation suggests that institutional investors have either 
conflicts of interest towards management or strategic alliances with 
management.286 Schrager similarly finds that management is more likely to 
win where institutional investors own more shares and where more shares 
are held in blocks of 5% or more.287 This may be because management 
exerts pressure on shareholders more effectively, which is a more important 
factor when there are fewer shareholders, or that management may place 
blocks of stock in friendly hand when they expect a proxy contest.288 
Dissidents have a better chance of winning when they own a larger 
percentage of the company or seek only to replace a minority of the 
board.289 In this way, the dissidents are able to gain the trust of the other 
shareholders.290 As expected, Pound finds that dissidents who have larger 
holdings or make formal offers to buy the company have higher chances of 
success.291 Dissidents that seek only minority representation on the board 
are also more successful than dissidents who want control of the board.292 
Shareholders naturally fear that dissidents may seek control of the board for 
the private benefits of control rather than to increase the profitability of the 
company.293 Owning larger portions of the company or making a formal 
offer to buy the company dissipates shareholders’ fears and helps dissidents 
to gain more votes.294  
  
                                                                                                                 
 284. Id. at 242. 
 285. Id. at 259 (showing significance at the 10% level in two regressions and at the 5% 
level in the other three regressions). 
 286. Id. at 259-60 (showing dissident holdings are significant at the 1% level in three of 
the five regressions, while making an offer is statistically significant at the 1% level in three 
of the three regression). 
 287. RONALD D. SCHRAGER, CORPORATE CONFLICTS: PROXY FIGHTS IN THE 1980S, at 51 
(1986) (showing t-statistics of 2.011 and 2.000 respectively). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Pound, supra note 259, at 260-61. 
 290. See id. 
 291. Id.; see also id. at 244-46 (explaining that, depending on the dissident’s goals, a 
formal tender offer may serve their interests better than a proxy contest). 
 292. Id. at 251 tbl.1, 261 (showing significance at the 1% level in all three regressions). 
 293. See id. 
 294. See id.; see also id. at 244-46 (explaining that, depending on the dissident’s goals, a 
formal tender offer may serve their interests better than a proxy contest). 
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2. Dissident Spending Impact 
As conventional electioneering strategy suggests, dissidents’ spending 
increases their chances of winning the proxy contest.295 Harris finds that 
challengers who win board seats spend more on the elections than those that 
lose.296 He confirms this with a logistic regression that shows that dissident 
spending positively relates to their chances of success.297 Interestingly, he 
does not find a statistically significant relationship between incumbent 
spending and their chances of success, using either a difference of means 
test or a logistic regression.298 This may be because the directors have 
access to the firm’s resources and can spend as much as they feel necessary 
to win the election.299 The fact that dissident spending plays a large role in 
determining proxy contests suggests that these contests may not be the most 
accurate mechanism for determining the best people to run the company.300 
3. Effect of Cumulative Voting 
The presence of cumulative voting greatly helps shareholders to gain 
some seats.301 Looking at representation contests, Duvall and Austin find 
that straight voting significantly decreases the dissidents’ chance of victory, 
compared to contests with cumulative voting.302 Ikenberry and Lakonishok 
also find that dissidents are more likely to gain a seat in elections with 
cumulative voting than in elections with straight voting.303 Austin finds that 
dissidents succeeded in approximately three-quarters of representation 
contests that involved cumulative voting.304 Cumulative voting may not 
help to give dissidents control of the board but it will help to give them 
representation.305 
                                                                                                                 
 295. Harris, supra note 69, at 1798. 
 296. Id. He finds that winners spend on average $730,912, while losers spend on average 
$468,969 on their election efforts. Id. A difference of means t-test finds a statistically 
significant difference at the 5% level. Id. 
 297. Id. at 1799-800 tbl.3 (showing significance at the 5% level).  
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. at 1807. 
 300. See id. at 1809-10. 
 301. See, e.g., Duval & Austin, supra note 73, at 468-69. 
 302. Id. (showing significance at the 1% level). All of the contests in their sample where 
dissidents succeeded in gaining representation used cumulative voting. Id. at 468. 
 303. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 413. They find that dissidents gain at 
least one seat in 46.3% of straight voting contests and at least one seat in 71.9% of 
cumulative voting contests. Id. 
 304. See AUSTIN, supra note 74, at 44.  
 305. See, e.g., Duval & Austin, supra note 73, at 468-69. 
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4. Voting Recommendations 
An Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) recommendation has a 
major impact on who wins the proxy contest.306 Alexander et al. find that a 
dissident wins the contest 55.06% of the time after receiving an ISS 
recommendation but only 41.28% after management receives a 
recommendation.307 A multivariate probit regression predicts that an ISS 
recommendation for the dissidents will increase their chances of winning by 
14.1 percentage points.308 When they add in a series of controls known to 
predict proxy contest outcomes, their model predicts that an ISS 
recommendation for dissidents will increase their chances of winning by 
29.5 percentage points.309 These results suggest that an ISS 
recommendation is a good predictor of contest outcome.310  
Alexander et al. also examine how an ISS recommendation affects the 
stock market’s valuation of each side.311 The stock market has a statistically 
significant positive reaction to an ISS recommendation for a dissident but 
no reaction to a recommendation for management.312 An ISS 
recommendation has a higher effect on the stock price of smaller 
companies.313  
                                                                                                                 
 306. See Alexander et al., supra note 132, at 4420. 
 307. See id. at 4439. A chi-squared test shows an association between a recommendation 
and winning significant at the 10% level. Id. These numbers are higher than the general 
probability of a dissident winning a proxy contest probably because ISS issued a 
recommendation in only 77.6% of proxy contests, presumably where the dissidents had a 
significant chance of winning. See id. at 4434 tbl.1.  
 308. Id. at 4444 (showing significance at the 6% level, heteroscedasticity-
robust z-statistic = 1.89). 
 309. Id. (showing significance at the 1% level, heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistic = 
2.75). 
 310. Id.  
 311. See id. at 4420. 
 312. Id. at 4422. For ISS recommendations for dissidents, they find positive abnormal 
returns of 3.76%, significant at the 1% level. Id. They find insignificantly abnormal returns 
of -0.56% for ISS management recommendation. Id. A t-test shows that the difference in 
abnormal return recommendations for management and dissidents is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Id. 
 313. Id. at 4438. Repeating the analysis on companies with asset values below the 
median, they find a CAR for endorsement of dissidents of 6.09% that is significantly greater 
at the 1% level than the CAR for endorsement of an incumbent of -0.82%. Id. 
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The enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) in October 
2000 weakened the effect of an ISS recommendation.314 Reg FD prohibits 
incumbent management from making selective disclosures to ISS and so 
decreases the information content of an ISS recommendation.315 Alexander 
et al. suggest that part of the recommendation’s effect on stock value occurs 
through a shift in the probability of each outcome (“the prediction effect”) 
and part occurs through additional information about the value of each 
outcome (“the certification effect”).316 They control for the prediction effect 
based on their earlier regression and reject the hypothesis of no certification 
effect.317 Investors rely on ISS recommendations to determine the value of a 
management or dissident victory, rather than just the probability of each 
outcome.318 An ISS recommendation affects the stock market’s valuation of 
a dissident’s victory but does not appear to affect the valuation of a 
management victory.319 This difference may be due to the uncertainty 
surrounding how dissidents would manage a company, since they do not 
have an active track record.320 
5. Earnings Management and Disclosure 
During a proxy contest, incumbent managers will manage the earnings of 
the company to make it appear more profitable.321 Looking at earnings 
reports released during the proxy campaign, DeAngelo finds significant 
unexpected earnings and unexpected accruals but no unexpected cash 
flows.322 If the unexpected earnings and accruals were the result of real 
increases in profitability, then one would also expect to see unexpected cash 
                                                                                                                 
 314. See id. at 4439. When they divide the sample around that date, they only find a 
statistically significant difference between a management and dissident recommendation in 
the period before the regulation. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See id. at 4420. 
 317. Id. at 4448 (showing significance at the 5% level). To do this, they use an OLS 
regression equation. See id. 
 318. See id.  
 319. See id. at 4449. A dissident recommendation increases the value associated with 
dissident victory by 8.4%, while a management recommendation decreases the value 
associated with a dissident victory by about 5.6%. Id. These figures are statistically 
significant using OLS standard errors at the 5% level but are not statistically significant 
using GMM standard errors. See id. 
 320. See id. at 4451. 
 321. DeAngelo, supra note 70, at 20. 
 322. See id. at 20-22. Using the random-walk model, she finds mean unexpected earnings 
of 0.01, significant at the 1% level, and mean unexpected accruals of 0.0195, significant at 
the 5% level. Id. at 21 tbl.5. 
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flow.323 To bolster her argument, she examines firms that do not release an 
earnings report during the contest and does not find any statistically 
significant unexpected earnings, unexpected accruals, or unexpected cash 
flow.324 She concludes that when an earnings report is released during a 
proxy contest, management takes the opportunity to manage earnings to 
make the firm appear more profitable.325 Collins and DeAngelo similarly 
find that managers’ accounting choices during the proxy contest artificially 
increase income.326  
Baginski et al. report that managers increase the rate of forward-looking 
disclosures during the campaign.327 They find no difference between the 
pre-contest and post-contest level of forward-looking disclosures.328 This 
suggests that managers may be increasing disclosures during the proxy 
contest to explain away poor performance or reduce undervaluation of the 
company.329 To judge whether the disclosures are more positive during the 
proxy contest, they examine how the stock market reacts to them.330 They 
find significantly negative CARs in response to disclosures before the 
campaign and statistically neutral reactions during the campaign.331 The 
                                                                                                                 
 323. See id. at 22.  
 324. See id. at 22-23. 
 325. See id.  
 326. Collins & DeAngelo, supra note 204, at 218-20. Using a random-walk model, they 
find mean unexpected accruals of 1.38% of total assets, which has a p-value of 0.0155 using 
a standard t-test. Id. at 220. Using an alternative model, they find a mean unexpected accrual 
of 1.82% of total assets, significant at the 0.0003 level. Id.  
 327. Stephen P. Baginski et al., Forward-Looking Voluntary Disclosure in Proxy 
Contests, 31 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1008, 1024-25 (2014). Baginski’s sample includes 
seventy proxy contests that occur between 1994 and 1999. See id. at 1019-22. They find 
0.2197 disclosures per month before the proxy contest compared to 0.4327 during it, 
significantly different at the 5% level. Id. at 1025 tbl.3. Using a smaller but more consistent 
sample of fifty-five firms, they find 0.3802 disclosures per month compared to 0.0970 after 
the contest, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. Using a multiple regression model, 
they find a strong positive correlation between being a proxy contest relative to the pre-
contest period and the frequency of disclosures, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 1028. 
Similarly, they find a strong negative correlation between the post-contest period relative to 
the contest period and the frequency of disclosures, significant at the 1% level. Id. 
 328. Id. at 1030. 
 329. Id. at 1008-09 (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, 
Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure 
Literatures, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405 (2001)). 
 330. See id. at 1033-34. 
 331. See id. at 1033. For the two years leading up to the contest, they find a mean CAR 
of -0.020, significant at the 1% level. Id. They find a mean CAR of 0.007 during the proxy 
contest, significant at the 1% level. Id. 
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disclosures may not have stock market reaction because investors 
understand that releases will be biased during the campaign.332 A multiple 
regression analysis confirms that disclosures are more positive during the 
campaign than before or after it.333 Another regression shows that the rate 
of positive forward-looking disclosures positively correlates the presence of 
a proxy contest.334 They next examine how the disclosures change when 
management wins or loses the proxy contest.335 They find that managers 
who won the contest temporarily increased their disclosures while the 
managers who lost did not.336 The authors suggest that the increased 
disclosures may have helped the managers to win the contest.337 Similarly, 
they rerun the multiple regressions examining stock market reaction and 
find that the disclosures were more positive for managers who won their 
contests.338 
6. Summary 
Incumbent directors appear to have a systematic advantage in proxy 
contests.339 Where the stock market would judge both sides as equal, the 
incumbent directors have a significantly higher chance of winning.340 Their 
position as directors allows them to manage the earnings reports of the 
company and release positive information to help themselves win.341 Other 
systematic factors give them a considerable advantage, such as the process 
                                                                                                                 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id. at 1034. A multiple regression model finds a negative correlation between a 
disclosure released before rather than during a proxy contest and market reaction to the 
disclosure, significant at the 1% level. Id. Another regression finds a significant negative 
correlation between a disclosure released before rather than during a proxy contest and 
market reaction to the disclosure. Id.  
 334. See id. at 1038-41. They find that rate of issuing positive disclosures positively 
relates to being in a proxy contest, significant at the 5% level. Id. 
 335. Id. at 1038-41. 
 336. Id. at 1038. Using an interaction term between being in the contest and dissidents 
winning and being in the post contest and dissidents winning, they find a negate coefficient 
for the first variable and a positive coefficient for the second variable, both significant at the 
5% level. Id. 
 337. Id. at 1041. 
 338. Id. Using interaction terms between the pre-proxy contest and dissidents winning 
and the post-contest and dissidents winning, they find positive coefficients, significant at the 
10% and 1% levels respectively. Id.  
 339. See supra Section II.B.1.  
 340. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 341. See supra Section II.B.5. 
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of soliciting proxies and the presence of institutional investors.342 While 
this may present a significant hurdle to dissidents, other factors can even 
the playing field.343  
The previous section demonstrated that dissidents have higher chances of 
winning at worse performing firms.344 Dissidents willing to spend their own 
money to invest in the company or run a better campaign may be able to 
ease the distrust of their fellow shareholders by demonstrating their 
dedication to the company.345 Cumulative voting can also help dissidents to 
get representation on the board, even if it will not help them to gain 
control.346 Finally, ISS can overcome collective action problems to 
effectively distinguish between dissidents likely to better manage the 
company from those who are not.347 The system may not be perfectly fair, 
but it presents each side with a very real chance of proving themselves and 
gaining the opportunity to run the company. 
III. Uncontested Director Elections 
The overwhelming majority of corporate elections are uncontested. 
Incumbents need not worry about losing their seats in these circumstances 
because state corporate law uses plurality voting, not majority voting, as the 
default rule for director elections. The combination of an uncontested 
election and a plurality voting system ensures that directors are almost 
guaranteed to get reelected.348 Under plurality voting rules in an 
uncontested election, shareholders can choose between voting “for” the 
candidate or “withholding” their vote.349 The director just needs a single 
vote, which can even be their own, to get reelected.350 Indeed, most 
directors get elected with more than 95% support from shareholders.351  
These concerns are compounded by the fact that free-rider problems may 
deter shareholders from taking the time and effort to seriously evaluate a 
                                                                                                                 
 342. See supra notes 274-288 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra Section II.A.5. 
 344. See supra Section II.A.5. 
 345. See supra Section II.B.2.  
 346. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 347. See supra Section II.B.4. 
 348. See Paul E. Fischer et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence 
from Uncontested Director Elections, 48 J. ACCT. & ECON. 172, 172 (2009). 
 349. See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor 
Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 85 (2008). 
 350. See id. 
 351. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 175, 176 tbl.2. They find a mean of 96.4% of 
support for directors and a median of 98% support. See id. at 176 tbl.2. 
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director’s performance.352 Also, shareholders may choose to sell their 
shares when directors mismanage a company rather than “withhold” their 
votes.353 Therefore, many commentators argue that uncontested director 
elections are a sham and an ineffective tool of corporate governance.354 
Others, however, contend that even minor drops in a director’s support can 
act as signal of shareholder disapproval and effectively discipline the 
director.355 
A. Determinants of Uncontested Election Outcomes 
1. Vote No Campaigns 
With this theory in mind, some shareholders have begun launching “just 
vote no” campaigns.356 Between 1990 and 2003, there were 112 such 
campaigns, mostly driven by institutional investors.357 These campaigns 
resulted in an average of 5.8% withheld votes, with 21.2% of campaigns 
having a withheld vote of greater than 20%.358 Studies evaluate whether 
director elections are a meaningful tool of corporate governance by 
examining what factors determine their results and how their results impact 
corporate governance.359 These studies show that shareholders vote based 
on the actions of individual directors rather than the overall company 
performance.360 While the evidence confirms that uncontested elections 
pose little threat to a director’s tenure on the board, they can have a 
meaningful impact on other aspects of corporate governance.361 
Cai et al. suggest that the results of a director election only weakly 
reflect the performance of the company.362 They show that the percentage 
of “for” votes that a director receives in an uncontested election reflects the 
company’s prior performance but has limited economic significance.363 Cai 
et al. find that having a poor operating performance predicts there will be 
                                                                                                                 
 352. See id. at 173 (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
(1957)). 
 353. See id. (citing Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership 
Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003)). 
 354. See id. at 172. 
 355. See id. 
 356. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 85. 
 357. See id.  
 358. Id. at 89. 
 359. See, e.g., id. at 85. 
 360. See, e.g., Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2416-17 (2009). 
 361. See, e.g., id. at 2417. 
 362. See, e.g., id. at 2399. 
 363. See id. 
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fewer “for” votes, but a standard deviation decrease in the industry-adjusted 
EBITDA-to-assets ratio only predicts a 0.37% decrease in support.364 
Similarly, Del Guercio et al. find barely significant evidence that groups 
start “just vote no” campaigns at companies with worse operating return on 
assets compared to their industry peers.365  
There is mixed evidence about the impact of stock returns on the results 
of a director election.366 Cai et al. fail to find any significant relationship 
between stock returns and voting outcome.367 Del Guercio et al., however, 
find stronger evidence that companies targeted for “just vote no” campaigns 
have negative market-adjusted stock returns over the previous year.368  
Fischer et al. find that a lower percentage of “for” votes in a director 
election predicts a more positive stock market reaction to a change in the 
CEO.369 This result suggests that shareholder votes in director elections are 
an accurate reflection of the management’s performance. While company 
performance has some role in director elections, shareholders appear to be 
looking at other factors in deciding whether to support a director or to 
withhold their vote.370 
2. Corporate Governance Effects 
The governance characteristics of the company have a strong relationship 
with the “for” votes cast for directors, albeit with small economic 
significance.371 Cai et al. find that lower ratings on the governance index, 
entrenchment index, and having both staggered board and poison pill 
provisions all predict fewer “for” votes at a statistically significant but 
                                                                                                                 
 364. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level). 
 365. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 93. In the third to second years before the 
start of the campaign, they find a difference of means of the operating performance 
significant at the 10% level but fail to find a significant difference of medians, compared to 
industry peers. See id. at 92 tbl.3. However, they fail to find a significant difference for mean 
or median in the year before the “just vote no” campaign. See id. 
 366. Compare Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2399, with Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, 
at 87 tbl.1. 
 367. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2399 (using two- and three-year excess returns to 
measure market performance). 
 368. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 87 tbl.1. They find that the mean and 
median market adjusted stock returns for the previous years for targeted companies are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%. See id. at 88. 
 369. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 177-79 (showing statistical significance at the 
1% level). 
 370. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2416-17. 
 371. See id. at 2399. 
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economically insignificant level.372 Their results reveal a similar 
relationship for the presence of a shareholder suit.373  
Board characteristics also have an impact on director elections.374 Larger 
boards, more outsiders on the boards, and higher ownership by directors 
predict more “for” votes.375 These results suggest that the features of a 
company’s corporate governance system affect a shareholder’s opinion of 
directors.376 
3. Bad Director Performance 
Evidence suggests that shareholders distinguish the actions of individual 
directors and hold directors accountable in specific instances for failing to 
perform their duties.377 Cai et al. find that the biggest determinant of a 
direct election, outside of a negative ISS recommendation, is failing to 
attend board meetings.378 In their study, directors that attended fewer than 
75% of board meetings received 14% fewer “for” votes in an uncontested 
election.379 Directors who abrogate their responsibilities will receive fewer 
“for” votes.380 Shareholders appear to react less to overall performance of 
the company and more to specific failures of the directors.381 
4. Impact of Weak Internal Controls 
Shareholders are more likely to “withhold” their votes for managing 
directors when there is a material weakness in the internal controls of a 
company.382 Starting in 2004, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that 
accelerated filers disclose the independent auditor’s opinion on the 
                                                                                                                 
 372. See id. at 2399, 2400 tbl.II (finding all significant at the 1% level). A standard 
deviation increase in their governance and entrenchment index all predict a decreased “for” 
votes of 0.43% and 0.4% respectively. Id.  
 373. See id. at 2399. The presence of a shareholder lawsuit predicts 1% fewer “for” 
votes, statistically significant at the 10% level. Id.  
 374. See id.  
 375. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level). 
 376. See id. 
 377. See, e.g., id. 
 378. See id. at 2404. 
 379. See id. (finding statistical significance at the 1% level). 
 380. See id. 
 381. See id. 
 382. Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye et al., Shareholder Voting in Director Elections and Initial 
SOX Section 404 Reports, 28 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 103, 104 (2013). Ye et al. collect a 
sample of 370 companies that received an adverse or disclaimer opinion on the effectiveness 
of internal control in the first year of the SOX section 404 auditor reports, and a 
corresponding industry matched control firms. See id. at 110, 112.  
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effectiveness of internal controls and in particular whether there was a 
material weakness.383 Studies suggest that internal control problems have 
negative consequences on the company including higher levels of debt, less 
accurate earnings forecasts, and a higher likelihood of receiving a modified 
audit opinion on financial statements.384 Management directors at firms 
with a material weakness in their internal controls received fewer votes than 
management directors in firms of the same industry.385  
Directors on the audit committee, however, did not receive significantly 
different voting results than their industry peers.386 Nonetheless, a 
disclosure restatement predicted significantly fewer votes for an audit 
committee director, but not fewer votes for a management director.387 
By contrast, Cai et al. fail to find a relationship between receiving an 
accounting restatement and the votes of an audit committee director.388 Ye 
et al. find that the more material weaknesses a company has predicts a 
higher percentage of votes withheld in an uncontested director election.389 
Disclosing a material weakness or deficiency, however, correlates with an 
increase in votes for management directors.390 These results suggest 
shareholders express their dissatisfaction with corporate management by 
withholding their vote.391 
5. Executive Compensation’s Role 
The ability of directors to ensure fair compensation of officers also 
significantly affects director elections.392 Cai et al. find that excess CEO 
compensation predicts fewer “for” votes in director elections.393 This is 
                                                                                                                 
 383. Id. at 104. 
 384. See id. at 106. 
 385. See id. at 114. A difference of means t-test shows that the difference is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. See id. at 114 tbl.3. A regression also shows that the presence of 
a material weakness predicts fewer votes for management directors, significant at the 10% 
level. Id. When the split material weakness into two variables, account balance-level 
weakness and company-level weakness, they find that both predict lower votes for 
management directors, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 118. 
 386. See id. at 114 tbl.3.  
 387. See id. at 115. A nontechnical restatement disclosure predicts fewer votes for an 
audit committee director, statistically significant at the 1% level. See id. 
 388. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2407.  
 389. See Ye et al., supra note 382, at 119 (showing significance at the 1% level). 
 390. See id. (showing statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels respectively). 
 391. See id.  
 392. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2399. 
 393. See id. (showing statistical significance at the 1% level). 
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particularly true when the director sits on the compensation committee.394 
Also, CEOs who serve as directors and receive excess compensation 
receive significantly fewer “for” votes than the other directors.395  
Ertimur et al. take advantage of the backdating scandal in 2006 and 2007 
to examine whether shareholders are more likely to cast “withhold” votes 
for directors that fail to properly oversee executive compensation.396 
Directors at firms caught up in the backdating scandal have more votes 
withheld than directors at other firms.397 Because a decade passed between 
when the backdating occurred and when the scandal became public, many 
directors at the backdating firms had no connection to the controversy.398 
While shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for both the 
backdating directors and the new directors, the shareholders withheld 
significantly more of their votes for backdating directors.399 These results 
suggest that shareholders are able to distinguish between different degrees 
of responsibility.400  
Shareholders blamed directors on the compensation committee more 
than directors on the auditing committee, and in turn, more than the other 
directors.401 Again, shareholders blamed directors who were on the 
compensation committee at the time of the backdating more than those who 
were not.402 This suggests that the directors who sat on the compensation 
                                                                                                                 
 394. See id. at 2407 (showing statistical significance at the 10% level). 
 395. See id.  
 396. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitor of Executive Pay: 
Evidence from Option Backdating, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 118, 121 (2012). They collect a sample 
of 178 firms involved in the scandal and a sample of control firms. See id. at 122. 
 397. See id. at 123. For directors caught in the backdating scandal, they found a mean 
and median withheld votes of 9.8% and 4.9%, compared to 4.9% and 2.2% respectively for 
directors at other companies, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A multiple regression 
confirms that shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for directors at the 
backdating firms, significant and positive around the 5% level. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. See id. Both groups see a positive correlation between being on the board and 
receiving a “withhold” vote relative to directors on other boards, significant at the 1% level. 
See id. at 125 tbl.2. However, the directors who were on the board during the backdating 
received 3.77% higher “withhold” votes. Id. at 123.  
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 123-24. When they divided the director of the backdating firms between 
compensation committee membership, auditing committee membership, and other directors, 
they find coefficients of 8.41, 5.79, and 4.06 respectively, all significantly more likely to 
receive a “withhold” vote at the 1% level. See id. at 125 tbl.2.  
 402. Id. at 123-24. Although all groups of the compensation committee had a statistically 
significant correlation at the 1% level, those also on the compensation committee during the 
backdating had a t-statistic of 7.41, compared to a t-statistic of 4.59 and 4.99 for those not on 
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committee at the time of the backdating received the largest penalty in 
“withhold” votes.403 It also suggests that shareholders view the backdating 
as a failure of the compensation committee rather than the auditing 
committee.404  
Directors received more “withhold” votes at firms that had more severe 
backdating.405 An ISS “withhold” recommendation based on the backdating 
correlated with higher percentage of “withhold” votes by shareholders.406 
This result may raise concerns that shareholders follow ISS 
recommendations too closely or mechanically.407 The directors at 
backdating firms received more “withhold” votes at other firms where they 
served as directors, but the results were largely statistically insignificant.408 
Shareholders appear not to penalize directors for their failings at other 
firms.409  
B. Key Players in Uncontested Elections 
1. Labor Union Voting Patterns 
In his paper, Agrawal claims that labor unions may use their votes to 
further their own interests, often at the expense of the company’s 
wellbeing.410 Agrawal further examines the voting habits of the AFL-CIO 
before and after part of the organization split off to become the Change to 
                                                                                                                 
the compensation committee or not on the board at all during the backdating. See id. at 125 
tbl.2.  
 403. Id. at 127. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 128. They divide directors between firms with backdating worth more than 
6.5% of assets and firms with less. Id. While both groups had significantly more “withhold” 
votes, the top half had a t-statistic of 6.10 in the regression model compared to 4.08 for the 
bottom half. See id. at 127 tbl.2. 
 406. See id. at 129. Of the firms involved in the backdating scandal, firms with an ISS 
“withhold” recommendation based on the backdating had a t-statistic of 10.92, compared to 
a coefficient of 4.99 at firms without a “withhold” recommendation by ISS. See id. at 127 
tbl.2. 
 407. Id. at 129.  
 408. Id. at 136. The directors of backdating firms received mean and median “withhold” 
votes at other firms of 5.8% and 2.6%, compared to 4.9% and 2.2% for directors who don’t 
serve at backdating firms. Id. However, the differences are economically small and don’t 
become statistically significant in multiple regressions. Id. 
 409. See id. at 139-41.  
 410. See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union 
Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 187 (2012).  
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Win (“CTW”) Coalition.411 He shows that the AFL-CIO varied its voting 
patterns based on whether or not it represented the workers of that 
company, thus leading to the inference that it is using its voting power as a 
tool in their labor struggles.412 The firms with AFL-CIO unions have 
similar characteristics as firms with CTW unions.413 The AFL-CIO is more 
likely to vote against directors at companies with AFL-CIO unions than 
those with no union.414 The difference suggests that the AFL-CIO’s votes 
are in part guided by its labor relations with the companies.415 The 
organization became significantly less likely to vote against a firm’s 
directors after it went from being an AFL-CIO union to a CTW union.416  
By comparison, mutual funds are more likely to vote for the directors at 
companies with unions and did not change their voting patterns after the 
move from AFL-CIO to CTW representation.417 The mutual funds’ voting 
                                                                                                                 
 411. Id. at 188-89. Specifically, he examines the AFL-CIO votes before and after part of 
the organization spun off in 2005 to form the Change to Win (“CTW”) Coalition, as well as 
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“UBCJA”) before and after 
joining the CTW Coalition in 2005. See id. at 188-90. They collect 10,407 votes by the AFL-
CIO between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2006. Id. at 194-95. On average, the 
organization supported 65% of director nominees. Id. at 195. 
 412. See id. at 190, 203. 
 413. See id. at 201-03. The notable difference is that the AFL-CIO firms have an average 
market capitalization of $32 billion, while the CTW firms have an average market 
capitalization of $23 billion. Id. at 201-02. Otherwise, the two groups have similar capital 
intensity, number of employees, return on assets, and asset growth. Id. at 202. 
 414. Id. at 203. For these purposes, “AFL-CIO firms” are those that have a AFL-CIO 
union both before and after the 2005 split off. See id. The AFL-CIO voted against 31% of 
directors at nonunionized firms and 44% of AFL-CIO firms. Id. Agrawal confirms that these 
differences are statistically significant. Id. A multiple regression confirms that the AFL-CIO 
was 11% more likely to vote against directors of unionized firms, statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Id. at 205 tbl.5, 206. 
 415. Id. at 203. 
 416. See id. When the CTW firms were represented by the AFL-CIO, the AFL-CIO 
voted against their directors in 45% of elections. Id. After the firms moved to CTW unions, 
the AFL-CIO voted against their directors in only 29% of elections. Id. A multiple 
regression confirms that the AFL-CIO became 17.9% more supportive of firms’ directors 
after they moved to CTW unions, statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. at 205 tbl.5, 
206. They find the same results when they repeat the regression with controls for governance 
characteristics and stock performance. Id. at 206. 
 417. Id. at 207. Agrawal examines the voting pattern of the Fidelity Spartan Total Market 
Index Fund, the Vanguard Institutional Total Stock Market Index Fund, and the TIAA-
CREF Equity Index Fund. Id. Vanguard was more likely to vote for the director of a firm 
with unionized works, statistically significant at the 5% level, while the other two funds had 
no statistically different result. See id. at 208 tbl.6. None of the funds had a statistically 
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tendencies suggest that unionization is not associated with lower director 
quality, eliminating one alternative explanation of the AFL-CIO’s voting 
pattern.418 Similarly, CalPERS, “the world’s largest public pension fund,” 
was not more likely to vote for or against directors of unionized firms and 
did not change their voting pattern in response to the change in union 
representation.419 
Agrawal suggests that the most reasonable explanation for AFL-CIO’s 
voting pattern is that the organization bases its decisions on the labor 
relations with the companies that it represents.420 Similarly, the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“UBCJA”) became 
more likely to vote against the directors of CTW firms after it joined the 
CTW.421 Agrawal claims that basing voting decisions on a union’s labor 
relations may be a common practice to other union pension funds.422  
The AFL-CIO is also more likely to vote against directors at firms 
experiencing management-union conflicts as compared to the other firms it 
represents.423 Agrawal argues that the AFL-CIO appears to use its 
shareholder voting power to influence the directors of firms where there are 
ongoing labor disagreements.424 Because the AFL-CIO pension fund 
controls $100 billion in assets, its vote can significantly affect a director 
                                                                                                                 
different likelihood of voting against the director after changing from AFL-CIO 
representation to CTW representation. See id.  
 418. See id. at 207. 
 419. See id. at 207, 208 tbl.6.  
 420. Id. at 187, 212. 
 421. Id. at 209. Specifically, the UBJCA became 21.7% more likely to vote against the 
directors of CTW firms after they joined the CTW, statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Id. at 208 tbl.6, 209. 
 422. Id. at 209. 
 423. Id. at 210-11. They use two proxies to assess the presence of labor strife: (1) 
whether any unfair labor practice charges were raised by the firm for unlawful attempts at 
strengthening union membership; and (2) whether any unfair labor practice charges were 
filed by the labor union against the firm for refusing to bargain collectively. Id. at 210. A 
multiple regression finds that the AFL-CIO is 17.7% more likely to vote against a director at 
a firm with unionization conflict compared to other firms the organization represents, 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and 13.9% more likely to vote against firms with 
collective bargaining conflicts with the AFL-CIO. See id. at 211 tb.7, 212.  
 424. See id. at 210. An alternative explanation is that the AFL-CIO is simply trying to 
remove directors who have created potentially value-decreasing labor conflicts. Id. To 
eliminate this possibility, the authors examine how the AFL-CIO’s voting pattern in 
response to labor strife changes at firms that move from AFL-CIO representation to CTW 
representation. See id. at 210, 211 tbl.7. They find that the pattern disappears and so 
eliminate the alternative explanation. Id. 
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election.425 On its own, AFL-CIO opposition to a director predicts 2.57% 
less support.426 The AFL-CIO’s use of its voting power to assist labor 
disputes appears to hurt shareholder value.427 When firms moved from 
representation by AFL-CIO to representation by CTW, their stock value 
increased.428 The stock price increase is more pronounced at firms that 
previously experienced AFL-CIO opposition to their directors compared to 
where the AFL-CIO supported their directors.429  
AFL-CIO appears to be an effective tool in benefiting labor unions.430 
Opposition to a firm’s directors predicts a decrease in the number of unfair 
labor practice findings, with a more pronounced effect when the AFL-CIO 
opposed the entire slate of directors.431 These results suggest that union 
pension funds vote with an eye to help the laborers, rather than just increase 
shareholder value, which appears to have a real benefit to the union at the 
expense of other shareholders.432 More broadly, the results suggest that 
directors respond to the votes of individual shareholders rather than just the 
aggregate election outcomes.433 
  
                                                                                                                 
 425. Id. at 215. 
 426. See id. at 215 tbl.8 (showing significance at the 1% level). They find that directors 
supported by the AFL-CIO receive on average 96.06% support, while directors opposed by 
the AFL-CIO receive on average 93.49% support. Id. at 214. 
 427. See id. at 216. 
 428. Id. The firms that move from AFL-CIO representation to CTW representation 
experience an average one-day abnormal return of 0.50%, statistically significant at the 1% 
level. See id. at 216, 217 tbl.9.  
 429. See id. at 216. Where the AFL-CIO previously opposed at least one director, the 
firm experienced a one-day abnormal return of 0.49%, statistically significant at the 1% 
level. See id. at 216, 217 tbl.9. Firms where the AFL-CIO did not oppose any directors do 
not have statistically significant abnormal returns. See id. at 216-18. Similarly, firms that 
experienced labor strife with the AFL-CIO had statistically significant abnormal returns, 
while the firms without labor strife had no statistically significant abnormal returns. Id. at 
218. 
 430. See id. at 218-19.  
 431. See id. at 219. The AFL-CIO opposition to at least one director predicted a 2.5% 
decrease in unfair labor practice filings, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 219, 220 tbl.10. 
AFL-CIO opposition to the entire slate of directors predicted a 11.5% reduction in union 
conflicts. Id. 
 432. See id. at 219-20.  
 433. Id. at 220. Agrawal suggests that analogous results may be found with other entities 
such as public pension funds, family shareholders, and government owners. Id. at 221. 
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2. Mutual Fund Voting 
Mutual funds are more likely to support management, perhaps also with 
an eye to self-interest.434 In 2003, the SEC created a new rule that required 
mutual funds to report their votes in shareholder elections, allowing 
researchers to study their voting patterns.435 Matvos and Ostrovsky find that 
some mutual funds have a greater propensity to vote for management than 
others, irrespective of company and director characteristics.436 These 
mutual funds may be “trying to build a reputation for management 
friendliness.”437 Mutual funds are also more likely to vote for directors 
when a higher percentage of other funds are voting for that director, which 
the authors call the “peer effect.”438  
Similarly, Cai et al., find that brokers are more likely to vote for the 
directors than other shareholders.439 This result is important because 
brokers vote on average 13.1% of outstanding shares.440 In fact, eliminating 
the broker’s votes would reduce overall “for” votes by 2.5%, a significant 
portion considering that directors normally receive only 5% “withhold” 
votes.441 Their regressions predict that a swing of this magnitude in election 
                                                                                                                 
 434. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Heterogeneity and Peer Effects in Mutual 
Fund Proxy Voting, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 90, 90 (2010). 
 435. Id. Matvos and Ostrovsky construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 votes by 
2774 mutual funds in 13,588 director elections of 1388 companies that occurred from July 1, 
2003 to June 30, 2005. Id. at 94. An average of 152 funds vote for each director. Id. 
Elections are made up of 16.7% of inside directors, 70.7% outside directors, and 12.6% 
outside related directors. Id. 
 436. Id. at 96-97. They note that if the fund’s voting decisions responded only to director 
characteristics, there would not be systematic differences in voting patterns. Id. A multiple 
regression shows that the percentage of “for” votes in a given year positively correlates with 
a “for” vote in a given election in the subsequent year. Id. at 97. Matvos and Ostrovsky rerun 
the regression while controlling for firm and director characteristics and see the same result. 
Id. They rerun the regression again with separate fixed effects for each shareholder meeting 
and fixed effects for each director election and find the same correlation. Id. 
 437. Id. at 97. 
 438. Id. Matvos and Ostrovsky avoid simply running a regression to see how the votes of 
other mutual funds predicts a given mutual fund’s vote because they don’t think they can 
control for every other factor that determines a fund’s vote. Id. Instead, they use the other 
mutual funds’ propensity to support management as an instrument for the other funds’ votes. 
Id. They find a statistically significant relationship between the other funds’ propensity to 
support management and the mutual fund’s vote with a linear probability model, statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Id. at 97, 100. They confirm this result by adding in controls and 
using alternative ways of instrumenting. See id. at 100.  
 439. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2415. 
 440. Id. 
 441. See id. 
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results would reduce CEO compensation by $600,000, increase the odds of 
CEO turnover by 1.07, and increase the odds of removing a poison pill by 
1.08, as examined in more detail below.442 
3. ISS Recommendation Effect 
The single biggest factor impacting a director election appears to be a 
recommendation from the ISS.443 There is evidence that ISS issues a 
“withhold” recommendation in 0.8% of director elections.444 Cai et al. find 
that an ISS “withhold” recommendation predicts that the director will 
receive 19% fewer “for” votes.445 Choi et al. find that a “withhold” 
recommendation by ISS predicts 10.7% fewer “for” votes by institutional 
investors and thus an overall 6.4% fewer “for” votes.446 The 
recommendation of Glass Lewis, another proxy advisor firm, also has a 
significant impact on the outcome of a director election, while the 
recommendations of Proxy Governance and Egan Jones do not.447  
Because proxy advisors, especially ISS, play such a large role in director 
elections, it is important to understand what factors determine how they 
vote.448 Choi et al. identify fourteen factors that have a statistically 
significant relationship with whether ISS issues a “for” or “withhold” 
recommendation.449 Eight of the ten board-related factors are statistically 
                                                                                                                 
 442. See id. at 2415-16. 
 443. Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 
869, 871 (2010). 
 444. Id. at 886. 
 445. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2404 (showing significance at the 1% level). 
 446. See Choi et al., supra note 443, at 903. They first use a multiple regression to show 
that an ISS recommendation has a significant correlation with the outcome of a director 
election. See id. at 894. They note that adding the variable for an ISS recommendation 
increased the predictive power of their regression from an R2 of 0.109 to 0.185. Id. at 895. 
Attempting to differentiate causation from correlation, they work off the assumption that ISS 
influences the votes of institutional investors and not individuals. See id. at 894. They rerun 
the multiple regression with two interaction variables: one multiplying the voting 
recommendation by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors and the second 
multiplying the voting recommendation by the fraction of shares not held by either directors 
or institutional investors. See id. at 901. This essentially works off the assumption that, 
absent the ISS recommendation, the institutional investors would vote the same way as 
individuals, thus producing the predicted effect of an ISS recommendation. See id. at 901-
02. 
 447. Id. at 905. 
 448. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 649, 651 (2008). 
 449. See id. at 671-72 tbl.3. The factors that make ISS significantly more likely to issue a 
“withhold” recommendation are being a CEO, an SEC investigation within the past two 
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significant, with some also having economic significance, such as failing to 
act on a proxy issue proposal that received majority support, attending less 
than three-quarters of board meetings, being an employee of the company, 
and being an outside director linked to the company; each factor increases 
the probability of a “withhold” recommendation from ISS.450 Interestingly, 
ISS was significantly less likely to issue a “withhold” recommendation for 
directors who had golden parachutes.451 In addition, being a CEO, serving 
on the compensation committee, having a classified board, or having 
cumulative voting each increased the probability of a “withhold” 
recommendation.452 Finally, new directors were less likely to receive a 
“withhold” recommendation.453 Relative to other proxy advisor firms, ISS 
paid less attention to compensation-related factors and no attention to audit- 
or disclosure-related factors.454 
C. The Effects of Uncontested Elections 
1. Effect of Weak Shareholder Support 
Evidence is mixed on whether low shareholder support will affect a 
director’s chances to remain in office.455 Cai et al. fail to find any 
relationship between director elections and subsequent director turnover.456 
They also fail to find a relationship between the election results and the 
director tenure at other firms.457 This result tends to support the view of 
director elections as meaningless charades of shareholder democracy.458  
Aggarwal et al., however, find that low shareholder support in an 
uncontested director election can have a meaningful impact on the 
                                                                                                                 
years, being on the compensation committee, having excess CEO compensation in the top 
5% of the sample, attending less than 75% of board meetings, being on at least three other 
major boards, being on the nominating committee, being an employee of the company, being 
an outside director with affiliate link to the company, owning more than 20% of the 
company, failing to implement a proxy issue proposal that received majority support, having 
a classified board, and having cumulative voting. See id. Factors that make an ISS “for” 
recommendation significantly more likely are being a new director, being an interlocking 
director, being a chairman and not an employee, and having a golden parachute. See id. 
 450. See id. at 673. 
 451. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).  
 452. See id. 
 453. See id. 
 454. See id. at 675. 
 455. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2414. 
 456. See id. 
 457. See id. 
 458. See id. 
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director’s career.459 Directors that receive more “withhold” votes are more 
likely to leave within the next year.460 Naturally, directors at firms with 
classified boards are less likely to leave within a year than directors at firms 
without classified boards.461 This result is because directors on classified 
boards only face election every three years.462 Additionally, a director that 
receives a higher percentage of votes withheld is likely to lose director 
positions at other firms.463 The authors next look at directors who stay on 
the board despite receiving low support from shareholders.464 A director 
who receives low support but still stays on the board is more likely to lose a 
committee position.465 Overall, their results suggest that “withhold” votes 
still have a negative impact on directors, both at the at issue company and at 
other companies.466  
2. CEO Turnover 
The percentage of “withhold” votes at an uncontested director election 
can also significantly impact the firm’s corporate governance.467 Fischer et 
al. find that a lower percentage of “for” votes predicts a higher rate of CEO 
turnover.468 Their results are also economically significant.469 A CEO at a 
company with the lowest quintile of board approval is two and half times as 
likely to suffer a forced turnover as a CEO at a company in the top 
quintile.470  
                                                                                                                 
 459. See Reena Aggarwal et al., The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from 
Uncontested Director Elections 3-4 (Georgetown McDonough Sch. of Bus. Research Paper 
No. 2609532, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2609532. The authors limit their sample to 
outside directors. See id. at 12. They look at all director elections between 2003 and 2014. 
See id. Their final sample includes 83,496 director elections. See id. at 18. 
 460. See id. at 23 (showing significance at the 1% level). Their regression also shows that 
if ISS makes an “against” recommendation, then the director is more likely to leave within 
the next year. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level).  
 461. See id. at 25-26.  
 462. See id.  
 463. See id. at 27, 48 tbl.7 (showing significance at the 1% level).  
 464. See id. at 28.  
 465. See id. at 29.  
 466. See id. at 33. 
 467. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 173. 
 468. See id. at 180 (showing statistical significance at the 1% level). 
 469. See id. 
 470. See id. A CEO in the lowest quintile of board approval has a 1.9% chance of 
suffering a forced turnover, compared to a 5.1% chance for a CEO at a company in the 
lowest quintile of board approval. Id. 
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By contrast, however, Cai et al. find a negative but insignificant 
relationship between shareholder support for a director and the rate of 
subsequent CEO turnover.471 This suggests that shareholder approval may 
be only a weak predictor of subsequent CEO turnover.472 Interestingly, 
when Cai et al. distinguish between inside and independent directors, they 
find that the support for independent directors has a significant negative 
correlation with subsequent CEO turnover, while inside directors do not 
have a statistically significant relationship.473 In their model, a standard 
deviation decrease in support for an independent director predicts a 20% 
greater likelihood of a CEO turnover.474 These results suggest that inside 
directors are less likely than independent directors to respond to shareholder 
dissatisfaction and replace the company’s CEO.475  
Fischer et al. rerun their regressions for CEO turnover rate and market 
reaction with variables for both the percentage of voter support out of 
shares voted and for the percentage of shares voted out of all shares, a 
proxy for shareholder apathy.476 Shareholder support has similar results as 
before, while the shareholder apathy has insignificant results.477 These 
results suggest that the market reaction to a CEO turnover is driven by the 
percentage of shareholders who vote for a director, not by the percentage of 
shareholders who vote overall.478 When there is a forced CEO turnover, the 
lower board approval predicts a higher likelihood that the CEO will be 
replaced by someone outside of the company.479 Similarly, lower board 
                                                                                                                 
 471. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2411. 
 472. See id. The different results may be explained by the different statistical procedures 
used. See id. at 2410. Cai et al. use a two-stage approach to control for the endogeneity of 
votes, such that they include firm performance to explain the director votes and use the 
residual to explain CEO turnover in the second stage. See id. Fischer et al. more simply use a 
multiple regression where they control for various measures of firm performance. See 
Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 180. 
 473. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2410-11.  
 474. See id. at 2410. 
 475. See id. at 2411. 
 476. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 186-87. 
 477. See id. at 187. The percentage of shareholder support out of votes cast had a 
significantly negative relationship with both CEO turnover rate and market reaction to the 
turnover rate, just as before. See id. The variable for apathy, the percentage of shares voted 
out of shares outstanding, did not have a significant correlation with the market reaction to 
CEO turnover but did have a significantly negative relationship to the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. See id.  
 478. See id. 
 479. See id. at 181-82. 
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approval predicts an increased likelihood that there will be a director 
turnover in the following year.480  
Del Guercio et al. similarly report that “just vote no” campaigns increase 
the likelihood of CEO turnover.481 They find that a “just vote no” campaign 
resulted in a CEO turnover 31% of the time and a forced CEO turnover 
25% of the time.482 These rates were significantly higher than similarly 
performing control firms.483 Del Guercio et al. find that these companies 
have significantly negative abnormal returns in the 250 days leading up to 
the forced CEO turnover and significantly positive returns in the two days 
surrounding the announcement.484 Their results suggest that director 
elections can have a meaningful impact on corporate elections, even if not 
by directly replacing the directors.485 
The CEO turnover resulting from poor election results tends to increase 
the profitability of the company.486 Del Guercio et al. find that companies 
targeted for “just vote no” campaigns tend to have higher operating returns 
on assets in the three years following the campaign compared to industry 
peers.487 However, when they remove the firms with a forced CEO turnover 
in the year following the campaign, the results become insignificant.488 In 
contrast, Cai et al. fail to find a relationship between election results and 
subsequent firm performance.489  
                                                                                                                 
 480. See id. at 182 tbl.6 (showing significance at the 5% level). 
 481. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 97.  
 482. See id.  
 483. See id. at 97 tbl.5. They find that the target firms have higher rates of CEO turnover, 
with a difference of means and medians significant at the 5% level. See id. They find that the 
targeted firms have significantly higher rates of forced CEO turnover, with a difference of 
means and medians significant at the 1% level. See id. 
 484. See id. at 101 tbl.7. For the 250 days leading up to the forced CEO turnover, they 
find a mean negative abnormal return of -42.75% and a median of -40.28%, both significant 
at the 1% level. See id. For the two days surrounding the announcement, they find mean 
abnormal returns of 2.52%, significant at the 1% level, and a median of 2.88%, significant at 
the 5% level. See id. 
 485. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 180. 
 486. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 93. 
 487. See id. When they control for both industry and prior performance, they find a 
difference of means significant at the 5% level and a difference of medians significant at the 
1% level. See id. at 92 tbl.2. When they control for only industry, they find a difference of 
means significant at the 10% level and no significant difference of medians. See id. 
 488. See id. at 101 tbl.7. 
 489. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2414. 
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Overall, these results provide some evidence that poor elections results 
increase the likelihood of CEO turnover, which in turn improves the 
performance of the company.490 
3. Corporate Governance and Takeover Defenses 
Director elections can help to bring the corporate governance practices of 
the company into line with shareholders’ expectations491 by, for example, 
reigning in excess CEO compensation.492 Cai et al. find that director 
elections impact the subsequent change in excess CEO compensation, 
especially for directors on the compensation committee.493 A 1% decrease 
in the votes for a compensation committee member predicts a reduction in 
unexplained CEO compensation of $143,000 in the following year.494 If the 
director is the chair of the compensation committee, then a 1% decrease in 
their votes predicts a decrease in excess CEO compensation of $220,000 in 
the following year.495 By contrast, election results for directors not on the 
compensation committee appear not to impact the subsequent CEO excess 
compensation.496 Similarly, Fischer et al. find that higher shareholder 
support for directors predicts higher subsequent excess CEO compensation, 
although these results are statistically insignificant.497 
The results of director elections can increase the likelihood of removing 
a poison pill.498 Cai et al. find weak evidence that lower director support 
increases the likelihood of a company removing its poison pill.499 Their 
initial results indicate a significant negative relationship between election 
results and removing the poison pill, but the relationship disappears when 
controls are added for firm characteristics.500 However, lower support for a 
                                                                                                                 
 490. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 93. 
 491. See, e.g., Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2408. 
 492. See id. 
 493. See id. 
 494. Id. at 2410 (showing a coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level). 
 495. See id. (showing a coefficient significant at the 1% level). 
 496. See id.  
 497. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 183, 184 tbl.7. They fail to find a correlation 
between board approval and CEO compensation, but they find a correlation between the 
quintile rank of board approval and CEO compensation, statistically significant at the 1% 
level, and a negative correlation between being in the lowest quintile and CEO excess 
compensation, statistically significant at the 5% level. See id. at 184 tbl.7.  
 498. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2411. 
 499. See id. 
 500. See id.  
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governance committee member significantly predicts a higher chance of 
removing the poison pill.501  
Weak election results do not affect the odds of declassifying the board.502 
Interestingly, however, an increase in the dispersion of election results 
between the directors does significantly increase the likelihood of 
declassifying the board.503 
The level of shareholder approval of the directors also impacts 
companies’ acquisition activity.504 Fischer et al. show that higher 
shareholder support for directors predicts a worse market reaction to a 
subsequent announcement that the company will be acquiring another 
firm.505 They also find a weak correlation between director support in an 
election and subsequent acquisition activity.506 External financiers or board 
members may be more likely to be careful in their analysis of proposed 
acquisitions when they are perceived to be poorly managing the 
company.507 There is also a negative correlation between shareholder 
approval of directors and the average subsequent divestiture market 
return.508 Lower support for directors also predicts more divestiture activity 
in the following year.509 Fischer et al. suggest that firm assets are likely to 
be underperforming at firms with low board approval, which increases 
returns on divestitures and the probability of more divestitures since there 
should be more valuable divestiture opportunities.510 Overall, their results 
suggest that uncontested director elections can play a meaningful role in 
reflecting investors’ perceptions of board performance.511 
The board’s structure also determines whether the shareholders’ votes 
will meaningfully impact corporate governance. Gal-Or et al. examine 
elections for directors on the audit committee to determine whether 
                                                                                                                 
 501. See id. (showing significance at the 5% level both with and without controls). 
 502. See id. at 2414. 
 503. See id. at 2414 tbl.7 (showing significance between 5% and 1% levels). 
 504. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 184. 
 505. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level). 
 506. See id. at 185. They fail to find a correlation between board approval and later 
acquisition activity but find a correlation between the quintile of board approval and 
subsequent acquisition activity, significant at the 5% level. See id. 
 507. See id. at 184. 
 508. See id. at 185 (showing significance at the 1% level). 
 509. See id. at 185-86. They find the correlation between board approval and the number 
of divestitures is statistically significant at the 1% level, but using quintile measures is 
significant at the 5% level. See id. at 186. 
 510. See id. at 185.  
 511. See id. at 187. 
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staggered boards affect the impact of director elections.512 They postulate 
that directors on staggered boards are more insulated from the opinion of 
shareholders because they are elected only once every three years and 
therefore may be less responsive to shareholder concerns.513  
They find that accounting financial experts on the audit committee are 
more likely to be turned over following low shareholder support, but only if 
they sit on a non-staggered board.514 Furthermore, weak shareholder 
approval increases the likelihood that the departing accounting financial 
expert will be replaced with another accounting financial expert on non-
staggered boards, but is not significant for staggered boards.515 Audit 
committees on non-staggered boards are more likely to increase the number 
of meetings following low support from shareholders, which the authors 
use as a proxy for diligence.516 
Low shareholder support, however, does not lead to any change in 
meeting frequency for audit committees of staggered boards.517 The low 
shareholder support also does not increase the number of board meetings or 
compensation committee meetings at companies with either staggered or 
non-staggered boards.518 Low shareholder support in audit committee 
elections also reduces money spent on tax non-audit services, but only for 
non-staggered boards.519 The non-staggered boards decreased discretionary 
accruals following low support from shareholders, while staggered boards 
remained insignificant.520  
                                                                                                                 
 512. Ronen Gal-Or et al., The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting in Staggered and Non-
Staggered Boards: The Case of Audit Committee Elections, 35 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & 
THEORY 73 (2016). Their sample includes more than 18,296 director elections in more than 
6786 firm year observations between 2004 and 2010. Id. at 74. 
 513. See id.  
 514. See id. at 87 (showing significance at the 5% level). The authors found no 
relationship between the level of support for a director who is on the committee and is an 
accounting financial expert and the likelihood of that director’s turnover. See id. For these 
directors on non-staggered boards, receiving low support increases the likelihood of turnover 
by 5.2%. See id.  
 515. See id. (showing significance at the 5% level). 
 516. See id. (showing significance at the 5% level). The regression suggests that the 
number of meetings increases by 3.7 meetings. See id.  
 517. See id.  
 518. See id. at 87-89.  
 519. See id. at 89 (showing significance at the 10% level). The authors acknowledge 
however that the economic significance of the reduction is small, only about 2.9 for firms 
with the highest spending. See id.  
 520. See id. at 91-92 (showing significance at the 5% level). 
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As a whole, their study suggests non-staggered boards are more 
responsive to shareholders than staggered boards.521 The study also 
suggests that researchers should be cognizant of whether they are looking at 
staggered or non-staggered boards when studying the impact of uncontested 
director elections.522  
4. Shift to Majority Voting 
Choi et al. argue that firms experienced a major shift from plurality 
voting to majority voting between 2005 and 2015 and that this shift has 
affected uncontested director elections.523 If a director’s election is 
uncontested, then that director needs only a single vote to win reelection 
under a plurality voting system.524 Under a majority voting system, 
however, the director would still need support from a majority of 
shareholders.525 Despite the increased accountability allegedly created by 
majority voting, directors are much less likely to fail to receive a majority 
of shareholder support in a majority voting system compared to a plurality 
voting system.526  
Choi et al. find that this difference largely results from the self-selection 
of firms to move from plurality voting to majority voting.527 The motivation 
for shifting from plurality to majority voting changed between the first half 
of the period, from 2007 to 2009, and the latter half of the period, from 
2010 to 2012.528 The early adopters self-selected, while the later adopters 
                                                                                                                 
 521. See id. 
 522. See id. 
 523. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1120, 1120-24 (2016). Their data set includes 64,933 elections between 2007 
and 2013. Id. at 1135. The number of firms with majority voting has grown from 16% of 
S&P 500 companies in 2006 to almost 90% in 2014. See id. at 1127.  
 524. See id. at 1121. 
 525. See id.  
 526. See id. at 1122. Between 2007 and 2013, 0.03% of directors at majority firms failed 
to receive majority support, compared to 0.6% at plurality firms. See id. at 1129 (showing a 
significant difference at the 1% level). 
 527. See id. Firms that decided to switch from plurality to majority voting in 2011 were 
less likely to have previously received a “withhold” recommendation or a significant number 
of “withhold” votes from shareholders compared to firms who did not switch. See id. at 
1140. The authors confirm this result using a Cox proportional hazard model. See id. at 
1141. Additionally, firms with a poison pill were less likely to adopt majority voting. See id. 
at 1142. Interestingly, companies with better stock performance were less likely to adopt 
majority voting. See id. Shareholders apparently seek more accountability from firms that 
are not performing as well. See id. 
 528. See id. at 1146.  
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were responding to shareholder pressure.529 The adoption of majority voting 
results in a decreased likelihood of receiving a “withhold” vote of more 
than 30% by 2 to 3 percentage points.530 When divided between early and 
late adopters, the decreased likelihood has a much higher magnitude and 
statistical significance for the late adopters compared to the early 
adopters.531 Directors are much less likely to miss more than 25% of board 
meetings after the adoption of majority voting as compared to before.532  
However, boards are no more likely to implement shareholder proposals 
after adopting majority voting.533 Given that a director has committed 
certain “offensive” conduct, leading to them receiving a “withhold” 
recommendation from ISS, the odds of a majority of shareholders casting a 
“withhold” vote is higher at firms with plurality voting than at firms with 
majority voting.534 These results suggest that directors engage in certain 
electioneering practices, but it is unclear exactly which practices.535 
Overall, majority voting adds a new dimension to director elections that 
deserves further study.  
5. Summary 
Empirical studies paint a picture of director elections that are more 
meaningful than the dearth of competition and uniformly high rate of “for” 
votes would suggest.536 Simultaneously, however, the elections act less as a 
direct check on the directors’ ability to maintain profits and more to ensure 
                                                                                                                 
 529. See id. When the authors split the sample between firms that adopted majority 
voting between 2007 and 2009 and those that adopted it between 2010 and 2012, the ISS 
“withhold” recommendation and the presence of the poison pill remain significant only for 
the early adopters, while abnormal returns remains significant only for the later adopters. See 
id. 
 530. See id. at 1150 (showing significance at the 1% level).  
 531. See id. at 1151. Additionally, firms that adopt majority voting are less likely to 
receive a high “withhold” vote relative to their industry matched peers. See id. at 1153 
(showing significance at the 1% level). When split between early and later adopters, the 
difference from industry match peers remains statistically significant only for late adopters. 
See id. at 1156-57. 
 532. See id. at 1167, 1169 tbl.8 (showing significance at the 5% level).  
 533. See id. at 1164.  
 534. See id. at 1173. The other conduct that the authors considered to be “offensive” was 
to miss more than 25% of board meetings. See id. When the authors split the sample between 
early adopters and late adopters, they find evidence that early adopters are doing 
electioneering, while late adopters are not. See id. 
 535. See id. at 1166. 
 536. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 173.  
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that they continue to perform their responsibilities.537 Company 
performance has only a limited impact on the outcome of a director 
election, with results ranging from a statistically but not economically 
significant relationship to no relationship at all.538  
The ability of directors to perform their stated duties appears to have a 
larger effect on their election results, somewhat irrespective of how it 
impacts the company’s bottom line.539 Directors receive fewer “for” votes 
when they allow the CEO to receive excess compensation.540 Shareholder 
can even distinguish between the failings of different directors.541 When 
there is a material weakness in the internal controls of the company, 
shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for management 
directors but not directors on the audit committee.542 One of the biggest 
factors impacting election results is the director’s neglect of responsibilities 
and failure to attend three-quarters of the board meetings.543  
These results perhaps show that shareholders can distinguish between the 
performance of the company and the performance of its directors.544 They 
may also show that free-rider problems prevent shareholders from assessing 
how the director’s decisions affect the company’s profitability and instead 
rely on heuristic cues to make voting decisions, such as board meeting 
attendance.545 The strong impact of ISS decisions, even when performance 
is controlled for, points toward the latter interpretation.546 Interestingly, 
while the specific failures of directors hurt the election results, poor election 
results have a greater impact on a company’s management than specific 
directors.547  
While some evidence suggests that low support for directors will lead to 
their resignation, often directors will replace the company’s management 
and keep a tight hold on to their own seats. Thus, uncontested director 
elections can be understood as keeping corporate governance on track 
without passing judgment on the efficacy of corporate policies. 
                                                                                                                 
 537. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 538. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 539. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 540. See supra Section III.A.5. 
 541. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 542. See supra Section III.A.4. 
 543. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 544. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 545. See supra Section III.A.3 and text accompanying note 352. 
 546. See supra Section III.B.3. 
 547. See supra Section III.C.1. 
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IV. Management Proposals 
A. In General 
Unlike director elections and proxy contests, management proposals 
often have a binding effect and give shareholders a direct say on directors’ 
governance of the corporation.548 These proposals also raise collective 
action concerns.549 Most shareholders own too few shares to make a 
meaningful impact on the vote tally and so may maintain a rational 
ignorance of the corporation’s affairs.550 Some practical aspects of the 
proxy process may give managers an inherent advantage in receiving votes 
for their proposals.551 Managers can bundle controversial proposals with 
favorable ones.552 Managers can also hire proxy solicitors to help pass 
proposals.553  
At first glance, shareholders appear to rubber stamp management 
proposals.554 On average, about 80% of shareholders support the 
management proposal.555 Less than 2% of management proposals fail to 
receive the necessary support from shareholders.556 
Management appears to have a significant structural advantage in 
winning the necessary votes to pass their management proposals.557 By 
examining the continuity of the distribution of close votes, Listokin finds 
significantly more management proposals that just barely pass than just 
barely fail to pass, suggesting that management is able to influence close 
votes to secure passage.558 He rejects the possible explanation that 
                                                                                                                 
 548. Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, Corporate Voting and the Proxy Process: 
Managerial Control Versus Shareholder Oversight 4-5 (paper presented at Tuck-JFE 
Contemporary Corp. Governance Conference, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=236099.  
 549. Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting 
Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules, 13 REV. FIN. 47, 47-48 (2008). 
 550. See Bethel & Gillan, supra note 548, at 4-5. 
 551. See id. at 5. 
 552. See id. at 7.  
 553. Id. at 8. 
 554. See id. at 2-3. 
 555. See Maug & Rydqvist, supra note 549, at 63 (finding that management proposals 
between 1994 and 2003 received 82.8% of shareholder support on average).  
 556. See id. (finding that management proposals pass 98.5% of the time); Bethel & 
Gillan, supra note 548, at 2-3.  
 557. See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 159, 173-74 (2008). 
 558. See id. at 173. Listokin uses a “caliper test” to determine the probability that the 
discontinuity surrounding the 50% mark is due to random chance. Id. (using the caliper test 
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management works to get to the 50% mark and then stops because the votes 
follow simple majority rules where the total number of votes that will be 
cast is itself uncertain.559  
As a comparison, he looks at the distribution of votes on shareholder-
sponsored resolutions, which are nonbinding, and finds that the distribution 
can easily be attributed to chance.560 He also finds that larger companies 
have a higher likelihood of winning a close election, while the level of 
institutional ownership and the score on the governance index has no 
significant association.561 These numbers may reflect management’s ability 
to track the results of the vote as they come in (accurate within a single 
percentage point) and intercede to shift the balance of close elections.562 
1. Bundling 
Another form of potential abuse is that managers can bundle separate 
issues together into a single management proposal in order to achieve the 
result that they want.563 In 1992, the SEC implemented “Unbundling Rules” 
that prohibit companies from bundling together multiple voting items into a 
single box on the ballot.564 Cox et al. discover that some form of bundling 
occurs in 28% of management proposals in their sample.565 Bundled 
proposals include items that would increase shareholder rights in nearly 
three times as many cases as items relating to restricting shareholder 
rights.566 However, many of the cases that would expand shareholder rights 
relate to board declassification, where there is no intrinsic need for the 
items to be bundled.567  
                                                                                                                 
suggested by Alan Gerber & Neil Malhotra, Do Statistical Reporting Standards Affect What 
Is Published? Publication Bias in Two Leading Political Science Journals, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 
313 (2008)). The test shows that the odds that the distribution is a result of random chance is 
less than one in a billion. Id. 
 559. See id. at 173-74.  
 560. See id. at 174-75. 
 561. Id. at 175-76 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 562. See id. at 176-77. 
 563. James D. Cox et al., Quieting the Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of 
Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2016). They 
collect a sample of 1349 management proposals between 2003 and 2012. Id. at 1220-21.  
 564. Id. at 1178.  
 565. Id. at 1220-21. More specifically, bundling with at least one material item occurs in 
23% of cases. Id. at 1221. Finally, a bundling of two or more material issues occurs in 18% 
of cases. Id. at 1222.  
 566. Id. at 1228. 
 567. Id.  
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Proxy advisors, particularly ISS and Glass Lewis, make their voting 
recommendations for bundled proposals “based on the perceived net effect 
of the items in the bundle.”568 ISS recommended an “against” vote for less 
than 10% of the items with some degree of bundling.569 All of the proposals 
with the “against” recommendation tended to restrict shareholder rights.570 
Additionally, ISS only notes the bundling issue in 13% of bundled 
proposals.571 These results suggest that shareholders cannot rely on proxy 
advisors to identify bundled proposals.572  
On average, only 4.2% of shareholders vote against the bundled 
proposals.573 The authors find similar results when looking at Glass Lewis’s 
recommendations and its impact on shareholder voting.574 Overall, it 
appears that managers use bundling as a strategy to influence shareholder 
votes, and this tool is an effective one.  
2. Use of Proxy Solicitors 
According to Bethel and Gillan, managers’ use of proxy solicitors does 
not appear to have a major impact on the voting results.575 They find no 
relationship between the amount of money spent on proxy solicitors and the 
voter turnout.576 In fact, money spent on proxy solicitors was negatively 
correlated with votes cast in favor of management.577 The most likely 
explanation for that result is that elections where the company spent more 
on a proxy solicitor were probably also more controversial and faced 
greater shareholder resistance.578 They may also be nonroutine proposals 
where brokers are not able to vote uninstructed shares.579  
                                                                                                                 
 568. Id. at 1230.  
 569. See id. at 1233.  
 570. See id. The thirty-one proposals with an “against” recommendation represented 37% 
of all the proposals that hurt shareholder rights. See id. The authors suggest that the reason 
that only thirty-one of the eighty-four proposals that hurt shareholder rights received an 
“against” recommendation is because those proposals also contained issues that would 
expand shareholder rights. Id. 
 571. See id. 
 572. See id. at 1234.  
 573. Id. However, voter dissent rises to 25.7% when ISS gives a “vote against” 
recommendation. Id. Only seven of the thirty-one proposals with an “against” 
recommendation failed to receive support from a majority of shareholders. Id.  
 574. See id. at 1234-36.  
 575. Bethel & Gillan, supra note 548, at 21.  
 576. See id.  
 577. See id. at 21, 40 tbl.8 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 578. See id. at 22. 
 579. See id. 
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Some other important results from their research include the finding that 
managers were more likely to use a proxy solicitor and spend more money 
on solicitors in votes on nonroutine management proposals than routine 
management proposals.580 Higher insider and block ownership predicted 
less spending on a proxy solicitor and a lower likelihood of using a 
solicitor.581 The presence of insiders and blockholders made the use of 
proxy solicitors less necessary.582 However, higher institutional ownership 
predicted more money spent on proxy solicitors, suggesting that 
management uses proxy solicitors to interact with institutional investors.583 
The authors, however, fail to find any relationship between the amount of 
money spent on a proxy solicitor and the voting results, presumably 
because management spends more money on measures that have more 
shareholder resistance.584  
Other characteristics of the company also influence voting results on 
management proposals.585 Bethel and Gillan find that companies with 
management proposals tend to have higher market-to-book ratios, market-
adjusted returns, price earnings ratios, insider holdings, and less debt.586 A 
negative recommendation from ISS leads to significantly fewer votes in 
favor of the management proposal.587 Higher levels of block ownership 
predict higher shareholder support for management proposals.588 
3. Mutual Fund Voting 
Mutual funds are major shareholders in most public companies, so the 
impact of their voting on management proposals is substantial, but studies 
disagree on whether their business ties or conflicts of interest influence how 
they vote.589 By way of background, the equity assets owned by mutual 
funds increased from $83 billion to $4.49 trillion between 1984 and 
                                                                                                                 
 580. See id. at 22, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 10% and 1% levels 
respectively). 
 581. See id. at 23, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 582. See id. at 23. 
 583. See id. at 23, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 584. See id. at 21-22. 
 585. See id. at 15. 
 586. Id. All results were different at the 1% level, except for the debt-to-asset ratio, 
which was different at the 5% level. Id. at 30 tbl.1. 
 587. See id. at 21. 
 588. See id. at 23, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 589. See Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New 
Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 157-58 (2006). 
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2004.590 In 2004, mutual funds held about 24% of U.S. stock market 
capitalization.591 To guide their voting on management proposals, the 
largest mutual funds have adopted voting guidelines, although many 
delegate the voting of their proxies to ISS in accordance with these 
guidelines.592  
Rothberg and Lilien find that all of the ten largest funds had policies in 
2004 of voting against at least one antitakeover defense, including eight 
against dual class stock, seven against supermajority voting and classified 
boards, and five supporting restricting poison pills.593 They find that mutual 
funds rarely supported social or political activists, with some funds saying 
they would support management and others stating they would follow ISS 
or even abstain.594 These authors interpret mutual funds’ voting decisions as 
evidence that they are willing to confront management to increase 
shareholder value.595  
Overall, mutual funds support management proposals about 80% of the 
time.596 For proposals on takeover defenses, they voted against 
management 59% of the time, including 70% on poison pills.597 They voted 
“no” on 47% of stock option compensation proposals but only voted “no” 
on 9% of bonus compensation proposals.598 Funds within the same family 
tended to vote the same way on the same proposals.599 For example, 
Fidelity’s funds only voted differently from each other 0.8% of the time, 
mostly where one voted against and another abstained, presumably as a 
result of some sort of communications error.600 Rothberg and Lilien note 
that the six funds that take long-term positions in companies were much 
more likely to vote with management than the five largest funds.601 They 
find similar voting patterns between the four “mostly mutual fund” families 
                                                                                                                 
 590. Id. at 159. 
 591. Id. at 160. 
 592. See id. at 163. 
 593. Id. at 164. 
 594. Id. at 165. 
 595. Id. at 164. 
 596. Id. at 167 (finding that the top five funds voted against management 17% of the 
time); cf. Lilian Ng et al., Firm Performance and Mutual Fund Voting, 33 J. BANKING FIN. 
2207, 2210 (2009) (finding that mutual funds supported management between 65% and 98% 
of the time depending on the type of management proposal). 
 597. Rothberg & Lilien, supra note 589, at 167. 
 598. Id. 
 599. Id. 
 600. Id. 
 601. Id. at 169 (noting 95% versus 81% support of management). 
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and the four mutual funds that mostly get their business from another 
source.602 This result suggests that business ties are not a major factor in 
mutual funds’ observations.603  
However, Ng et al. find evidence that mutual funds’ voting is partly 
driven by conflicts of interest.604 They compare mutual funds without 
business ties to those with business ties, which they define as those with 
banking, insurance, brokerage, or investment banking parents or large 
401(k) business or large retirement accounts.605 A difference of means test 
finds statistically significant differences between the two groups for eleven 
of the twenty proposal types.606 This result shows that mutual funds with 
business ties vote differently than those without them.607 They also find that 
strong company performance and an ISS recommendation increases the 
odds that the mutual fund will support the management proposal.608 
4. Confidential Voting 
Confidential voting does not appear to eliminate management’s 
advantage in voting on management proposals. Confidential voting 
prevents management from knowing how any individual shareholder 
voted.609 Theory suggests that confidential voting would mitigate conflicts 
of interest, since shareholders, particularly institutional investors, could 
vote against management without losing their favor.610 Romano, however, 
fails to find a relationship between having confidential voting and 
shareholder support for management proposals.611 These results undermine 
the hypothesis that confidential voting will reduce the effects of conflicts of 
                                                                                                                 
 602. See id. at 170-71.  
 603. See id. at 171. 
 604. See Ng et al., supra note 596, at 2215-16. 
 605. Id. 
 606. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level ten times and the 10% level once). 
 607. Id. at 2216. 
 608. See id. at 2212-14 (varying significance between the 10% and 5% level depending 
on proposal type). 
 609. See Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
465, 466 (2003). She examines proxy proposal outcomes for firms that adopted confidential 
voting between 1988 and 1997, leading to a sample of 129 firms with 920 management 
proposals and 801 shareholder proposals. Id. at 472, 480. Of the 129 firms with confidential 
voting, only fifty-two firms had shareholder votes on a proposal to adopt confidential voting. 
Id. at 474. The proposals voted on before the adoption of confidential voting received an 
average support of 39.2%. Id. at 475. Of these, seven received majority support, leading 
management to adopt confidential voting in the following years. See id.  
 610. See id. at 466.  
 611. See id. at 493, 496. 
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interest in institutional investors.612 It is, however, possible that managers 
submit more favorable plans in anticipation of the decreased support 
resulting from having confidential voting.613 Romano also fails to find 
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of plans to adopt 
confidential voting.614 She argues that the insignificant stock market 
reaction suggests that confidential voting does not increase the value of the 
company.615 
Shareholders may be able to vote strategically on management 
proposals.616 Maug and Rydqvist develop a model where each shareholder 
has access to some private information and all the public information.617 
Shareholders do not know each other’s private information but do know 
how they intend to vote.618 If each shareholder uses “sincere voting,” then 
they will vote based on their own private information but will disregard 
others’ voting intentions.619 Sincere voting creates a problem with 
supermajority requirements, where more than half of shareholders have 
information that the proposal will increase value but the vote still fails.620 
However, if voters engage in “strategic voting,” then they will recognize 
how others intend to vote and adjust their votes to reflect the collective 
wisdom of the shareholders, allowing the supermajority proposal to pass.621  
Maug and Rydqvist find that shareholder support increases when a 
proposal requires supermajority support, suggesting that shareholders vote 
strategically.622 The impact of strategic voting changes 77 of the 510 
supermajority proposals from fail to pass.623 These results suggest that 
shareholders are able to take into account the information of other 
shareholders and overcome collective action problems.624 
                                                                                                                 
 612. See id. at 496. 
 613. See id. at 496-97. 
 614. See id. at 502-04.  
 615. Id. at 504. 
 616. See Maug & Rydqvist, supra note 549, at 47. 
 617. Id. at 48. 
 618. See id. at 48-49. 
 619. See id. at 49. 
 620. See id. 
 621. See id. 
 622. See id. at 67. 
 623. Id.  
 624. See id. at 74. An alternative explanation may be that managers campaign harder 
when their proposal requires supermajority approval. See id. at 73-74. However, Maug and 
Rydqvist reject this explanation by looking at a matched sample of simple majority and 
supermajority provisions that were voted on at the same meeting and still found a higher 
approval for the supermajority provisions. See id. at 73. 
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To better understand management proposals, we next examine the 
evidence related to shareholder voting on four types of management 
proposals: antitakeover amendments, mergers and acquisitions, auditor 
ratification, and compensation proposals. 
B. Antitakeover Amendments 
Scholars disagree on whether antitakeover amendments will help to 
increase the corporation’s value.625 Some argue that antitakeover 
amendments destroy shareholder value by exacerbating managerial agency 
costs and decreasing the odds of a takeover.626 Others claim, however, that 
antitakeover amendments increase value by giving management negotiating 
leverage with bidders and providing managers with short-term job 
security.627  
1. Stock Price Effects 
Older studies have shown that shareholders generally vote to approve 
antitakeover amendments,628 although this appears to no longer be the case. 
Between 1985 and 1988, however, Young et al. find that antitakeover 
amendments on average received the support of 80% of shareholders.629 
Data from this time period shows that more than 95% of amendments on 
average receive the needed majority support from shareholders to pass.630  
By the 1990s, however, things had changed. Institutional investors held 
an ever-increasing percentage of most public companies’ stock and began 
to engage in shareholder activism.631 In particular, they began voting 
against antitakeover defenses proposed by corporate management based on 
                                                                                                                 
 625. See Erin E. Smith, The Value of Antitakeover Provisions in the Post-SOX Era 2 
(last revised Mar. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303921. 
 626. Id. 
 627. See id. 
 628. See, e.g., James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Voting: Evidence from Charter 
Amendment Proposals, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 5, 8-9 (1994) [hereinafter Brickley et al., Corporate 
Voting]. 
 629. See Philip J. Young et al., Trading Volume, Management Solicitation, and 
Shareholder Voting, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 61 (1993). 
 630. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 8 (finding that about 5% of 
antitakeover amendments failed to pass); Sanjai Bhagat & Richard H. Jefferis, Voting Power 
in the Proxy Process: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 
223 (1991) (finding that only one antitakeover proposal failed to pass out of 187). 
 631. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827-29 (1992).  
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empirical studies such as the ones summarized below.632 As a result, it 
became impossible for corporate management to win shareholder approval 
for charter amendments to insert classified boards and other antitakeover 
defenses.  
Agrawal and Mandelker examine the stock returns surrounding the 
announcement of antitakeover amendments and find that the amendments 
appear to hurt the corporations’ value.633 They find significantly negative 
cumulative average abnormal returns (“CAARs”) of -2.6% during the forty 
days leading up to and including the announcement of the proposed 
amendments.634 Interestingly, when they shorten the period to the ten days 
leading up to the announcement, they find insignificant results, suggesting 
that news of the proposed amendment has already been incorporated into 
the stock market price.635  
The authors find that the announcement of a proposal to add a 
supermajority voting provision with a board-out clause636 resulted, on 
average, in significantly negative CARs, while votes on supermajority and 
authorized preferred stock provisions resulted, on average, in weakly 
negative returns.637 The negative stock market reaction is probably due to 
the combination of a supermajority provision with a board-out clause, 
which gives enormous power to managers to prevent a takeover or to 
discriminate against bidders.638  
Bhagat and Jefferis similarly report that firms that propose antitakeover 
amendments have significantly worse returns around the announcement 
                                                                                                                 
 632. See James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover 
Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267, 273-74 (1988) [hereinafter Brickley et al., Ownership 
Structure]. 
 633. See Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the 
Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 149-51 (1990). 
 634. See id. at 149 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Only 41.7% of their 
sample had positive cumulative abnormal returns during this period. Id. 
 635. See id. 
 636. A supermajority voting provision with a board-out clause requires support from a 
supermajority of shareholders, generally between 66% and 95%, in order for a merger to be 
approved, but allows the board to waive this requirement. See id. at 144. 
 637. See id. at 156, 157 tbl.6. The presence of a supermajority with a board-out clause 
predicts negative CARs, significant at the 1% level, for the forty- and twenty-day periods. 
See id. at 157 tbl.6. The presence of a supermajority provision predicts negative CARs, 
significant at the 5% level, for the twenty-day period. See id. The presence of an authorized 
preferred stock provisions predicts a negative CAR, significant at the 10% level, for the 
forty-day period. See id. 
 638. See id. at 156. 
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date than industry-matched control firms.639 The result holds for each group 
of amendments: amendments that entrench the board, fair-price or 
supermajority amendments, anti-greenmail amendments, and blank-check 
preferred stock amendments.640 They use weighted maximum likelihood 
estimates to show that antitakeover amendments destroy about 1% of a 
company’s value.641  
Smith, however, examines the stock market’s reaction to close votes and 
claims that passing an antitakeover provision increases the value of the firm 
by 4.66%.642 However, this same study finds that close proposals to repeal 
an antitakeover amendment did not have a statistically significant effect on 
company value.643 The difference in results may be due to the different time 
periods examined.644 
2. Impact of Institutional Investor Holdings 
Institutional investors and blockholders actively monitor the adoption of 
antitakeover amendments and help to screen out those that would decrease 
the corporation’s value.645 Brickley et al. (1988) find that institutional 
investors are more likely to vote on, and more likely to vote against, the 
antitakeover amendments.646 Their results show that institutional investors 
are active in the affairs of the firm and do not rubber stamp management.647  
Agrawal and Mandelker conclude that corporations with higher levels of 
institutional ownership had better stock returns leading up to the 
announcement of the amendment.648 They argue that their results are 
                                                                                                                 
 639. See Bhagat and Jefferis, supra note 630, at 203. They fail to find significant returns 
for the antitakeover firms over the three-day announcement period. See id. However, the 
control group had positive returns over the same period, significant at the 1% level for all 
types of amendments, which were significantly different from the antitakeover firms at the 
1% level. See id. 
 640. See id.  
 641. See id. at 215. The same results hold when they separate amendments that entrench 
the board from those that require a fair price or supermajority support in a takeover. See id. 
 642. See Smith, supra note 625, at 26, 54 tbl.2 (demonstrating significance at the 1% 
level). 
 643. See id.  
 644. Compare Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 630, at 196 (using a sample period of 1984-
1984) with Smith, supra note 625, at 1 (using a sample period of 2006-2010). 
 645. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 273-74. 
 646. Id. at 274 (finding both results statistically significant at the .01 level). 
 647. Id. 
 648. See Agrawal & Mandelker, supra note 633, at 151. They divide the firms into three 
groups based on the percentage of institutional ownership. Id. at 150-51. They find that the 
group with the lowest institutional ownership has significantly negative CAARs during the 
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consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis—that more sophisticated 
and well-informed shareholders, such as institutional investors, are more 
likely to vote in their economic interests.649 Their results may underestimate 
the impact of institutional ownership because management knows about 
institutional opposition before they propose the amendment.650 Similarly, 
the more investments by institutions, the more likely that the announcement 
of the amendment would receive a better stock market reaction.651 The 
concentration of institutional ownership in the five largest institutional 
investors also positively relates to a better stock market reaction to the 
amendment announcement.652  
Agrawal and Mandelker also show that firms with higher levels of block 
ownership are also more likely to receive better CARs leading up to the 
amendment announcement.653 Using a multiple regression model, they find 
a significant relationship between institutional ownership and CARs around 
the announcement for fair-price provisions, supermajority provisions, and 
supermajority with board-out provisions, while finding no relationship with 
classified board provisions and authorized preferred stock.654  
                                                                                                                 
forty and twenty days leading up to the announcement, at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
See id. at 151 & tbl.3. The other two groups had CAARs indistinguishable from zero. See id. 
at 151. The CAARs of the groups with the largest and smallest institutional ownership 
during the forty-day period were significantly different at the 1% level. See id. 
 649. See id. For a discussion of the active and passive monitoring hypotheses, see id. at 
143-44. 
 650. See id. at 151-52. 
 651. See id. at 152. As before, they divide the firms into three groups based on the dollar 
value of institutional ownership. See id. For the group with the smallest institutional 
ownership, they find significantly negative CAARs of -5.4% for the forty-day period 
(z-score = -3.09) and -3.09% (z-score = -1.89) for the twenty-day period. See id. The other 
two groups had insignificant results. See id.  
 652. See id. at 153. They use Herfindahl Index to measure the concentration of 
institutional investors. Id. After the dividing the firms between three groups based on the 
Herfindahl Index, the group with the lowest concentration had significantly negative CAARs 
of -3.8% over the forty-day period and -2.6% over the twenty-day period, significant at the 
1% and 5% levels. See id. at 153, 154 tbl.4. The other two groups had insignificant returns. 
Id. 
 653. See id. at 153-54. The third of firms with the lowest 5% or greater ownership had a 
CAAR of -3.3% over the forty days leading up to the amendment announcement, significant 
at the 10% level. See id. at 154. The other two-thirds had insignificant results. See id. 
 654. See id. at 156. They use interaction variables to test the relationship of institutional 
ownership to CARs for specific types of antitakeover provisions. See id. For supermajority 
with a board-out clause, higher institutional ownership predicts better CARs at the 5% and 
1% levels for the forty-day and twenty-day periods. See id. at 157 tbl.6. For a supermajority 
provision, higher institutional ownership predicted better CARs at the 10% and 5% levels for 
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Bhagat and Jefferis, however, fail to find a correlation between the level 
of institutional ownership and the likelihood of proposing an antitakeover 
amendment, suggesting that institutions increase the value of antitakeover 
amendments by some way other than deterring management from 
proposing them.655 The type of institutional investor can also impact 
support for the antitakeover amendment.656 Theory suggests that pressure-
sensitive institutions, such as insurance companies, banks, and trusts, tend 
to be more susceptible to management coercion, while pressure-insensitive 
institutions, such as corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, and 
investment council firms, tend not to be susceptible to such pressure.657 As 
expected, Brickley et al. (1988) find that the pressure-sensitive institutions 
correlated positively with the “voted for” while the pressure-resistant 
institutions correlated negatively, and vice versa for the “voted against” 
regression.658 
Brickley et al. (1994) also report that higher ownership by pressure-
sensitive institutions increases support for the proposal, while higher 
ownership by pressure-insensitive institutions decreases support for the 
proposal.659 Similarly, they find that high ownership by blockholders 
increases the proportion of outstanding votes cast.660 These results suggest 
that blockholders have greater incentive to overcome free-rider problems 
associated with voting.661 The presence of more institutional owners either 
makes managers less likely to propose antitakeover amendments or 
moderates their negative effects through better monitoring or greater voting 
                                                                                                                 
the forty-day and twenty-day periods. See id. For fair price provisions, institutional 
ownership predicts better CARs at the 10% level in the forty-day and twenty-day periods. 
See id.  
 655. See Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 630, at 214. They note that their data does not 
allow them to distinguish between institutional investors that might be biased towards 
management from those who are independent. See id. 
 656. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 277, 278 tbl.2. 
 657. See id. at 277. 
 658. See id. at 278 tbl.2. The hypothesis that the pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
variables are equal can be rejected at the .05 significance level. See id. at 279 n.13. 
 659. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 21 tbl.3, 22. Pressure-
sensitive institutions are those that are easily pressured by management, including insurance 
companies, banks, and non-bank trusts, while pressure-insensitive institutions include public 
pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, and foundations. Id. at 20 n.11.  
 660. See id. at 18-19, 19 tbl.2 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Their model 
predicts that every 1% increase in blockholder ownership will result in an increase of 0.1% 
of votes cast. See id.  
 661. See id. at 19. 
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power in the presence of a takeover bid.662 However, institutional investors 
may just be better at identifying firms that are more likely to be 
successfully taken over or have management that would not propose a 
value-harming amendment.663  
3. Management Stock Holdings 
Studies find that managers who are also shareholders tend to vote in 
favor of antitakeover proposals.664 Brickley et al. (1988) find that 
managerial stock ownership is not significantly related to the percentage of 
votes cast but is significantly related to the percentage of “for” votes, 
possibly because management ownership reduces other shareholders’ 
incentives to vote.665  
Bhagat and Jefferis find that the CEOs of the firms proposing the 
amendments and all directors and officers as a group received higher 
compensation as a percentage of firm value than the control firms.666 The 
CEO and the officers and directors at the amendment firms owned a lower 
percentage of the voting rights compared to the control firms.667 They find 
no significant difference in earnings between the two groups.668 The 
fraction of votes held by the CEOs, all officers and directors, or outside 
directors negatively correlated with the probability of proposing an 
antitakeover amendment.669 Having officers who are also 5% blockholders 
decreases the likelihood of management proposing an antitakeover 
amendment when other ownership characteristics are controlled for.670 The 
                                                                                                                 
 662. See Agrawal & Mandelker, supra note 633, at 156-57. 
 663. See id. at 158. 
 664. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 273-74. 
 665. Id. at 274. 
 666. See Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 630, at 205. CEOs at the amendment firms receive 
on average $0.6 million (0.20% of firm value) compared to $0.49 million (0.55% of firm 
value) at the control group. See id. The entire group of officers and directors at amendment 
firms receive $3.19 million (0.83% of firm value) compared to $2.29 million (1.26% of firm 
value) at control firms. See id. These results are significantly different. See id. at 205 tbl.4. 
 667. See id. at 205. CEOs at the amendment firms own on average 2.54% of the 
company, compared to 7.15% at the control firms. See id. The officers and directors as a 
group own 8.03% of the company at the amendment firms, compared to 14.86% of the 
control firms. See id. These results are significantly different. See id. at 205 tbl.4.  
 668. See id. at 208. 
 669. See id. at 213. Using a weighted probit analysis, they find t-statistics of 2.53 for 
CEOs, 1.01 for all officers and directors, and 1.19 for outside directors. See id. at 211 tbl.6. 
Using a LaGrange multiplier test, they find t-statistics of 3.47 for CEOs, 2.97 for all officers 
and directors, and 1.89 for outside directors. See id. at 212 tbl.7. 
 670. See id. at 214. 
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authors suggest that officers who are blockholders are usually part of the 
founding family of the company and face a decreased risk of hostile 
takeovers or management turnover.671  
However, Brickley et al. (1994) find that management’s ownership does 
not correlate with the percentage of votes cast.672 One would expect that 
management votes their shares in favor of their own proposals, but this may 
not be the case.673 Requiring a supermajority of votes outstanding also 
predicts higher shareholder support for the proposal.674 This result suggests 
that management decides which amendments to propose with an eye toward 
the likely level of shareholder approval.675 Management also has a variety 
of mechanisms to influence shareholder voting.676  
4. Proxy Solicitors’ Effect 
Young et al. find that increased money spent on proxy solicitation 
predicts a higher proportion of votes cast by shareholders.677 However, the 
total number of days between the record date and the meeting date (which 
measures the amount of time for a solicitation to occur) did not relate to the 
proportion of votes cast.678 More days between the record date and when 
the proxy is received predicts fewer votes cast, while more days between 
receiving the proxy and the meeting date predicts a higher proportion of 
votes cast.679 These results suggest that a company can increase the 
proportion of shares voted by mailing the proxy as soon as possible after 
the record date.680 When the proposal requires a certain percentage of votes 
outstanding for approval, there tend to be more days between when the 
shareholders receive the proxy and when the meeting date occurs.681 This 
suggests that management is aware that the length of time between the 
record date, the proxy mailing date, and the meeting date influences the 
                                                                                                                 
 671. See id.  
 672. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 18-19, 18 tbl.2. When they 
break up blockholders by type, they find that individual and corporate blockholders and 
institutional investors increase the percentage of votes cast, significant at the 1% level, but 
management does not. See id. 
 673. See id. at 19. 
 674. See id. at 24-25, 25 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 675. See id. at 24. 
 676. See Young et al., supra note 629, at 66-67 tbl.4. 
 677. See id. at 66-67 tbl.4, 69 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). 
 678. See id. 
 679. See id. (finding both significant at the 1% level).  
 680. Id. at 69-70. 
 681. See id. at 68 tbl.4, 70 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
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number of votes cast, so management uses this phenomenon to their 
advantage to secure passage of their proposals.682 
Individuals, possibly due to collective action problems, appear more 
likely to support management than institutional shareholders.683 Brickley et 
al. (1988) find that the size of the firm positively relates to support for 
management, which suggests that individual shareholders are more likely to 
vote with management.684 Brickley et al. (1994) find that larger firms tend 
to receive more shareholder support for their antitakeover amendments.685 
Because larger firms tend to have more shareholders, the results suggest 
that management can more effectively control shareholders when there are 
more of them and each one owns a lower percentage of the company.686 
Interestingly, positive performance of the company, based on either stock 
performance or return on assets, does not significantly correlate with 
shareholder voting support for the proposed amendments.687 
5. Impact of Counter Solicitations 
Counter-solicitation proxy fights help demonstrate the value-decreasing 
nature of antitakeover amendments.688 Counter-solicitation campaigns are 
relatively rare compared to antitakeover amendment proposals, with only 
twenty campaigns occurring between 1979 and 1987 out of more than 600 
charter provisions proposed and ratified in the same period.689 Pound finds 
that the counter-solicitation campaign succeeded in preventing the 
amendment in 25% of cases.690  
Management has significant advantages in passing antitakeover 
amendments because they can give as little as ten days’ notice of a 
shareholders meeting and decide who is allowed to vote by judiciously 
                                                                                                                 
 682. See id.  
 683. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 274. 
 684. Id. (finding statistically significant results for one regression at the .02 level and 
another at the .01 level). The relationship between firm size and percent of stock voted was 
not statistically significant, which would seem to cut against the free-rider hypothesis. See 
id.  
 685. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 21 tbl.3, 23 (demonstrating 
significance at the 1% level). 
 686. See id. at 23. 
 687. See id. at 21 tbl.3, 22.  
 688. John Pound, Shareholder Activism and Share Values: The Causes and 
Consequences of Countersolicitations Against Management Antitakeover Proposals, 32 J.L. 
& ECON. 357, 358 (1989).  
 689. See id. at 360-61. Of these, sixteen had sufficient information to be included in the 
study. See id. at 361.  
 690. See id. at 362.  
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setting the record date.691 These advantages prevent dissidents from having 
the necessary time to buy additional shares.692 Where the antitakeover 
amendments were ultimately approved, the firms experienced significant 
negative returns when the vote outcome became public.693 Where the 
antitakeover amendment was defeated, the firms experienced significant 
positive returns.694 These results are economically significant and suggest 
that antitakeover amendments hurt shareholder value.695 When Pound 
examines the entire period of the counter-solicitation campaign, he finds 
similar results.696 Looking at news articles, he finds that almost all of the 
dissident groups expressed intent to control the firm and had a record of 
control-oriented investment activity.697 As a result, the shifts in shareholder 
value probably result from the changing probability of a successful 
takeover.698 
6. Summary 
Despite the negative stock market reactions, shareholders have 
historically tended to overwhelmingly approve antitakeover amendments.699 
Today this is no longer the case, and corporate management is reluctant to 
propose such charter amendments as they are almost certain to fail. In fact, 
in recent years, shareholders have often succeeded in persuading corporate 
management to propose the removal of classified boards and then voted 
overwhelmingly to get rid of them.700 
                                                                                                                 
 691. See id.  
 692. See id. at 363. 
 693. See id. at 366. Pound finds an average net-of-market stock return of -7.24%, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. See id. at 367 tbl.1. 
 694. See id. at 366. For the four firms where the antitakeover amendment was defeated, 
Pound finds an average net-of-market stock return of 4.60%, statistically significant at the 
1% level. See id. at 367 tbl.1. 
 695. See id. at 366. 
 696. See id. For companies where the antitakeover amendment ultimately succeeded, he 
finds an average net-of-market return of -8.99%, significant at the 5% level. See id. at 367 
tbl.1. For companies where the antitakeover amendment ultimately succeeded, he finds an 
average net-of-market increase of 8.11%, significant at the 5% level. See id. 
 697. See id. at 369. He finds that fourteen of the sixteen dissident groups expressed intent 
to control the firm. Id. Similarly, fifteen of the sixteen dissidents were individuals or firms 
with a record of control-oriented investment activity. Id.  
 698. See id.  
 699. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 700. 102 Companies Declassified, HARV. L. SCH.: SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, 
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml (last visited June 12, 2017). 
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Although it is not entirely clear why shareholders once offered such high 
levels of support, the historical evidence does help to illuminate the 
different roles that each group of shareholders play. Management holdings 
are not as directly related to the likelihood of proposing or adopting 
shareholder amendments as would be expected, possibly because larger 
holdings act as a takeover defense in themselves and remove the need to 
adopt other defenses.701 Institutional investors with large stock ownership 
can effectively overcome collective action problems if they are organized to 
block value-decreasing antitakeover amendments.702 Individuals, however, 
do not own enough shares to escape rational ignorance and therefore tend to 
support management in higher numbers.703 As a result, institutional 
shareholders need to overcome collective action problems to stop 
antitakeover amendments. 
C. Voting on Mergers and Acquisitions 
1. Approval of Acquisitions 
Matvos and Ostrovsky demonstrate that shareholders consistently 
approve acquisitions despite their value-decreasing effect on the 
company.704 From the perspective of management, the acquisitions can be 
explained by the overconfidence of managers, the pursuit of empire 
building, and the pressure effects on acquirers’ stock prices around 
mergers.705 However, little explanation exists for why shareholders would 
approve any merger, given their predominantly value-decreasing nature.706  
Acquisitions generally receive the support of around 95% of votes cast 
and 70% of outstanding voting rights.707 Examining the acquisition votes 
between 1990 and 2000, Burch et al. do not find a single instance of the 
                                                                                                                 
 701. See supra Section IV.A.3. 
 702. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 703. See supra text accompanying notes 683-684. 
 704. Gergor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in 
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 391 (2008). 
 705. See id. 
 706. See id. 
 707. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights 
Around Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 
J. CORP. FIN. 129, 135 (2009) (finding an average approval of 95% of votes cast and 70% of 
votes outstanding for 350 mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2005); Timothy R. 
Burch et al., Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers 
Perfunctory?, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2004, at 45, 45-46 (finding an average approval rate of 
98% of votes cast and 73% of votes outstanding for 209 acquisition votes between 1990 and 
2000).  
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acquirer’s shareholders failing to approve a merger.708 Unsurprisingly, 
shareholders are much more likely to support a merger when ISS issues an 
“approve” recommendation.709  
The rise of merger arbitrage provides new importance in shareholder 
voting on mergers.710 In merger arbitrage, or more technically “activist risk 
arbitrage,” “a shareholder attempts to change the course of an announced 
[merger and acquisition (“M&A”)] deal through public campaigns.”711 
Voting against a deal and persuading other investors to do the same 
provides leverage to the activists to negotiate better terms.712 However, 
these activists are cognizant of the fact that they will only profit if some 
deal is eventually completed.713 This type of activism has been an 
increasingly common aspect of the M&A landscape, with activism in 0.6% 
of deals in 2000 up to 13% and 6.5% of all deals in 2013 and 2014.714 In 
total, Jiang et al. observe 343 instances of M&A activism between 2000 and 
2014.715 Even where activists intervene, the merger tends to receive a high 
level of support from the target’s shareholders, with an average of 65% 
voting in favor of the deal.716 These numbers, however, are much lower 
than in standard mergers and suggest a more controversial vote. Activists 
                                                                                                                 
 708. See Burch et al., supra note 707, at 46. 
 709. See Laura Sophie Henning, Shareholder Voting and Merger Returns, 29 FIN. MKTS. 
& PORTFOLIO MGMT. 337, 348 (2015). The author’s sample includes 141 firm votes that 
occur in target firms and 243 votes that occur in acquiring firms between 2003 and 2011, for 
a total of 384 votes over 367 transactions. See id. at 342. The reason for the low overlap is 
that private firms are not required to hold shareholder meetings or publicly release the 
results, and shareholder approval is required for acquirer firms only when more than 20% of 
outstanding shares will be issued. See id. at 342-43. An ISS recommendation was negatively 
related to dissent at the target firm at the 5% level and negatively related to acquirer 
recommendation at the 1% level. See id. at 349, 349 tbl.2. Henning also noted that the “free 
float” of the company, meaning the percentage of shares in the hands of ordinary investors, 
is positively associated with voter dissent for acquirers, and no statistically significant 
relationship for target shareholders exists. See id. at 348, 349 tbl.2 (demonstrating 
significance at the 1% level). Thus, ordinary investors at acquiring firms are more likely to 
dissent to the acquisition. See id. at 348. 
 710. See Wei Jiang et al., Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage 3 (Columbia 
Bus. Sch. Research Paper Series, Paper 15-41, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587925. 
The author’s sample covers 4278 deals between 2000 and 2014. Id. at 3. 
 711. Id. at 1. 
 712. See id. at 18-19. 
 713. See id. at 22. 
 714. Id. at 3.  
 715. See id. at 3-4. Because of incomplete data, they narrow down their final sample of 
M&A activism in targets to 255 instances. See id. at 9.  
 716. See id. at 11.  
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will use several techniques to influence other shareholders’ votes, such as 
public criticism of the deal and proxy solicitation to veto the deal.717 By far 
the most influential method is support from ISS, where dissidents gained 
support in 69% of the eighty-four ISS recommendations disclosed.718 
Overall, the activists attained better terms in 31% of deals, but failed to 
reach a completed deal in 21% of cases.719 Of the deals withdrawn from the 
initial buyer, a failed shareholder vote was the cause in 25% of cases, 
including 7.89% where the activist’s vote was pivotal and 5.26% where the 
negative vote followed a negative ISS recommendation.720 By contrast, the 
authors find shareholders vote down the deal in 1.07% of all deals not 
involving shareholder activists.721 These results suggest that shareholder 
voting on mergers provides activists with a meaningful tool to attain better 
terms for all of the company’s shareholders. The rise in merger activism 
gives the merger vote a more meaningful role in corporate governance. 
2. Impact of Stock Returns 
Even if they do not vote down the acquisition, shareholders pay attention 
to the acquisition’s value when casting their votes. Burch et al. find that the 
acquirer’s stock returns around the announcement of the merger and around 
the shareholder vote both predict a higher rate of shareholder support.722 
The acquirer’s change in return on the assets before and after the 
acquisition correlates with acquirer shareholder support for the 
acquisition.723 The ratio of cash to assets predicts a worse reception of the 
merger by shareholders.724 Shareholders may understand that acquisitions 
by cash-rich firms tend to destroy more value because they represent a way 
to waste cash.725 Neither the acquirer’s return on assets nor their stock 
                                                                                                                 
 717. See id. 
 718. See id. These numbers suggest that ISS issued a recommendation in favor of the 
dissidents in 31% of cases. Id. at 12.  
 719. See id. 
 720. See id. at 52 tbl.5 (Panel C). Some of these deals were complete with other buyers, 
where the activist’s efforts led to better terms for the shareholders. See id. For all deals, 
shareholders voted down the deal in 6.88% of cases. See id. However, it is not clear how 
many of these deals made it to a shareholder vote. See id.  
 721. See id. However, it is not clear how many of these deals came to a shareholder vote. 
See id.  
 722. See Burch et al., supra note 707, at 57 tbl.3, 58 (finding both significant at the 5% 
level). 
 723. See id. at 57 tbl.3, 59 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).  
 724. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). 
 725. See id. at 58-59. 
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returns over the previous year significantly relate to the level of shareholder 
support.726 This result suggests that shareholders are voting to approve the 
transaction based on the quality of the target and not based on their 
company’s performance over the previous year.727 
The relationship between stock market returns and shareholder approval 
presents a more complicated picture.728 Hsieh and Wang find that requiring 
the shareholders of the acquiring company to vote on and approve the 
acquisition predicts higher gains to both the acquirer and the target.729 On 
the other hand, Kamar fails to find a relationship between requiring 
shareholder approval and the stock market returns surrounding the 
announcement.730 The lack of a correlation suggests that the shareholder 
voting requirement does not prevent harmful acquisitions or even 
discourage management from putting a harmful acquisition to a shareholder 
vote.731 Shareholder approval is also unrelated to the premium over the 
stock price paid for the target company, although this is admittedly a crude 
proxy for acquisition value.732  
However, Henning finds that abnormal announcement returns relate 
negatively to voting dissent by both target and acquirer firm 
shareholders.733 This result suggests that shareholders take market reaction 
into account when deciding how to vote.734 The relationship, however, is 
stronger for target shareholders than for acquirer shareholders.735 Henning 
interprets this result to mean that the merger is more pivotal for the target 
                                                                                                                 
 726. See id. at 57 tbl.3, 58.  
 727. See id. at 58.  
 728. See Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang, Shareholder Voting Rights in Mergers and 
Acquisitions 26 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www1.american.edu/ 
academic.depts/ksb/finance_realestate/rhauswald/seminar/vote_American.pdf. 
 729. See id. at 26, 49 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). Gains are 
measured over the five-day event window as both a percentage increase in market equity of 
the acquirer and target and as dollar value of the increase in market equity. See id. at 24. 
Having voting rights for the acquirer’s shareholders predicts an additional increase in market 
value of 1.1%. See id. at 26. 
 730. Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 14 (Mar. 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www7.tau.ac.il/blogs/law/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ 
March-2011.pdf.  
 731. See id. at 13-14. 
 732. See id. at 16-17. 
 733. See Henning, supra note 709, at 348.  
 734. Id. 
 735. See id. Abnormal returns are negatively related to target shareholder votes at the 1% 
level. See id. at 349 tbl.2. Abnormal returns are also negatively related to acquirer dissent 
but only marginally significant at the 10% level. See id.  
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company and, as a result, the target shareholders invest more energy in 
monitoring the transaction.736 
Henning analyzes the effect of voting dissent on abnormal returns 
following the shareholder meeting.737 Voting dissent has a strong positive 
relationship with the cumulative abnormal returns following the meeting for 
both target and acquiring firms.738 Thus, meetings with higher voting 
dissent are followed by a more positive stock market reaction.739 This 
counterintuitive result reflects the fact that the shareholder vote resolves 
part of the uncertainty around the completion of the deal.740 Henning claims 
that the level of voting dissent reflects the uncertainty of deal completion, 
even if the deal as a whole increases shareholder value.741 Thus, once the 
shareholders approve the deal, despite the high dissent, the company’s share 
value increases.742 Henning also looks at the relationship between voting 
dissent and long-run abnormal returns.743 As expected, voting dissent is 
negatively related to long-run abnormal performance over the following 
two years.744 Voting dissent, however, is only marginally significant when 
correlated with performance over a five-year period.745 The amount of 
shareholder dissent predicts a large portion of subsequent performance of 
the merged company.746 
  
                                                                                                                 
 736. See id. at 348. 
 737. See id. at 355.  
 738. See id. (finding both significant at the 1% level).  
 739. See id. at 355-56.  
 740. See id. at 356-57.  
 741. See id.  
 742. See id. at 355-56. To confirm this interpretation, Henning uses the length of the 
negotiations as a proxy for deal uncertainty and divides the deals into two groups with above 
and below median negotiation length. See id. at 357. As expected, for deals with shorter 
negotiation periods, there was no significant correlation between voting dissent and 
subsequent abnormal returns. See id. For deals with longer negotiation periods, higher voting 
dissent predicted higher abnormal returns. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 1% 
level for acquirers and the 5% level for target firms). Thus, the correlation between voting 
dissent and abnormal returns reflects the increased certainty in resolving the deal going 
forward. See id. 
 743. See id. She excludes firms that are not acquirers and creates separate samples for 
firms with at least two years of subsequent data (194 firm observations) and five years of 
subsequent data (79 firm observations). Id.  
 744. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).  
 745. See id.  
 746. See id. at 361.  
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3. Advisor Opinions 
Becher et al. find that the acquirer’s shareholders appear to pay more 
attention to the fairness opinion of the target’s advisors than the acquirer’s 
advisors.747 They show that the presence of a target advisor’s opinion 
increases shareholder support more than the presence of an acquirer 
advisor’s opinion.748 Receiving a positive equity valuation (“EV”) ratio749 
from a target advisor also increases shareholder support, while one from an 
acquisition advisor does not.750 Ouyang finds similar results.751 A target 
advisor’s opinion of target equity value leads to better support from 
acquirer shareholders than the acquirer advisor’s opinion.752 In fact, the 
                                                                                                                 
 747. David Becher et al., Do Shareholders Listen? M&A Advisor Opinions and 
Shareholder Voting 4 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rhsmith.umd. 
edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/Session6BecherDoShareholdersListen.pdf. 
 748. See id. at 15-16. A target advisor increases shareholder support by 8.38 percentage 
points (significant at the 1% level), while an acquirer advisor increases shareholder support 
by 6.25 percentage points (significant at the 3% level). See id. at 34 tbl.2. More dramatically, 
a multiple regression finds that a target advisor’s opinion significantly increases shareholder 
support for the acquisition, significant at the 5% level, while the presence of an acquirer 
advisor opinion has no significant effect. See id. at 16, 36 tbl.3.  
 749. The EV ratio is the difference between the average target equity valuation and the 
offer price divided by the offer price. Id. at 12. A positive EV ratio indicates that the target 
firm value is higher than the offer price, so that the offer is a good deal for the acquirer, 
while a negative EV ratio indicates that the acquisition is a bad deal. Id. 
 750. See id. at 15-16. An opinion with a positive EV ratio from the target’s advisor 
increases the mean shareholder support by 6.92% (p-value = 0.11), with a median of 6.82% 
(p-value = 0.08), while the opinion from the acquirer’s advisor had no statistically 
significant effect. See id. at 34 tbl.2. A multiple regression similarly finds that a positive 
opinion from a target’s advisor significantly increases shareholder support, significant at the 
10% level, while the acquirer’s advisor had no impact. See id. at 36 tbl.3. Part of the reason 
for the lower statistical significant was because of the smaller sample size. See id. at 34 tbl.2, 
35-36 tbl.3.  
 751. See Wenjing Ouyang, The Effect of M&A Advisors’ Opinions on Acquirer 
Shareholder Voting, 57 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 175, 175-76 (2015). The author collects a 
sample of 136 friendly negotiated deals announced between 2000 and 2006. Id. at 178. The 
paper focuses on acquirer shareholders rather than target shareholders because target firms 
usually do not report voting results. Id. at 176 n.2. She limits the acquirer shareholder vote to 
outside shareholder approval to limit the impact of insiders. See id. at 178. Using this 
definition, she finds an average shareholder approval rate of 68.5%. See id. All of the 
mergers she studies are approved by the acquirer shareholders. See id. 
 752. See id. at 181. “[W]hen a target advisor provides an estimation of the target equity 
value, the average and median increases in acquirer shareholder support are 5.63% and 
8.17% . . . respectively.” Id. (demonstrating significance at the 2% and 1% levels 
respectively). A Probit model “shows that when the target advisor provides an estimation of 
target value, acquirer shareholder support significantly increases [by] 4.46%,” significant at 
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acquirer advisor’s estimated EV ratio does not appear to have any 
significant effect on shareholder voting.753 As acquirer advisor opinions 
tend to be more optimistic, these results suggest that shareholders can see 
through the bias of acquirer advisors and focus on the less-biased opinions 
of target advisors.754 
Becher et al. determine that shareholder support increases when the 
target advisor provides an earnings forecast, particularly when the forecast 
indicates that the merger is non-dilutive, and that an earnings forecast by 
the acquirer’s advisor has no impact on shareholder approval, even where 
the opinion indicates that the merger is non-dilutive.755 Ouyang also finds 
that the shareholder approval rate increases by an average of 6.34% when 
the target advisor provides forecasts of the deal’s impact on the acquirer’s 
earnings.756 By contrast, when the acquirer advisors provide an earnings 
forecast, the voting results do not change significantly.757 If target advisors 
forecast non-dilutive earnings, then the shareholder support increases by 
                                                                                                                 
the 7% level. Id. When an acquirer advisor provides the same estimation, however, it has no 
impact on shareholder voting. Id. When the offer price is less than the midpoint of the target 
advisor’s valuation range, “the mean and median acquirer shareholder approval rates 
increase by 8.01% and 8.52%, respectively.” Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% 
level). Additionally, acquirer shareholders have significantly higher support for the deal 
“when target advisors issue higher target equity evaluations.” Id. (demonstrating significance 
at the 5% level). A Probit model similarly shows that a one standard deviation increase in 
the target advisor’s equity valuation estimate increases the acquirer shareholders’ approval 
rate by 2.53%. Id. 
 753. See id. A Probit model similarly shows no significant relationship. See id. 
 754. Id. 
 755. See Becher et al., supra note 747, at 17-18. Univariate results indicate that the 
presence of an earnings opinion from the target’s advisor increases shareholder support by 
6.5%, significant at the 1% level, while a non-dilutive forecast increases shareholder support 
by 5.05%, significant at the 4% level. See id. at 37 tbl.4. Having an earnings forecast, even a 
non-dilutive forecast, from the acquirer’s advisor did not relate to shareholder voting. See id. 
A multiple regression similarly finds that the presence of an earnings forecast from the 
target’s advisor increases shareholder support, while one from the acquirer’s advisor does 
not. See id. at 39 tb.5. Interestingly, having a non-dilutive earnings forecast has a similar 
impact from the acquirer’s and target’s advisor, each significant at the 10% level. See id. 
 756. Ouyang, supra note 751, at 182 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). The 
median increase is 9.22%, significant at the 1% level. Id. A Probit model similarly “shows 
that the approval rate increases by 5.60% when the target advisors provide earnings 
forecasts.” Id.  
 757. See id. A Probit model similarly fails to find a statistically significant relationship. 
See id. 
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4.53%.758 Again, the shareholder approval rate does not significantly 
change when the acquirer advisors issue a similar opinion.759 
The recommendation of an analyst who works for the same investment 
bank as an advisor to the target or acquirer may have an impact on 
shareholder voting.760 Becher et al. find that shareholder support increased 
by 11% when the analyst affiliate of a target advisor provides a 
recommendation, and shareholder support increases even more when that 
analyst’s recommendation provides a positive recommendation.761 By 
contrast, the recommendation of an analyst affiliated with the acquirer 
advisor had no impact.762 But shareholder support decreased by 14% when 
the acquirer advisor had prior business with the acquirer firm.763 This 
suggests that shareholders respond negatively to potential conflicts of 
interest in their firm’s advisor.764 
Interestingly, the level of support from the acquirer’s shareholders for the 
acquisition accurately predicts whether the acquirer will use the same 
advisor in a future acquisition.765 This result suggests that managers believe 
that the choice of advisor significantly impacts shareholder support, even 
though the data suggests that their advisor’s recommendation has little 
impact on the deal.766 The acquirer’s shareholders appear to recognize their 
firm’s advisor faces an inherent conflict of interest and so look to the 
target’s advisor.767  
Overall, Burch et al. interpret these results to suggest that shareholders 
pay attention to the value of the acquisition when casting their vote, even if 
they do not overall reject the acquisition.768 Although these approval rates 
suggest that shareholder voting does not directly block management’s 
                                                                                                                 
 758. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 4% level). Similarly, a Probit model shows 
that a non-dilutive forecast leads to increased shareholder support by 4.36%. Id. 
 759. See id. A Probit model also finds that a non-dilutive forecast by acquirer advisors 
does not impact shareholder support. See id. 
 760. See Becher et al., supra note 747, at 18. 
 761. See id. at 20, 42 tbl.7. The relationship between issuing an opinion and shareholder 
support was significant at the 4.2% level, while the relationship between issuing a positive 
opinion and shareholder support was significant at the 7% level. See id. 
 762. See id. at 20. 
 763. Id. at 20, 42 tbl.7 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 764. See id. at 20. 
 765. See id. at 22 (demonstrating significance at the 2% level). A standard deviation 
increase in shareholder support increases the odds that the same advisor will be used in a 
future deal by 13%. Id. 
 766. See id. 
 767. Id. at 24. 
 768. See Burch et al., supra note 707, at 46-47.  
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decisions on mergers, the shareholder vote may offer an indirect check.769 
The threat of shareholder rejection may prevent acquirer management from 
pursuing a bad merger long before a shareholder vote occurs.770 Burch et al. 
postulate that disapproving shareholders may also prefer to sell their shares 
rather than vote down the acquisition, or may simply view voting against 
the acquisition as futile.771 
4. Deal Structure 
If management fears that shareholders will vote down the deal, they may 
structure the deal to avoid the shareholder approval requirement.772 Hsieh 
and Wang find that slightly more than half of acquirers proposed 
transactions that required shareholder approval.773 They find that deals are 
less likely to be successful where the acquirer’s shareholders have to vote 
on the deal.774 Kamar, however, finds no correlation between the 
shareholder vote requirement and the odds of completing the stock 
acquisition once the registration statement was filed.775 He interprets this 
lack of correlation to suggest that shareholder approval does not filter 
value-harming acquisitions,776 although the advent of merger arbitrage 
(discussed in Jiang above) suggests that this may have changed today.777  
A shareholder approval requirement makes the acquisition of a private 
company take longer to complete.778 A shareholder approval requirement is 
less likely when the deal uses unregistered stock for a private company, 
                                                                                                                 
 769. Id. at 46. 
 770. Id. 
 771. See id. at 51-52. 
 772. See Hsieh & Wang, supra note 728, at 3-4. Shareholder approval is required when 
“the acquirer issues new shares exceeding 20% of outstanding shares.” Id. at 8-9. However, 
cash deals do not require approval of the acquirer’s shareholders. Id. at 10. 
 773. See id. (finding that 53% of acquirers had shareholder approval). 
 774. See id. at 18, 46 tbl.4 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). Their model 
predicts a 24.06% decrease in the probability of deal success if the acquirer’s shareholders 
need to approve the deal. Id. at 18. 
 775. See Kamar, supra note 730, at 21. The author limits his sample to mergers that 
involve stock consideration because prior literature finds that mergers without stock 
consideration are treated differently by the markets and rarely require shareholder approval. 
Id. at 8.  
 776. See id. at 21. 
 777. See supra notes 710-718 and accompanying text.  
 778. See Kamar, supra note 730, at 25, 44 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 1% 
level). A multiple regression predicted that a shareholder-approved acquisition of a private 
company would take ninety-five days longer than an acquisition without shareholder 
approval, which would take fifty days. See id. 
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suggesting that the acquirer will avoid a shareholder vote to save time.779 
However, shareholder approval does not increase the duration of an 
acquisition of a public company.780 
 Hsieh and Wang find that larger acquirers are less likely to seek 
shareholder approval of the acquisition.781 Acquirers with more cash 
holdings were more likely to face shareholder approval, while acquirers 
with higher market-to-book ratios, more institutional investors, or worse 
stock performance were less likely to face shareholder votes.782 On the 
other hand, shareholder votes were more common for the acquirer when the 
target had higher institutional holdings.783 Kamar finds no relationship 
between the level of ownership by insiders and blockholders and having a 
shareholder voting requirement, suggesting that managers do not avoid the 
voting requirement for fear of shareholder resistance.784 These results 
provide some support for the theory that voting rights serve as a screening 
method to prevent bad deals from going through.785 
5. Effect of Institutional Investors  
Institutional investors may be facilitating approval of the acquisitions.786 
Matvos and Ostrovsky find that, on average, institutional investors owned 
43% of acquiring companies and 30% of target companies.787 Consistent 
with previous research, institutional investors who hold acquirer stock 
receive negative returns from the acquisition.788 However, when the 
institutional investor’s holdings in both the acquirer and the target are 
accounted for, their returns become statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.789  
While an acquisition may hurt the acquirer’s value, institutional investors 
still increase the value of their investments by investing in both the acquirer 
                                                                                                                 
 779. See id. at 30, 47 tbl.9 (finding both significant at the 1% level). 
 780. Id. at 26. 
 781. Hsieh & Wang, supra note 728, at 16. They find that the logarithm of the book 
value of assets correlates negatively with having shareholder approval, significant at the 1% 
level. See id. at 16-17, 45 tbl.3. 
 782. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 783. Id. at 16, 45 tbl.3 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 784. See Kamar, supra note 730, at 30. 
 785. See Hsieh & Wang, supra note 728, at 19. 
 786. See Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 704, at 393-94. 
 787. Id. at 393. 
 788. Id. at 394 (finding significantly different from 0 at the 1% level). However, the raw 
returns are not significantly different from zero. See id. 
 789. Id. 
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and the target.790 Matvos and Ostrovsky find that institutional investors that 
only owned shares in the acquirer were more than twice as likely to 
disapprove of the merger as institutional investors that owned shares in both 
the acquirer and the target.791 Interestingly, they report several instances of 
an institutional investor approving the merger on one side of the deal while 
rejecting it on the other.792 When they limit the sample to acquisitions that 
received a positive stock market reaction, the difference in voting habits 
disappears.793  
Institutional investors appear to buy additional shares leading up to the 
record date, the date that determines who can vote on the acquisition.794 
Bethel et al. show that institutions trade and buy more actively before and 
on the record dates for mergers than afterward, suggesting that they do so 
for the voting rights.795 However, they find no statistically significant 
relationship between cross-ownership of the target and acquirer and 
institutional buying behavior.796 These results provide some explanation for 
why shareholders approve acquisitions but fall short of completely solving 
the puzzle. 
6. Summary 
Although shareholder voting may not prevent every bad acquisition, 
shareholders’ decision-making process appears consistent with the goal of 
maximizing company value.797 The shareholder vote closely follows the 
stock market’s assessment of the acquisition and reflects how the 
acquisition will impact the company’s operating performance.798 
Shareholders can even screen out conflicted and unreliable sources of 
                                                                                                                 
 790. See id.  
 791. See id. at 399. They find that on average 0.82% of cross-over firms voted against the 
merger, while 2.17% of acquirer-only firms voted against it. See id. They use linear 
probability, logit, and conditional logit models to confirm that cross-over funds are more 
likely to vote for a merger than acquirer-only funds, significantly different at the 1% level. 
Id.  
 792. Id. at 398. 
 793. See id. at 400. They are unable to find a statistically significant difference in voting 
patterns between cross-over and acquirer-only firms during good mergers with linear, logit, 
and conditional logit probability models. Id. 
 794. See Bethel et al., supra note 707, at 135. 
 795. Id. They eliminate the explanation of merger arbitrage by constructing a multiple 
regression between trading around the record date and trading around the merger 
announcement and find no statistically significant correlation. See id. at 139.  
 796. Id. at 143.  
 797. See supra Sections IV.B.1-4. 
 798. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
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information when making their decision.799 A binding shareholder vote, 
however, loses its bite when management can structure the transaction to 
avoid the requirement.800 Still, the evidence suggests that the shareholder 
vote has some screening impact without resorting to an outright rejection, 
even if only as a soft deterrent or an implicit threat.801 Other dynamics, such 
as cross-ownership in the target company, may create shareholder approval 
of an otherwise bad acquisition.802 
D. Auditor Ratification 
Auditor ratification allows shareholders, in a nonbinding vote, to 
approve or reject the company’s outside auditor.803 The goal is to keep the 
auditor independent so he or she can effectively check the company’s 
books.804 Despite the lack of a legal requirement of shareholder approval, 
around two-thirds of public companies hold a vote on auditor ratification.805 
In auditor ratification votes, auditors receive on average between 98% and 
99% support from shareholders, as close to unanimous support as possible 
in any election.806  
In studies examining data going back to 1976, there has been only one 
instance of shareholders failing to ratify the board-approved auditor.807 In 
                                                                                                                 
 799. See supra Section IV.B.3. 
 800. See supra Section IV.B.4. 
 801. See supra Section IV.B.4. 
 802. See supra Section IV.B.5. 
 803. See Mai Dao et al., Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection, Audit Fees, and Audit 
Quality, 87 ACCT. REV. 149, 149-50 (2012) [hereinafter Dao et al., Shareholder Voting]. 
 804. See id. at 150. 
 805. See id. at 156 (finding that 67% of firms had auditor ratification); Jagan Krishnan & 
Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye, Why Some Companies Seek Shareholder Ratification on Auditor 
Selection, 19 ACCT. HORIZONS 237, 238 (2005) (finding that 68% of public companies put 
their auditor up for ratification); K. Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama, Audit Committee 
Composition and Shareholder Actions: Evidence from Voting on Auditor Ratification, 22 
AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 253, 258 (2003) (finding that 64% of companies held auditor 
ratification votes). 
 806. See G. William Glezen & James A. Millar, An Empirical Investigation of 
Stockholder Reaction to Disclosures Required by ASR No. 250, 23 J. ACCT. RES. 859, 863 
tbl.1 (1985) (finding an average of 99% shareholder support from 1976 to 1981); Barbara J. 
Sainty et al., Investor Dissatisfaction Toward Auditors, 17 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 111, 
119 (2002) (finding an average of 1.177% disapproval, with a maximum of 21% 
disapproval). Both studies counted abstaining votes as voting against auditor ratification, 
although they are technically two different categories.  
 807. See Suchismita Mishra et al., Do Investors’ Perceptions Vary with Types of 
Nonaudit Fees? Evidence from Auditor Ratification Voting, 24 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & 
THEORY 9, 10 (2005). 
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2002, the shareholders of Hershey Foods voted against ratifying Arthur 
Andersen LLP, a month after the accounting firm was indicted for its 
involvement in the Enron collapse as the company’s outside auditors.808  
Critics naturally question whether these votes have any impact on the 
auditor’s independence and effectiveness.809 Despite the high levels of 
shareholder support, auditor ratification votes help to keep auditors 
independent and provide insight into what shareholders view as a threat to 
auditor independence and effectiveness.810 
1. Non-Audit Fees 
Theory suggests that the primary threat to auditor independence is the 
fees paid to auditors for non-auditing services.811 Auditors may fear 
exposing problems with the company’s books and risking management’s 
wrath where they receive substantial business from the company in addition 
to their usual auditing fee.812  
The evolution of the required disclosure of fees paid to auditors has 
allowed researchers to understand whether shareholders hold a similar 
concern. Between 1978 and 1982, ASR No. 250 “required public 
companies to disclose . . . the percentage of fees for nonaudit services in 
relation to the audit fee.”813 Glezen and Millar find no statistically 
significant difference in the percentage of “for” votes before and after the 
disclosure requirements.814 Also, they did not find a correlation between 
auditor approval rating and the percentage of fees paid for non-auditing 
services.815 This finding suggests that shareholders are not concerned that 
non-auditing services will undermine auditor independence.816  
                                                                                                                 
 808. Id. (noting that 81% of shareholders rejected ratification). 
 809. See id. 
 810. K. Raghunandan, Nonaudit Services and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 22 
AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 155, 155-56, 162 (2003).  
 811. See id. at 156-57. 
 812. See id. 
 813. Glezen & Millar, supra note 806, at 859. The requirement “was withdrawn because 
[the SEC] found few companies reporting ‘sensitive’ nonaudit services” and because the 
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division of Firms later required the release of similar 
information. Id. 
 814. See id. at 864. Separating the data by industry and firm size also failed to yield a 
statistically significant difference. See id. at 865.  
 815. See id. 
 816. See id. at 864.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
100 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:9 
 
 
In 2001, the SEC again began requiring the disclosure of audit and non-
audit fees paid to the outside auditor.817 The SEC’s research suggests that 
the average non-audit fee ratio for Fortune 1000 companies is 269%.818 
Raghunandan finds that the non-audit ratio positively predicted the 
proportion of shareholders who vote against shareholder ratification.819 The 
non-audit fee ratio also predicted a decrease in shareholder support for 
auditor ratification compared to before the new disclosure requirement.820 
The difference in ratification support suggests that the disclosure 
requirement has facilitated shareholders’ ability to monitor their company’s 
auditor.821 Similarly, Raghunandan and Rama find that a higher non-audit 
fee to audit fee ratio predicted significantly more votes against auditor 
ratification.822  
In 2003, the SEC updated the auditor disclosure rules by adding two new 
categories, “audit-related fees” and “tax fees,” to the fee types.823 Mishra et 
al. find that the audit-related fee ratio predicted increased support for 
auditor ratification.824 The tax fee ratio and the “other” non-audit fee ratio 
predicted more shareholders voting against ratification.825 These results 
suggest that shareholders do not view audit-related fees as creating a 
conflict for the auditor’s independence.826 However, tax fees are still 
perceived negatively as undermining the auditor’s independence.827  
                                                                                                                 
 817. Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 155, 157. Companies were required to start 
disclosing fees paid to the auditor after February 5, 2001. Id. at 159. “[T]otal nonaudit fees 
are defined as the sum of the ‘Financial Information Systems Design and Implementation 
Fees’ and ‘Other Fees.’” Id. The non-audit fee ratio “is the ratio of total nonaudit fees to 
audit fees.” Id. 
 818. Id. at 157. 
 819. See id. at 161. He finds a relationship between the non-audit fee ratio and both the 
percentage of shareholders voting against and the percentage of shareholders either voting 
against or abstaining, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 160 tbl.2 (Panel A). 
 820. See id. at 161 tbl.2, 162 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).  
 821. See id. at 161-62. 
 822. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 805, at 259-60, 260 tbl.2 (demonstrating 
significance at the 5% level).  
 823. Mishra et al., supra note 807, at 10. The other available fee type is “other fees.” Id. 
The SEC removed the financial information systems design and implementation fees 
because they were prohibited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id. The SEC has argued that audit-
related fees and tax fees are viewed more favorably by shareholders and do not undermine 
an auditor’s independence. Id. 
 824. See id. at 19, 21 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 825. See id. (finding each significant at the 1% level). 
 826. See id. at 20. 
 827. See id. at 21. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/2
2017]        SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN PROXY CONTESTS 101 
 
 
Although non-audit fees may reduce shareholder support for auditor 
ratification, shareholders’ votes on auditor ratification do not appear to 
affect the level of non-audit fees. Neither Raghunandan nor Krishnan and 
Ye find any statistically significant relationship between allowing 
shareholders to vote on auditor ratification and the ratio of non-audit to 
audit fees.828 
Overall, these results suggest that shareholders have viewed non-audit 
fees as a threat to auditor independence since 2001, but they did not view it 
as a threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The change in shareholder 
sentiment may be due to an increased willingness of shareholders to 
question the board’s decision. It may also be due to a greater recognition of 
the need to have outside auditing after the scandals that took down Enron 
and WorldCom.  
2. Auditor Tenure 
The relationship between an auditor’s tenure and its effectiveness 
presents another ongoing debate.829 Some argue that longer tenure between 
an auditor and a client undermines the independence (and thereby, the 
quality) of the auditor.830 Others argue that having a mandatory rotation of 
auditors would undermine their effectiveness “because of high audit start-
up costs and increased risk of audit failures.”831  
Dao et al. show that longer tenure of an auditor predicts higher 
opposition to ratification from shareholders.832 This result suggests that 
shareholders view auditors as less independent and less effective the longer 
that they have audited the company.833 Sainty et al. find a more conflicted 
relationship between tenure and approval rates.834 Univariate results suggest 
that longer experience with a client decreases ratification opposition.835 
However, multivariate results provide weak evidence that shareholders are 
more likely to oppose auditor ratification the longer the auditor has worked 
                                                                                                                 
 828. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 246; Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 159. 
 829. See Mai Dao et al., Auditor Tenure and Shareholder Ratification of the Auditor, 22 
ACCT. HORIZONS 297, 297 (2008) [hereinafter Dao et al., Auditor Tenure].  
 830. Id. 
 831. Id. 
 832. Id. at 305 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). The relationship holds true 
for both Big Four and non-Big Four auditing firms, when the data is split up. Id. at 307.  
 833. See id. at 309. 
 834. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 122, 129.  
 835. See id. at 122. They divide the sample between clients who have had their auditor 
for more (1.042% opposition) and less (1.338% opposition) than five years and find the 
result significantly different at the 5% level. Id. at 121 tbl.3 (Panel C). 
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with the company.836 These results suggest that shareholders may be 
concerned that auditors who work for the company for a longer period of 
time will become too cozy with management and lose their 
independence.837 
3. Negative Reports 
When the outside auditor issues a negative report, the shareholders 
appear to respond with level-minded judgment by weighing the costs of the 
negative report against the severity of the problem.838 The issuance of a 
going-concern audit opinion presents an opportunity for shareholders to 
judge the effectiveness of their company’s auditor.839 One might think that 
issuing such an opinion would increase the confidence of shareholders in 
the auditor, since it would provide evidence that the auditor is performing 
his or her monitoring function and is not beholden to management.840 
However, going-concern audit reports can also lead to a variety of negative 
consequences for the company, including “negative publicity, violation of 
debt covenants, higher costs of capital, [and] negative market reactions.”841 
They can sometimes even be a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” eliminating the 
company’s chances of recovery.842  
Sainty et al. find that issuing a going-concern audit opinion increases 
disapproval by shareholders.843 Interestingly, a going-concern audit report 
receives more shareholder opposition when the company is showing fewer 
signs of financial distress.844 The initial going-concern opinion increases 
                                                                                                                 
 836. See id. at 128 tbl.5 & 129. An ordinary least-squared regression finds no correlation 
between audit tenure and voting results. See id. However, a logistic regression finds that 
longer tenure makes shareholders more likely to oppose auditor ratification, significant at the 
5% level. See id.  
 837. See Dao et al., Auditor Tenure, supra note 829, at 309. 
 838. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 121 tbl.3 (Panel D). 
 839. See id. at 115. 
 840. See id. 
 841. Id. 
 842. Id. 
 843. Id. at 121 tbl.3, 122. Auditors that issued a going-concern audit report received on 
average 3.367% opposition, while auditors who did not received 1.007% opposition, which 
were significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A multiple regression confirms that issuing a 
going-concern audit report leads to more audit opposition. See id. at 128 tbl.5, 129.  
 844. See id. They rerun their multiple regression with an interaction variable between the 
issuing of a going-concern audit report and a composite measure of the inverse likelihood of 
financial distress. See id. at 126. The interaction variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that fewer signs of financial distress lead to more 
blame by shareholders on the auditor. See id. at 128 tbl.5, 129.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/2
2017]        SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN PROXY CONTESTS 103 
 
 
shareholder dissatisfaction with the auditor, while a reversal of the going-
concern opinion decreases dissatisfaction back to normal levels.845 These 
results suggest that shareholders can develop a nuanced understanding of 
the situation, punishing auditors more when they prematurely issue a going-
concern opinion and returning to normal levels of support when the 
situation is resolved.846 
4. Restatement’s Impact  
Similarly, restatement disclosures also lead to lower support for auditor 
ratification.847 In theory, restatements evidence failure on the auditor’s 
part.848 Having a restatement disclosure predicts a decrease in shareholder 
support for auditor ratification.849 This suggests that a restatement 
announcement decreases the shareholders’ perceptions of their auditor.850 It 
also supports the idea that shareholders’ perception of audit quality will 
influence their votes on audit ratification.851 
5. Adverse Internal Control Reports 
Shareholders do not blame the auditors for issuing an adverse internal 
control opinion unless the opinion involves a non-company-level material 
weakness.852 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires companies to 
disclose whether the auditor believes there are any material weaknesses in 
the company’s internal controls, which is known as an adverse internal 
                                                                                                                 
 845. See id. at 130 & tbl.6. They expand out their data from 1994 to 1998. Id. at 130. The 
initial going-concern leads to an average jump of shareholder opposition of 1.63%, 
significant at the 5% level. Id. at 130 & tbl.6. Reversing the going-concern opinion reduced 
opposition by 1.244%, significantly different from the year before at the 1% level. Id.  
 846. See id. at 130-31. 
 847. See Li-Lin Liu et al., Financial Restatements and Shareholder Ratifications of the 
Auditor, 28 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 225, 234-35 (2009). 
 848. Id. at 226. 
 849. See id. at 233 tbl.4, 234 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Liu et al. find 
that, on average, 2.75% of shareholders, with a median of 1.59%, vote against auditor 
ratification for a restatement, compared to 1.45% average and 0.93% median for the control 
group. Id. at 233 & tbl.3. 
 850. See id. at 234-35. To ensure that the restatement firms did not simply always have 
lower auditor ratification rates, the authors compare the voting results before and after the 
restatement and find the differences to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Id. at 234 
& tbl.5. 
 851. See id. at 237. 
 852. See Dana R. Hermanson et al., Adverse Section 404 Opinions and Shareholder 
Dissatisfaction Toward Auditors, 23 ACCT. HORIZONS 391, 391, 393 (2009). 
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control opinion.853 The disclosure of an internal weakness can have 
negative effects such as higher debt costs, decreased stock price, and even a 
self-fulfilling prophesy of company failure.854 The auditor may be partly 
responsible for any internal control problems, since the outside auditor 
often helps the company develop its internal controls.855  
Hermanson et al. find no significant difference between the percentage of 
shareholders that vote against auditor ratification in companies with and 
without an adverse internal control opinion.856 However, shareholders are 
more likely to vote against auditor ratification when the auditor issues an 
adverse opinion on an internal control that does not involve a company-
level material weakness.857 This result suggests that shareholders are 
punishing the auditor for being too conservative in issuing an adverse 
opinion against a company that has not experienced any significant 
misstatements.858 An adverse opinion for a company-level material 
weakness only results in decreased shareholder support for the auditor when 
the company had a restatement.859 These results suggest that shareholders 
blame auditors for not identifying and correcting material weaknesses in the 
past and thus providing low-quality auditing services.860 It also suggests 
that, where an auditor issues a company-level adverse opinion before a 
restatement has been issued, shareholders reward or at least do not penalize 
                                                                                                                 
 853. See id. at 392. 
 854. Id. at 395. 
 855. See id. 
 856. See id. at 400, 401 tbl.2. Companies with an adverse internal control opinion saw on 
average of 2.419% of shareholders voting against or abstaining from voting for auditor 
ratification, with a median of 0.968%, compared to an average of 1.828% and a median of 
1.118% for the control sample. Id. at 401 tbl.2. These results were not statistically different. 
See id.  
 857. See id. at 403 tbl.4, 404. In the overall sample, they find a mildly significant 
relationship between a non-company level material weakness adverse opinion and increased 
votes against auditor ratification, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 403 tbl.4. When they 
split the sample between companies that disclosed restatements and those that did not and 
removed the interaction variables between restatements and adverse opinions, both samples 
resulted in a positive correlation between issuing a non-company level adverse opinion and 
increased votes against auditor ratification, significant at the 5% level. See id. 
 858. See id. at 404.  
 859. See id. at 403 tbl.4, 404. When the sample is limited to companies with a 
restatement, an adverse opinion for a company-level material weakness predicts decreased 
support for auditor ratification, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 403 tbl.4. The full 
sample and the sample of companies without a restatement does not result in a significant 
correlation between an adverse opinion for a company-level material weakness and 
shareholder voting on audit ratification. See id.  
 860. See id. at 404.  
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the auditor, because they believe that the auditor has identified an important 
problem that needs to be corrected.861 
6. Auditor Characteristics 
Auditor characteristics impact how shareholders vote on auditor 
ratification.862 Theoretical literature suggests shareholders can determine 
the quality of an auditor through proxies such as reputation, name brand 
recognition, client base, and accumulated capital wealth since the auditor is 
seen as a possible indemnifier if the investment goes bad.863 Sainty et al. 
find that bigger auditing firms are likely to get more shareholder support.864 
However, they find no difference in shareholder support when the auditor is 
an industry leader for the specific industry.865 
7. Insider Ownership and Audit Committee Effects 
Characteristics of the company and the audit committee can also impact 
shareholder voting on auditor ratification. Raghunandan and Rama find that 
higher share ownership by officers and directors and by blockholders 
predicted fewer votes against auditor ratification, while having the CEO as 
the chairman of the board predicted more votes against auditor 
ratification.866 Similarly, Raghunandan finds that the percentage of insider 
ownership inversely predicts the proportion of shareholders voting against 
auditor ratification.867  
Some evidence suggests that the composition of the audit committee also 
affects the auditor ratification results.868 When Raghunandan and Rama 
                                                                                                                 
 861. See id. at 406. 
 862. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 119-20. 
 863. See id. at 114. 
 864. See id. at 120. The then-Big Six firms received on average 0.519% opposition, while 
national firms received 0.876% opposition and local firms received 1.142% opposition. Id. at 
121 tbl.3. The difference between these categories was significant at the 1% level. See id. at 
120. A multiple regression confirms that the Big Six audit firms receive less opposition than 
the other firms, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 127, 128 tbl.5.  
 865. See id. at 120, 121 tbl.3. They define industry leadership as having clients with 
market share exceeding 20% in the specific industry. See id. at 120. Similarly, a multiple 
regression fails to find any relationship between market share and voting results. See id. at 
128 tbl.5, 129. 
 866. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 805, at 259, 260 tbl.2. Blockholder 
ownership was significant at the 5% level, while officer and director ownership and CEO as 
chairman were significant at the 1% level. Id. at 260 tbl.2.  
 867. See Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 159, 160 tbl.2 (demonstrating significance at 
the 1% level). 
 868. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 805, at 260. 
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divide the sample in two based on the audit fee ratio, they find that the 
presence of a non-expert or non-independent audit committee predicted 
significantly higher “against” votes in the half of the sample with a higher 
non-audit fee ratio.869 These results suggest that the composition of the 
audit committee affects shareholder perception of the audit when the non-
audit fee ratio is high.870 
8. Effect of Seeking Auditor Ratification 
An examination of which companies allow their shareholders to vote on 
auditor ratification suggests that auditor ratification is associated with better 
accounting practices.871 Companies with auditor ratification tend to pay 
more in auditor ratification fees.872 Krishnan and Ye found that higher total 
auditing fees predicted a higher chance that the company would seek 
auditor ratification.873 This result suggests that auditors seek ratification 
when the auditor’s interest in the engagement is high.874 Dao et al. also find 
that having shareholders vote on auditor ratification predicted higher audit 
ratification fees.875 Their regression model predicts that having shareholders 
vote on auditor ratification is associated with 9% higher auditor fees.876  
Krishnan and Ye report that auditing committees with greater financial 
expertise were more likely to seek auditor ratification.877 Dao, 
Raghunandan, and Rama also find that companies with auditor ratification 
were less likely to receive a restatement for fiscal year 2006.878 Their 
regression analysis predicts that having auditor ratification predicts a 32% 
                                                                                                                 
 869. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). Interestingly, the dummy 
variable was not significant for the bottom half of the sample. See id. 
 870. Id.  
 871. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 238. 
 872. See id. at 247-49. 
 873. See id. at 247, 248 tbl.3 (demonstrating significance at the 10% level). 
 874. See id. at 247, 250. 
 875. See Dao et al., Shareholder Voting, supra note 803, at 156, 159 tbl.2 (demonstrating 
significance at the 1% level). They limit their sample to firms that added or removed auditor 
ratification and again find a significant positive correlation between having auditor 
ratification and having higher auditor fees, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 160, 161 
tbl.3. Their regression suggests that a firm that added auditor selection would have 8% 
higher fees than a firm that removed auditor selection. See id. 
 876. See id. at 156-58. 
 877. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 248 tbl.3, 250 (demonstrating significance at 
the 10% level). 
 878. See Dao et al., Shareholder Voting, supra note 803, at 162 tbl.4, 165 (demonstrating 
significance at the 10% level). 
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reduction in the likelihood of having a restatement.879 Companies with 
auditor ratification also have significantly lower abnormal current 
accruals.880 The decreased likelihood of a restatement and the lower 
abnormal current accruals suggest that having shareholders vote on auditor 
ratification increases the quality of the auditor’s work.881 Raghunandan 
finds no statistical difference in company size between companies that do 
and do not submit their auditor for shareholder ratification.882 Krishnan and 
Ye, however, find that larger companies are more likely to seek auditor 
ratification.883  
Companies with better returns and where directors receive higher levels 
of shareholder support are also more likely to seek shareholder ratification 
of their auditor.884 These results suggest that better performing companies 
tend to allow shareholder ratification of the auditor.885 Beyond the 
difference in companies that do and do not have auditor ratification, there is 
little evidence of the impact of shareholder voting. Sainty et al., however, 
find that greater opposition to auditor ratification increases the chances that 
the firm will change auditors in the next two years.886 
9. Summary 
While shareholders give auditor ratification almost universally high 
support, the small variations in shareholder support appear to accurately 
reflect the auditor’s ability to maintain independence and effectively 
perform the job. Shareholders understand the threat that non-audit fees, tax 
fees, and a longer relationship pose to an auditor’s independence and 
respond by withholding their support.887 Shareholders also appear to 
understand the importance of going-concern opinions, restatements, and 
adverse internal control opinions and only blame the auditor for the 
                                                                                                                 
 879. Id. at 165.  
 880. See id. at 166, 167 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 881. See id. at 168. 
 882. Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 159. 
 883. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 248 tbl.3, 250 (demonstrating significance at 
the 5% level). 
 884. See id. (each demonstrating significance at the 10% level). 
 885. See id.  
 886. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 132, 133 tbl.7. A firm that changed auditors 
received average ratification opposition of 2.67%, while firms that did not change auditors 
received ratification opposition of 1.01%, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A 
multiple regression confirms that higher opposition to auditor ratification predicts a greater 
chance that the firm will be fired in the next two years, significant at the 1% level. See id. 
 887. See supra Sections IV.D.1-2. 
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associated problems when the auditor has gone too far prematurely.888 
Allowing shareholders to ratify the outside auditor is associated with an 
audit committee possessing greater financial expertise, lower abnormal 
current accruals, and a lower chance of having a restatement.889 Although it 
is still unclear whether auditor ratification leads to a more effective and 
independent auditor, auditor ratification votes are at least associated with 
such results.890 
E. Compensation Proposals and Say on Pay 
Depending on how compensation is structured, it can increase 
shareholder value by properly incentivizing executives or it can dilute 
shareholder interest in the corporation.891 When managers are compensated 
according to firm performance, they will work harder and take appropriate 
risks.892 However, managers can make the plans overly beneficial to 
themselves and thereby undermine shareholder value.893 As a result, a 
shareholder vote on compensation can theoretically represent an important 
check against management abuse.894  
1. Voting Support for Compensation Proposals 
Compensation proposals receive, on average, support from 80% of 
shareholders.895 Shareholders almost always approve compensation 
proposals.896 Thomas and Martin found only five proposals, less than 1% of 
                                                                                                                 
 888. See supra Sections IV.D.3-5. 
 889. See supra Section IV.D.8. 
 890. See supra Section IV.D.8. 
 891. See Angela G. Morgan & Annette B. Poulsen, Linking Pay to Performance — 
Compensation Proposals in the S&P 500, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 489, 490-91 (2001).  
 892. Id. at 491. 
 893. Id. at 490. 
 894. Id. 
 895. See, e.g., Angela Morgan et al., The Evolution of Shareholder Voting for Executive 
Compensation Schemes, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 715, 723-24 (2006) (finding average shareholder 
support for compensation proposals of 85% to 80.9% between 1992 and 2003); Randall S. 
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option 
Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 58-59 (2000) (finding that stock option proposals in 
1998 received on average only 18.6% opposition).  
 896. See, e.g., Christopher S. Armstrong et al., The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: 
Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 909, 910-11 (2003) (finding 
that shareholders failed to approve 2% of equity compensation proposals between 2001 and 
2010); Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 58 (finding less than 1% of stock proposals fail 
to receive shareholder support in 1998). 
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their sample, which failed to receive the necessary shareholder support.897 
From case studies of the defeats, they concluded that high levels of 
shareholder dilution caused the rejection, ranging from 20% to 44%.898  
At least before 2003, management had some latitude to structure 
executive compensation to avoid the shareholder approval requirement, 
which they had been increasingly avoiding despite the expanding 
regulations requiring shareholder approval.899 Between 1978 and 1997, 
companies adopted only 9% of plans without shareholder approval.900 By 
contrast, between 1997 and 2002, companies adopted 27% of plans without 
shareholder approval.901  
2. Effect of Company Performance 
Managers appear more likely to submit compensation to a shareholder 
vote when the company is doing well, although shareholders seem 
unconcerned with company performance.902 Balachandran et al. find that 
firms with better corporate governance tend to put their compensation plans 
up for a vote.903 Firms with a lower return on assets (“ROA”) are less likely 
to put their compensation plans up for a vote.904 Similarly, Morgan and 
                                                                                                                 
 897. Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 58. 
 898. Id. at 57. 
 899. Sudhakar V. Balachandran et al., Do Voting Rights Matter: Evidence from the 
Adoption of Equity-Based Compensation Plans 1 (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/1083/1083.pdf. SEC rule 
16b-3 has long required that compensation awarded to executives be subject to the short 
swing sale prohibition unless the plan was approved by shareholders. Id. at 9. In 1996, the 
SEC amended the rule by expanding the exemption to approval by directors or a board 
committee. Id. at 10. Also, in 1998, the NYSE created an exemption for requiring 
shareholder approval of plans where 20% of companies were eligible to participate, half of 
which must not be either officers nor directors. Id. They ended the exemption in 2002. Id. In 
2003, NYSE and NASDAQ began requiring firms to obtain shareholder approval for equity-
based compensation plans. Id. at 1. 
 900. Id. at 3-4. 
 901. Id. at 4. The increase in unapproved plans may be the result of regulatory changes. 
See id. at 9-10.  
 902. Id. at 22-23. 
 903. Id. at 23. They use the proportion of directors that are insiders, whether the CEO is 
also the chair of the board and whether the firm has a beneficial owner, defined as owning 
more than 10% of the company’s stock. See id. at 36 tbl.4. A CEO chairman and a higher 
proportion of inside directors make the firm less likely to submit the compensation plan to 
shareholders, both significant at the 5% level. See id. Having a beneficial owner made it 
more likely that the company would submit compensation for shareholder approval, 
significant at the 10% level. See id. 
 904. Id. at 22-23 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
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Poulsen find that managers are more likely to submit compensation 
proposals after high stock-price performance, although sales did not make a 
difference.905  
Executives may see periods of strong stock performance as opportune 
times to have their compensation tied to company performance.906 The 
performance of the company, however, does not appear to affect 
shareholders’ support for compensation plans.907 Morgan et al. find that 
neither the prior one-year stock performance nor the book-to-market ratio 
had a statistically significant relationship to proposal support.908 Cremers 
and Romano also find that company performance did not relate to support 
for equity compensation proposals.909  
Poor company performance may also increase support for incentive-
based executive compensation.910 Thomas and Martin find that shareholders 
offer greater support for future stock option plans when the company has 
been performing poorly.911 Perhaps shareholders are willing to create 
stronger incentives to attract better managers when their company performs 
poorly and needs top-notch management expertise.  
However, while examining the first round of say-on-pay votes in 2011, 
Ertimur et al. find that poorly performing firms, based on abnormal returns 
and ROA, received less shareholder support.912 Cotter et al. also find better 
stock performance over the previous two years resulted in more support on 
the say-on-pay proposals.913 Ignoring the recent say-on-pay votes, managers 
                                                                                                                 
 905. Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 512. The stock result was significant at the 
5% level. See id. at 509 tbl.7.  
 906. Id. at 512. 
 907. See Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 726, 728.  
 908. Id. at 726, 727 tbl.5. 
 909. See K. J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy 
Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure 
Rule, 13 AM. L. ECON. REV. 220, 238 tbl.3, 242 (2011). 
 910. Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 61-62. 
 911. Id. They divide the sample in half based on the prior one-year, three-year, and five-
year market returns. Id. at 61. They find no significant difference in shareholder opposition 
based on one-year returns. Id. However, lower three-year returns and five-year returns had 
significantly lower shareholder opposition. Id. at 61-62. These results are confirmed with a 
multiple regression, finding a significantly positive relationship between one-, three-, and 
five-year returns and shareholder opposition. Id. at 71-72.  
 912. Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on 
Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 973, 975 tbl.6A (2013) (both measures significant at the 1% 
level). 
 913. James F. Cotter et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An 
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 985 (2013). They group 
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appear to incorrectly believe that shareholders vote on compensation 
proposals based on the company’s recent performance.914 
Allowing shareholders to approve compensation plans may also improve 
company performance.915 In the year after the compensation proposal, 
Morgan and Poulsen find that companies had significantly higher stock 
performance, earnings divided by assets, and sales divided by assets than a 
control group.916 Balachandran et al. similarly find that having shareholder 
approval of compensation plans predicts better ROA and better operating 
returns in the year after initiating the plan.917 It may be that the 
compensation proposals lead to better company performance or that 
executives propose compensation proposals when they expect strong 
performance.918  
Plans approved by shareholders tended to be larger and have a higher 
exercise price.919 Plans covering directors were likely to be approved by 
shareholders, while plans covering officers were less likely to pass.920 Also, 
Morgan and Poulsen find that firms with higher institutional holdings were 
more likely to let shareholders vote on the compensation plan, while insider 
ownership had an insignificant impact.921 These results suggest that insiders 
are not able to propose these plans without support from institutional 
investors.922 Overall, these papers indicate that firms with good corporate 
                                                                                                                 
companies into five groups based on total stock returns over the twenty-four months leading 
to Fiscal Year End 2010. Id. The group with the best stock returns received on average 
68.9% support, while the group with the lowest support received on average 62.8% support; 
these were significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A multiple regression confirms that 
higher stock returns led to higher support, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 990, 991 
tbl.6.  
 914. See id. 
 915. See Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 519-20. 
 916. Id. The CARs are significantly different at the 5% level, while earnings/assets and 
sales/assets are significantly different at the 10% level. See id. at 519.  
 917. Balachandran et al., supra note 899, at 25 (both significant at the 5% level). 
 918. See Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 520.  
 919. Balachandran et al., supra note 899, at 16. Plans approved by shareholders included 
an average of 5502 shares and an average exercise price of $12.13. Id. at 31 tbl.1. Plans not 
approved by shareholders included an average of 3142 shares and an average exercise price 
of $10.47. Id. A multiple regression finds that smaller plans were less likely to be put to a 
vote, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 23. 
 920. Id. (both demonstrating significance at the 5% level). 
 921. Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 510 (demonstrating significance at the 5% 
level). 
 922. See id. 
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governance and strong performance allow shareholders to approve their 
compensation plans.923 
3. Effect of Dilution 
The primary driver of shareholder support for compensation proposals 
appears to be their effect on the level of shareholder dilution.924 Morgan 
and Poulsen find that the average dilution of the plans was 3.21%, with a 
median dilution of 2.35%, while 23% of the plans had a dilution effect 
greater than 5%.925 Plans that resulted in less dilution of the company’s 
stock saw a better stock market response than plans with more dilution.926 
Shareholders gave lower support to plans with higher dilution levels.927 
Similarly, Thomas and Martin find that the dilution of all plans proposed 
predicted significantly less shareholder support.928 The total dilution of all 
the stock option proposals in the proxy statement had a greater impact on 
shareholder voting than the dilution of each individual proposal.929  
Morgan et al. report that more dilutive plans received less shareholder 
support.930 Armstrong et al. find that the dilution of the compensation plan 
predicted less support from shareholders.931  
                                                                                                                 
 923. See id. 
 924. See id. at 499. 
 925. Id. 
 926. See id. at 514. Plans with dilution of less than or equal to 5% had average CARs of 
0.46% (t = 2.70), while plans with returns greater than 5% returns received CARs of 0.17% 
(t = 0.75). Id. at 515. When the sample was limited to plans that affected executives, plans 
less than 5% received CARs of 0.62% (t = 3.04), while plans with greater dilution saw 
CARs of 0.15% (t = 0.64). Id. 
 927. See id. at 514-15. 
 928. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 69 (demonstrating significance at the 1% 
level). The result holds when they divide the sample between plans with more and less than 
10% dilution. See id. at 69-70. 
 929. Id. at 60. They run a chi-squared analysis of total dilution of the proposals within a 
stock option proposal greater or less than 10% and the dilution of individual proposals of 
greater or less than 5%. Id. Naturally, shareholder disapproval is highest when the total of 
dilution is greater than 10% and the individual dilution is greater than 5%, receiving 
shareholder disapproval of 24.8% on average. Id. This disapproval rate is significantly 
different from when total dilution is high and individual dilution is low. Id. However, there 
is no significant difference between high and low individual dilution when total dilution is 
low. Id.  
 930. Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 726, 727 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 
1% level). 
 931. See Armstrong et al., supra note 896, at 929-30. The number of shares created by 
the plan as a proportion of shares outstanding, the number of stock options and restricted 
stock not yet granted as a proportion of shares outstanding, and the proportion of the CEO’s 
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CEO compensation affects how shareholders vote on compensation 
proposals.932 Armstrong et al. find that the shareholders’ support for the 
equity compensation proposal correlates negatively with the CEO’s option 
compensation, total compensation, proportion of equity compensation, and 
options granted.933 Morgan et al. find that a higher ratio of CEO 
compensation to total assets predicted lower support for the compensation 
proposal.934 These results indicate that higher CEO compensation led to less 
shareholder support.935 Conyon also finds that higher levels of CEO pay are 
associated with higher levels of shareholder opposition to the firm’s say-on-
pay proposal.936 Furthermore, firms with better economic performance see 
lower levels of shareholder dissent on the proposals.937 Finally, the 
composition of the board also has a significant impact on the say-on-pay 
proposals.938 Shareholders appear to pay attention to the dilution of the 
compensation plan and the current pay of the CEO when they vote on 
compensation proposals. 
4. Shareholder Composition and Corporate Governance Impact 
The company’s shareholder profile affects support for compensation 
proposals.939 Morgan et al. find that larger institutional holdings lead to less 
                                                                                                                 
compensation in equity all predict less shareholder support for the equity compensation plan, 
each statistically significant at the 1% level. Id. at 929 tbl.2.  
 932. Id. at 935. 
 933. Id. at 931 tbl.3, 935 (each significant at the 1% level, except for total compensation 
significant at the 10% level). 
 934. See Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 729, 730 tbl.7.  
 935. See Armstrong et al., supra note 896, at 935. 
 936. Martin J. Conyon, Shareholder Dissent on Say-on-Pay and CEO Compensation 17 
(Mar. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748645. Their sample 
includes 3205 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2012 that includes 1264 unique firms. Id. 
at 10. Each of cash pay, total pay, realized pay (which includes ex post gains from the sales 
of options and restricted stock), and excess compensation predict higher levels of 
shareholder dissent, each significant at the 1% level. See id. at 29 tbl.6.  
 937. Id. at 18. Higher market performance and accounting performance result in higher 
levels of shareholder support for the say-on-pay proposals, significant at the 1% level. See 
id. at 29 tbl.6. 
 938. See id. at 18. A larger board leads to lower levels of support for say-on-pay 
proposals, at a marginal level of significance. See id. at 18, 29 tbl.6. Interestingly, Conyon 
finds no relationship between the percentage of independent directors and shareholder 
support for the say-on-pay proposals. Id. Shareholders are more likely to oppose the say-on-
pay proposal when the CEO is also the chairman of the board. See id. at 18, 29 tbl.6 
(demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 939. See Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 726. 
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support for the compensation proposals.940 This result suggests that 
institutional shareholders are more critical of executive compensation plans 
than are individual shareholders.941  
Morgan and Poulsen find that higher managerial holdings led to higher 
support for compensation proposals.942 Similarly, being a larger firm 
predicts high shareholder support for a compensation proposal.943 Cremers 
states that high stock turnover led to less support for the equity 
compensation proposals.944 The presence of a poison pill is also correlated 
with significantly less support for the equity compensation proposals.945 
5. Type of Compensation Plans Matters 
Shareholders seem more inclined to support different types of plans.946 
Thomas and Martin find that stock option plans for all employees 
experience significantly higher opposition than plans for just executives or 
outside directors.947 Evergreen plans face significantly more opposition 
than stock option plans generally.948 Plans with discount options receive 
more opposition than fair market options.949 Plans that allow for repricing 
underwater options receive significantly more opposition than plans without 
the option.950 Plans with omnibus awards receive significantly more 
                                                                                                                 
 940. Id. at 726, 727 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). 
 941. See id. 
 942. Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 517. 
 943. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).  
 944. Cremers & Romano, supra note 909, at 238 tbl.3, 242 (demonstrating significance 
at the 5% level). 
 945. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). 
 946. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 62.  
 947. Id. at 61. They find that stock option plans for all employees have opposition of 
22.1%, plans for executives of 18.1%, and plans for outside directors of 11.9%. Id. A chi-
squared analysis shows that these differences are statistically significant. See id. 
 948. See id. at 62. On average, plans with evergreen or quasi-evergreen provisions 
receive 28.2%, which is higher than the opposition rate to plans without the provisions, 
significant at the 1% level. Id. at 62, 76 tbl.2. A multiple regression finds that evergreen 
plans are weakly correlated with shareholder opposition, significant at the 10% level. See id. 
at 71. 
 949. See id. at 63. Plans with discount options receive 24.2% opposition on average, 
which is higher than plans with the market options, significant at the 1% level. Id. A 
multiple regression shows that discount options are weakly correlated with shareholder 
opposition, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 71. 
 950. See id. at 65. An underwater repricing option allows the board to lower the exercise 
price of the option when the stock price has fallen below the original exercise price. Id. at 
63. They find that plans that allow for repricing underwater options received on average 
25.1% opposition, while options that did not have a repricing option received on average 
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opposition than plans without the feature.951 Time-lapse restricted stock 
records greater opposition than other plans.952 Thomas and Martin did not 
find a significant difference in opposition to reload options compared to 
other plans.953 Plans with change in control provisions receive greater 
opposition than plans without the provisions.954 Plans accompanied by 
preferential loans to executives to pay for the stock receive significantly 
more opposition than other plans.955 They did not find a significant 
difference between plans with pyramiding of stock options compared to 
other plans.956 Plans with acceleration provisions receive significantly more 
                                                                                                                 
16.1% opposition, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 65. These results are confirmed with a 
multiple regression. See id. at 71. 
 951. See id. at 65. Plans with an omnibus feature receive on average opposition of 21.1% 
while plans without the feature receive opposition of 17.1%, which is significantly different 
at the 1% level. Id. However, a multiple regression fails to find a significant correlation 
between an omnibus provision and shareholder opposition. See id. at 71. 
 952. See id. at 66. Time-lapsing restricted stock occurs where “company stock . . . is 
given or sold, at a deep discount, [but] . . . cannot be sold during a fixed period of time,” 
which made up 44% of their sample. Id. at 66. The time-lapsing restricted stock received 
20.8% opposition compared to other plans that received 16.9% opposition, significantly 
different at the 1% level. Id. These results are confirmed with multiple regression analysis. 
See id. at 71. 
 953. Id. at 67. Reload options allow the executive to lock in gains on their existing stock 
options “without giving up the opportunity to realize further gains if the company’s stock 
price should continue to increase.” Id. at 66-67. They made up 10% of the sample. Id. at 67. 
The reload options received 20.4% opposition and other proposals received 18.4% 
opposition, which were not significantly different. Id. However, a multiple regression fails to 
find any significant relationship between a reload option and shareholder opposition. See id. 
at 71. 
 954. Id. Change in control provisions allow executives to exercise their options “upon a 
change in control of the company.” Id. They received opposition of 19.7%, while other plans 
received opposition of 14.9%, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. However, a multiple 
regression fails to find a significant relationship between a change in control provision and 
shareholder opposition. See id. at 71. 
 955. See id. at 68. Proposals that included “the possibility of using loans to pay the 
exercise price” made up 27% of the sample and received opposition of 24.8%, while other 
plans received opposition of 16.4%, which was significantly different at the 1% level. Id. 
These results are confirmed with a multiple regression. See id. at 71. 
 956. Id. at 68. 
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opposition than other plans.957 Proposals that add shares to existing plans 
face significantly higher opposition than proposals that create new plans.958  
Morgan and Poulsen find that proposing a new compensation plan 
predicted higher shareholder approval, while replacement plans and adding 
additional plans did not.959 These results suggest that shareholder voting 
reflects the negative and positives aspects of a compensation plan, even if 
shareholders do not actually reject any of them.960  
6. Impact on CEO Compensation 
Studies have found conflicting evidence on whether shareholder support 
affects a CEO’s future compensation. Martin and Thomas find that 
shareholder support for a proposal correlated with changes in salary and 
total pay for the CEO in the following year.961 Shareholder support, 
however, did not have a statistically significant relationship to salary plus 
bonus or to option pay.962 These results suggest that CEO compensation is 
responsive to shareholder voting on compensation proposals.963  
In contrast, Armstrong et al. fail to find a correlation between the 
shareholder vote and different measures of CEO compensation in the first 
and second year after the vote.964 They also examine whether there was a 
relationship between approval of the equity compensation plan and the 
CEO’s compensation in the next year.965 They find no correlation between a 
failed vote on equity compensation and future compensation.966 This is 
surprising because equity proposals are generally binding, so it suggests 
that boards are seeking additional shares for the CEO in the later years.967  
                                                                                                                 
 957. See id. Plans with acceleration provisions received 21.2% opposition while other 
plans received opposition of 15.7%, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. However, a 
multiple regression fails to find any significant relationship between an acceleration 
provision and shareholder opposition. See id. at 71.  
 958. See id. (using a multiple regression, significant at the 1% level).  
 959. See Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 505 tbl.5, 506 (demonstrating 
significance at the 5% level). 
 960. See id. at 514, 515 tbl.9. 
 961. See Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, When Is Enough, Enough? Market 
Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the Subsequent Impact on CEO 
Compensation, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 61, 78 tbl.8 (2005) (demonstrating significance at the 10% 
level). 
 962. Id. at 78 tbl.8, 79. 
 963. Id. at 80. 
 964. See Armstrong et al., supra note 896, at 932-33 tbl.3, 935.  
 965. See id. at 943. 
 966. See id. 
 967. Id. 
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Conyon finds that firms with higher levels of dissent are less likely to 
increase their CEO’s pay, but only at marginal levels of significance.968 
This result suggests that the say-on-pay votes provide some check on CEO 
compensation.969 
7. Impact of SEC 2003 Rules 
In 2003, the SEC adopted new rules that require shareholder approval for 
new equity compensation plans or material alterations to an existing equity 
compensation plan.970 Ng et al. find that the percentage of firms with 
management-sponsored equity compensation proposals increased from 
47.6% before the 2003 regulation to 53.4% after the regulation.971 
However, the increase in the percentage of firms with compensation 
proposals resulted mainly from firms that already had compensation 
approved by shareholders.972 Interestingly, ISS gave positive 
recommendations to 80% of the equity compensation proposals in the two 
years leading up to the new rule compared to 90% in the two years after the 
new rule, suggesting that equity compensation proposals increased in 
quality.973  
After, but not before the new rule, total compensation and equity 
compensation of the top five executives predicted significantly less support 
for the compensation proposals.974 More entrenched directors and more 
institutional holdings also predicted significantly less support after, but not 
before, the new rule.975 These results suggest that the new rule increased the 
quality of shareholder voting.976 The new mandatory nature of equity 
proposals may have empowered shareholders to more critically examine the 
compensation proposals on which they vote.977 
                                                                                                                 
 968. Conyon, supra note 936, at 19, 30 tbl.7. 
 969. See id. at 19-20.  
 970. Lilian Ng et al., Does Shareholder Approval Requirement of Equity Compensation 
Plans Matter?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1510, 1511 (2011). Prior to the new rule, about half of S&P 
500 firms had equity-based compensation plans that weren’t approved by shareholders. Id. 
Equity compensation proposals fall into three categories: stock options, restricted stock, and 
omnibus awards. Id. at 1515. 
 971. Id. at 1516. They find that 47.6% of firms have compensation proposals between 
2001 and 2003 compared to 53.4% between 2003 and 2005. Id. 
 972. Id. at 1517. 
 973. Id. at 1520. 
 974. Id. at 1523, 1524 tbl.7 (both showing significance at the 5% level). 
 975. See id. (both significant at the 10% level). 
 976. Id. at 1523. 
 977. Id.  
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The average composition of executive compensation dropped from 60% 
equity and 40% cash to 50% equity and 50% cash after the new rule.978 As 
expected, it appears that the 2003 rule motivated management to receive 
their compensation in cash instead of equity.979  
8. Mutual Fund Voting After 2003 
Another part of the 2003 SEC reforms require that mutual funds disclose 
how they vote on proxy proposals.980 The SEC hoped that such disclosure 
would reduce mutual fund support for management by making them more 
accountable to their investors.981 Cremers and Romano find that mutual 
fund support for management did not decline after the disclosure rules.982 In 
fact, mutual funds may have increased their support for management after 
the disclosure rules.983 The added transparency may make mutual funds 
more vulnerable to management backlash, but this interpretation is unlikely 
since management would already have known how the mutual funds 
voted.984 Management would not have already known about the mutual 
funds’ votes if the corporation had confidential voting, but that 
characteristic did not correlate with proposal support.985 Perhaps mutual 
funds may believe that their investors prefer them to vote with management 
and are now responding to that pressure.986  
9. Dodd-Frank’s Say-on-Pay Vote 
In 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act created a new mandatory, but non-binding, 
vote on executive compensation known as say on pay.987 On average, 9.6% 
                                                                                                                 
 978. Id. at 1525. The differences between the two periods are statistically significant at 
the 5% level. See id. at 1525 tbl.8. 
 979. See id. 
 980. Cremers & Romano, supra note 909, at 221. 
 981. Id. The SEC hoped that investors would pressure mutual funds into reducing their 
support for management. See id. at 226. 
 982. Id. at 239. Their results suggest that mutual fund holdings, both before and after, 
lead to decreased support for the EEIC proposals, significant at the 5% levels. Id. at 238 
tbl.3. However, the correlation disappears as they add in additional control variables. See id. 
The interaction variable between mutual fund holdings and the “after” dummy correlates 
positively with EEIC support, significant at the 10% level, suggesting that mutual funds may 
have increased their support for management after the disclosure. See id. at 238 tbl.3, 239. 
 983. See id. at 238 tbl.3 (demonstrating significance at the 10% level). 
 984. Id. at 242. 
 985. Id. at 242-43. 
 986. See id. at 243.  
 987. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n-1 (2012); Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 951-52. They focus on the 
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of shareholders (median 4.6%) vote against the say-on-pay proposal.988 
Shareholders paid attention to the CEO’s current compensation in voting on 
the say-on-pay proposals.989 Cotter et al. find that higher excess CEO 
compensation predicted significantly less support for the say-on-pay 
proposal.990 The growth in CEO pay, however, did not have a major effect 
on the say-on-pay vote.991 Similarly, Ertimur et al. find that a higher level 
of and higher growth of CEO pay predicts less shareholder support for the 
say-on-pay proposal.992  
10. Proxy Advisor Impact on Say-on-Pay Vote 
The recommendation of a proxy advisor had the greatest impact on 
shareholder voting on say-on-pay proposals.993 ISS recommended “against” 
for 13% of the compensation packages in their sample.994 Similarly, Glass 
Lewis recommended “against” for 21% of the compensation packages in 
their sample.995 The two firms offer the same recommendation in 
                                                                                                                 
recommendations given by ISS and Glass Lewis in 2011 on say-on-pay votes, which are 
mandatory but nonbinding. Id. Both proxy advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis, provide a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the executive pay plan, assign a rating, and issue a 
final vote recommendation. Id. at 953. ISS issued an “against” recommendation for 11.3% of 
firms, while Glass Lewis issued an “against” recommendation for 21.7% of firms. Id. 
 988. Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 973. 
 989. See Cotter et al., supra note 913, at 987-92.  
 990. Id. at 990, 991 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Excess CEO 
compensation is defined as CEO compensation minus the expected CEO compensation 
based on company performance and industry standards. See id. at 988-89 n.96.  
 991. See id. at 987-88. After dividing companies into five groups based on growth in 
CEO compensation, they find statistically significant differences between the groups when 
ISS issues a positive recommendation, significant at the 5% level, but not when it issues a 
negative recommendation. Id. A multiple regression also fails to find a significant 
relationship between the growth in CEO compensation and shareholder support. Id. at 990, 
991 tbl.6. 
 992. See Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 973, 975 tbl.6A (demonstrating significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels respectively). 
 993. See Cotter et al., supra note 913, at 990. 
 994. See David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory 
Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 180 (2015). Their sample is based on 2008 firms from the 
Russell 3000 index that were required to have a say-on-pay vote in 2011 under the Dodd-
Frank Act. See id. at 176.  
 995. Id. at 181. Glass Lewis does not publicly release their recommendations. As a result, 
the authors extrapolate Glass Lewis recommendations from the voting of four firms that 
follow Glass Lewis policies. The firms disagreed in only six instances, suggesting that this 
methodology has a high level of accuracy. See id. at 180.  
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approximately 79% of cases.996 No firm that received a positive ISS 
recommendation failed to receive majority support, while one firm that 
received a positive recommendation from Glass Lewis failed to receive 
majority support.997  
Cotter et al. find that an ISS recommendation in favor of the say-on-pay 
proposal resulted in significantly more shareholder support.998 Out of all of 
the variables they studied, an ISS recommendation appeared to have the 
largest effect.999 Ertimur et al. also find that a negative recommendation 
from ISS or Glass Lewis predicted significantly less shareholder support for 
the proposal.1000 The ISS recommendation also had a significantly larger 
effect on shareholder votes compared to the Glass Lewis 
recommendation.1001 These results confirm that ISS and Glass Lewis have a 
major impact on shareholder voting, with ISS playing the larger role.1002  
Ertimur et al. further report that a negative ISS recommendation had a 
greater effect on non-blockholders than blockholders.1003 This result 
suggests that institutional investors deviate more from the ISS 
recommendation when they own a greater share of the company, perhaps 
because a greater ownership share incentives them to overcome collective 
action problems.1004 
                                                                                                                 
 996. Id. at 181. However, where one of the firms offers a “vote against” 
recommendation, the firms agree only in 23% of cases. See id. 
 997. See id.  
 998. See Cotter et al., supra note 913, at 982. Say-on-pay proposals with a positive ISS 
recommendation received on average 28.2% more shareholder support than say-on-pay 
proposals with a negative ISS recommendation. See id. A multiple regression confirmed that 
companies with a positive ISS recommendation received more support, significant at the 1% 
level. See id. at 990, 991 tbl.6. 
 999. Id. at 990. 
 1000. Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 976 tbl.6B, 978 (both demonstrating significance at 
the 1% level). The R2 is 43.8% in the model with Glass Lewis, 65.7% in the model with ISS, 
and 82.3% in the model with both, compared to 20.9% in the model with neither, suggesting 
that their recommendations explain a larger part of the variation in shareholder voting. See 
id.  
 1001. See id. at 978. 
 1002. See id. 
 1003. See id. at 979. Their results indicate that a negative recommendation from ISS 
results in 34.4% of nonblockholders voting no and 24.5% of blockholders voting no, while a 
negative recommendation from Glass Lewis resulted in 17.6% and 13.7% respectively. Id. at 
979-80. 
 1004. See id. 
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Larcker et al. find that the recommendations of proxy advisors are more 
likely to shift votes at firms with more passive investors.1005 This result 
reflects a free-rider problem among passive investors, who are happy to 
defer to the recommendations of a proxy advisor.1006 An ISS “against” 
recommendation that results from multiple parts of the compensation plan 
being of high concern leads to more shareholders voting against the plan 
then when only a single part created high concern.1007 This result suggests 
that some shareholders pay attention to the rational for the negative 
recommendation and do not blindly follow the proxy advisor.1008  
11. ISS Effect on Board Behavior 
Of the firms that received a negative ISS recommendation, 55% claimed 
to change their compensation the following year in response to the say-on-
pay vote.1009 The claim occurred in 72% of firms that received 30-35% 
dissent from shareholders, compared to 32% in firms that received 25-30% 
dissent from shareholders.1010 These results suggest that firms will change 
their compensation policy in response to an ISS recommendation and 
shareholder votes.1011 However, Ertimur et al. find no market reaction to 
these changes.1012 Ertimur et al. interpret their results as showing that proxy 
advisors process significant amounts of information for institutional 
investors but fall short of identifying or promoting best practices in 
compensation proposals.1013 
12. Effect of Additional Disclosures on Say-on-Pay Vote 
Mukhopadhyay and Shivakumar use the say-on-pay vote to understand 
how disclosures affect shareholder voting.1014 A higher number of 
                                                                                                                 
 1005. See Larcker et al., supra note 994, at 184. They define passive investors as firms 
that are “quasi indexers” and “transient institutions.” See id. at 183. An interaction term of 
ISS “against” and percentage of passive investors, as well as Glass Lewis “against” and 
percentage passive, is statistically significant at the 1% level. Id. at 184, 185 tbl.2. 
 1006. Id. at 201-02.  
 1007. See Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 980-81. 
 1008. See id. at 981. 
 1009. Id. at 984. Dodd-Frank requires firms to disclose how they reacted to the previous 
say-on-pay vote. See id. 
 1010. Id. at 986. 
 1011. Id. 
 1012. See id. at 987.  
 1013. See id. 
 1014. See Tathagat Mukhopadhyay & Lakshmanan Shivakumr, Do Compensation 
Disclosures Matter for SoP Voting? 1 (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2718438. To examine the disclosures, the authors compute a score 
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performance-related disclosures decreases the likelihood of getting less than 
70% support on a say-on-pay vote.1015 A firm in the top decile of 
disclosures has about a 5% chance of missing the 70% threshold, compared 
to a 6.1% chance for a firm in the bottom decile.1016 Thus, while not 
determinative of the vote, the increased disclosure has a significant impact 
relative to not disclosing.1017 Additionally, firms become more forthcoming 
in their disclosures after receiving a low level of support for the say-on-pay 
vote.1018 The low support prompts management to do more to justify its 
compensation.1019 These increased disclosures also decrease the likelihood 
of receiving a low level of support on the next say-on-pay vote.1020  
Finally, the authors look at whether the introduction of the say-on-pay 
voting requirement changed firms’ behavior.1021 As expected, firms that 
award their CEOs higher compensation also provide more disclosure, 
presumably in order to justify the higher compensation.1022 This 
relationship, however, is significantly stronger in the post-say-on-pay 
period.1023 This result suggests that boards view disclosure as a useful tool 
to gain approval of the say-on-pay vote.1024 Additionally, the result shows 
that managers are responsive to investors’ demands for compensation-
related disclosures.1025 
                                                                                                                 
of textual disclosures of managerial performance. See id. at 2. Their sample includes 7973 
say-on-pay votes that occurred between January 2011 and September 2014. See id. at 25.  
 1015. See id. at 27, 55 tbl.4 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). The authors 
focus on the 70% support level because receiving less support begins to affect firm behavior 
and makes it more likely that ISS will issue a negative recommendation on subsequent say-
on-pay votes. Id. at 20. The authors find similar results when they use a continuous variable 
of the resulting disapproval of the say-on-pay vote. Id. at 28. 
 1016. Id. 
 1017. See id. 
 1018. Id. at 30, 60 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). 
 1019. See id. at 31.  
 1020. See id. at 32, 62 tbl.7 (demonstrating significance at the 10% level). However, the 
variable loses its significance when a control variable for ISS recommendation is added to 
the regression. See id. at 32. This result may be because an ISS recommendation already 
reflects the increases in textual disclosure. See id. at 32-33.  
 1021. Id. at 33. The authors look specifically at how the relationship between peer-
adjusted executive pay and textual disclosures of performance changes around the 
introduction of mandatory say-on-pay voting. See id. The authors use peer-adjusted 
executive pay as a proxy for shareholder demand for compensation-related disclosure. See 
id.  
 1022. See id. at 35, 63 tbl.8 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 1023. Id. at 35.  
 1024. Id.  
 1025. Id. at 35-36. 
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13. Frequency of Say-on-Pay Vote 
The say-on-pay provisions also created a vote on how often shareholders 
would vote on say on pay, with the ability to chose between every one, two, 
or three years, known as “say when on pay.”1026 The say-when-on-pay vote 
created a unique situation where proxy advisors consistently recommended 
choosing every year, but managers’ recommendations varied between one 
and three years.1027  
Ferri and Oesch find that a management recommendation for the 
triennial option significantly increased shareholder votes for that result.1028 
Their results suggest that a management recommendation increased 
shareholder support for the triennial option by 26%.1029 Using four proxies 
of management credibility, they find that shareholders give less support to 
the triennial option in firms where management recommended the triennial 
option but had less credibility.1030 In almost all cases, the board adopts the 
frequency voted highest by shareholders.1031 In 2012, firms were requested 
to disclose if and how they took into account the 2011 say-on-pay vote.1032  
Significantly, of those companies that received negative ISS 
recommendations on the say-on-pay vote, companies that adopted an 
annual say-on-pay vote were significantly more likely to change their 
compensation practices in 2012 because of the 2011 say-on-pay vote, 
compared to the companies that adopted the triennial vote.1033 This result 
                                                                                                                 
 1026. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. 
§78n-1(a)(3)(B) (2012); Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on Investors: 
Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay, at 3-4 (Columbia Bus. 
Sch. Research Paper No. 13-17, Oct. 25, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238999. 
 1027. Ferri & Oesch, supra note 1026, at 3. Management recommended an annual vote in 
61.6% of cases. Id. On average, 75.5% of shareholders supported the annual option, 
compared to 1.7% for biennial and 21.3% for triennial. Id. at 8. The annual option received 
the most support in 90.8% of votes. Id. 
 1028. See id. at 11, 39 tbl.1 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). 
 1029. See id. at 11. Including the management recommendation increased R2 from 35.2% 
to 74.4%, suggesting that the management recommendation had significant explanatory 
power. See id. 
 1030. See id. at 17-18, 43 tbl.3. In firms where management recommended the triennial 
option, high votes against say on pay, high votes withheld from directors, average high votes 
against management proposals, and management forecast error all predicted less support for 
the triennial option, significant at the 5% level. Id. 
 1031. See id. at 19 (only twelve companies adopt a different frequency than recommended 
by shareholders). 
 1032. See id. 
 1033. Id. at 20 (demonstrating significant differences at the 1% level). For the companies 
with annual votes and negative ISS recommendations, 67.5% made changes to their 
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suggests that a less frequent say-on-pay vote makes management less 
responsive to shareholders’ concerns on compensation.1034 
14. Summary 
Although the changing regulatory landscape for compensation proposals 
makes direct comparisons difficult, some lessons can be drawn from the 
evidence. The use of compensation proposals is clearly associated with 
stronger company performance.1035 When they have a choice, managers are 
more likely to submit their compensation to shareholder approval when the 
company is doing well, but shareholders appear largely unconcerned with 
the company’s performance when it comes to determining 
compensation.1036 Thus, managers at less successful firms should be willing 
to submit their compensation to shareholder approval without fear of 
retribution. Also, submitting a proposal to a shareholder vote is associated 
with better company performance in the future, but this may only be 
because better performing firms submit compensation to shareholder 
approval.1037  
The primary factor affecting shareholder support appears to be the level 
of dilution created by the plan.1038 The 2003 reforms appear to result in 
higher quality compensation plans but appear to not affect mutual fund 
voting behavior.1039 The new say-on-pay rules appear to give proxy 
advisors a more important role in executive compensation and appear to 
prompt many companies to reform their compensation practices.1040 
V. Conclusions 
A tremendous amount of empirical work has been done to document the 
different aspects of shareholder voting in proxy contests for corporate 
control, uncontested director elections, and management proposals. Proxy 
contests for corporate control, or even the threat of such a proxy contest, act 
as a productive corporate governance mechanism by providing several 
benefits, including facilitating a change in management, reducing 
                                                                                                                 
compensation plans in response to the 2011 vote, while only 14.3% of companies with 
triennial votes and negative ISS recommendation made such changes. Id. 
 1034. Id. at 23. 
 1035. See supra Section IV.E.2. 
 1036. See supra notes 902-905 and accompanying text. 
 1037. See supra Section IV.E.2. 
 1038. See supra Section IV.E.3. 
 1039. See supra Section IV.E.8. 
 1040. See supra Sections IV.E.12-13. 
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unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the payout of dividends. The stock 
market’s reaction to their announcement appears to price the benefits of the 
contest before it begins. Dissident shareholders take significant stakes in the 
targeted company and target underperforming companies in need of better 
management.  
However, some evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of proxy 
contests and newly elected dissidents to help poorly performing 
corporations. The stock gains, apparently associated with proxy contests, 
may actually occur because of the market’s revised perspective on the 
likelihood of a corporate takeover. Dissident victories are associated with 
poor future stock returns and weak subsequent operating performance.  
Hedge fund activism has been understudied with little academic research 
examining the differences between proxy contests brought by hedge funds 
and those initiated by other activist investors. Hedge funds do, however, 
appear to be the primary proponents of contested proxy solicitations and to 
have brought more short-slate contests than control contests. The most 
pressing area for future research from a policy perspective relates to hedge 
fund activists’ use of short-slate contests.  
Uncontested director elections act less as a direct check on directors’ 
ability to maintain profits and more to ensure directors continue to perform 
their responsibilities. Company performance appears to only slightly affect 
voting results. Directors’ ability to perform their duties, however, has a 
larger effect on their election results. For example, directors receive fewer 
“for” votes when shareholders perceive that they have granted the company 
CEO excess compensation.  
Shareholders distinguish between different directors in their voting. 
Thus, when there is a material weakness in the internal controls of the 
company, shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for 
management directors than they are for directors on the audit committee. 
Similarly, if a director neglects his or her responsibilities and fails to attend 
board meetings, shareholders are more likely to vote against him or her in 
the next election. While some evidence suggests that low support for a 
director will lead to their resignation, directors will often replace the 
company’s management and keep a tight hold on to their own seats. In sum, 
uncontested director elections can be understood as keeping directors 
focused on performing their individual jobs without passing judgment on 
the efficacy of corporate policies. 
Management proposals no longer receive a free pass from shareholders: 
antitakeover charter amendments are suspect, and other proposals are 
scrutinized by ISS and its institutional investor clients. Institutional 
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investors with large stock ownership can effectively overcome collective 
action problems if they are organized to block value-decreasing 
antitakeover amendments. 
For mergers and acquisitions, shareholder voting will not block all bad 
acquisitions, although increasingly shareholders’ voting behavior focuses 
on maximizing company value. Shareholder votes track the stock market’s 
assessment of the acquisition and how it will impact the company’s 
performance. However, a binding shareholder vote loses its bite when 
management can structure the transaction to avoid the requirement. 
Furthermore, institutional cross-ownership in the target company and the 
acquiring firm may lead to shareholder approval of an otherwise bad 
acquisition. 
Auditor ratification votes almost universally show high shareholder 
support with small variations reflecting the auditor’s ability to maintain its 
independence and perform its work. Shareholders’ votes reflect their 
understanding of the potential conflicts of interest posed for audit firms if 
they are receiving non-audit fees for performing other work (such as tax 
advisory services) and have a long-standing relationship with the firm. 
Shareholder ratification of the outside auditor is also associated with an 
audit committee with greater financial expertise, lower abnormal current 
accruals, and a lower chance of having a restatement. 
For management compensation proposals, the dramatic changes in 
government regulations makes direct comparisons difficult. Shareholders 
appear largely unconcerned with the company’s performance when it 
comes to determining compensation. The primary factor affecting 
shareholder support appears to be the level of dilution created by the plan. 
The new say-on-pay rules appear to have given proxy advisors a more 
important role in executive compensation and appear to have prompted 
many companies to reform their compensation practices. They have also led 
to greater shareholder management dialogue when management’s proposals 
receive lower levels of shareholder support.  
As evidenced by these conclusions, the power of the proxy contest can 
have dramatic impacts on corporate governance. This tremendous amount 
of empirical work offers terrific insight into the effects of proxy contests for 
corporate control, uncontested director elections, and management 
proposals. 
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